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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Arthur’s Pass township, located close to the Main Divide of the central Southern Alps, is 
highly exposed to natural hazards and has been affected by hazard events since it was 
founded in 1906. The village is a small alpine township, with a permanent resident 
population of approximately 54. Its location within the Arthur’s Pass National Park and on 
the main road between the east and west coasts of the South Island makes it popular with 
tourists, trampers, climbers and skiers, which can expand the local population to up to 500 
people. Its position on the Bealey River floodplain within a highly dynamic tectonic and 
geomorphic environment makes it vulnerable to earthquakes, landslides, rockfalls, debris 
flows, heavy rain and snow, river flooding and riverbed erosion.  
 
Previous investigations on natural hazards in the area are limited to the Otira Gorge and 
State Highway 73, with little focus on hazards affecting the village area. Natural hazard 
events are persistent and frequent in the Arthur’s Pass region and the village is susceptible 
to being isolated from external resources during and after a disaster, making it necessary 
for the village to be self-sufficient during a large-scale disaster.  
 
The hazards were identified and analysed using aerial photographs and satellite images, 
historical data, supported by in-field reconnaissance at various times of the year to record 
seasonal changes. Hazard mapping used the same methods to illustrate the spatial and 
volumetric hazard changes over a range of time scales; >2% annual probability of 
occurrence (0-50 years recurrence interval), 2%-0.2% annual probability of occurrence 
(50-500 years recurrence interval) and <0.2% annual probability of occurrence (500+ years 
recurrence interval). The hazard maps show that that most hazards are not restricted to a 
specific temporal or spatial scale, and that they are often interdependent.  
 
It is difficult to determine the precise effects that climate change and global warming will 
have on natural hazards, but they are expected to increase the unpredictability of hazard 
events and alter weather patterns significantly in the long-term.  
 
A visitor questionnaire undertaken in the village indicated that many visitors do not regard 
the hazards as severe enough to represent a legitimate threat; hence the public perceptions 
of natural hazards are affecting the vulnerability of the village. Additionally, many people 
do not feel confident that they would know what to do if a disaster did occur in the village. 
This level of awareness can be improved by providing more information to visitors and 
displaying details on emergency procedures.  
 
The village does not currently have an emergency plan that specifies particular 
preparedness and response procedures; it relies heavily on a plan adapted from Mt. 
Cook/Aoraki village. Current emergency management in the village could be improved by 
the production of an emergency plan specifically for the region, the use of education 
schemes and information sessions, and the installation of warning signs.  
 
The provision of this detailed hazard investigation and hazard maps is intended to assist 
emergency managers to identify, prioritise, mitigate the hazards to reduce the vulnerability 
of the village to natural hazards in the short- and long-terms. 
 
 
 
 iv
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
 
Many people have contributed both personally and professionally to this research whom I 
would like to thank.  
 
At the University of Canterbury, I would like to thank my supervisor Tim Davies for 
always providing an insightful perspective, for never being too harsh in his criticism and 
for reassuring me when I was inevitably panicking too much. Also, thank you to Jarg 
Pettinga, John Southward and Pat Roberts in the department for their miscellaneous help. I 
received partial funding for this project from the Mason Trust which was of great 
assistance and very much appreciated, so thank you for that.  
 
I have had assistance from a number of people and organisations over the last two years. I 
would like to thank the following people for supplying information, data, photos, advice 
and/or anecdotes, without which my research would not have been possible: 
- Dawn Davison and Helen Grant at Environment Canterbury. 
- Elaine Fouhy at NIWA. 
- Mauri and Eileen McSaveney at GNS Science.  
- Dion Douglas and Wilson Brown at the Selwyn District Council. 
- Wayne Costello and Vicky Heslop at the Department of Conservation Visitor 
Centre in Arthur’s Pass.  
- Alan Causer and Mr Beaven of the Arthur’s Pass Association. 
 
Special thanks must go to the crew (Bob, Jan and Nic in particular) at Arthur’s Pass 
Mountain House Backpackers for being so welcoming and making my stays in Arthur’s 
Pass so enjoyable and comfortable. 
 
On a personal note, thanks must go to my friends, in particular Anita, for always being 
willing to meet for a coffee and discuss the apprehension one feels when writing a thesis. 
To my dear friend Sheree, for always being so supportive and making sure I looked after 
myself, especially while Olly was away, and for taking my mind off my thesis when I 
really needed it. Thanks also to Monique, Mel, Chops and my other friends for keeping me 
sane during my uni days.  
 
To my late grandmother, Jean Dundas, for her contribution to my postgraduate education.  
 
To Olly, for providing a welcome distraction when it was needed, for going away just long 
enough for me to get some work done, for your offers of proofreading and/or colouring-in 
and for putting up with the moody, grumpy, stressed-out version of me, especially during 
those last few months. You can have your social life back now.  
 
And lastly to my parents and Shannon, for your support (albeit long-distance). Most 
importantly I have to thank Ma and Pa for their unwavering support, not only financial, but 
in every other way possible. I hope you know how much I appreciate the help you have 
given me over the last 25 years, and I hope I haven’t made you bankrupt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
TITLE PAGE                 i 
FRONTISPIECE                 ii 
ABSTRACT                 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS               iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS               v 
LIST OF FIGURES               xii 
LIST OF TABLES                      xv 
 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT ....................................................................................... 1 
1.2 AIM AND LIMIT OF SCOPE.................................................................................. 2 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE............................................................................................. 2 
1.5 TERMINOLOGY - RISK, HAZARD AND VULNERABILITY ........................... 5 
 
CHAPTER 2 – THE ARTHUR'S PASS STUDY AREA 
 
2.1 LOCATION AND STATISTICS ............................................................................. 7 
2.2 HISTORICAL REVIEW ........................................................................................ 10 
2.3 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ATTRIBUTES ...................................... 11 
2.3.1 Geology ........................................................................................................... 11 
2.3.1.1 Lithology ..................................................................................................... 11 
2.3.1.2 Structural Features....................................................................................... 13 
2.3.2 Geomorphology............................................................................................... 14 
2.3.3 Climate ............................................................................................................ 15 
2.3.3.1 Temperatures ............................................................................................... 15 
2.3.3.2 Rainfall ........................................................................................................ 17 
2.3.3.3 Snowfall....................................................................................................... 18 
2.3.4 Vegetation........................................................................................................ 19 
2.4  CURRENT AND FUTURE TOWN DEVELOPMENTS ...................................... 20 
2.5 PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THEORY ............................................................ 21 
2.5.1 Seismic Hazards .............................................................................................. 21 
2.5.2 Mass movement hazards.................................................................................. 23 
 vi
2.5.3 Meteorological hazards ................................................................................... 24 
2.5.4 Flooding hazards, erosion and sedimentation.................................................. 26 
2.6 RESEARCH PRACTICE METHODS ................................................................... 27 
 
CHAPTER 3 – SEISMIC HAZARDS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 28 
3.2 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES............................................................................. 28 
3.3 SEISMICITY AT ARTHUR’S PASS .................................................................... 29 
3.4 FAULTS IN THE ARTHUR’S PASS REGION.................................................... 35 
3.4.1 Regional faults................................................................................................. 35 
3.4.1.1 The Alpine Fault.......................................................................................... 35 
3.4.1.2 The Marlborough Fault System................................................................... 37 
3.4.1.3 Other regional faults .................................................................................... 37 
3.4.2 Local earthquake sources................................................................................. 38 
3.5 HISTORICAL EARTHQUAKES .......................................................................... 39 
3.5.1 The September 1, 1888 Amuri (North Canterbury) earthquake (M 7.0-7.3) .. 41 
3.5.2 The March 9, 1929 Arthur’s Pass earthquake (M 7.1) .................................... 41 
3.5.3 The June 17, 1929 Murchison (Buller) earthquake (M 7.8)............................ 43 
3.5.4 The June 26, 1946 Lake Coleridge earthquake (M 6.2) .................................. 43 
3.5.5 The June 18, 1994 Arthur’s Pass (Avoca River) earthquake (M 6.7) ............. 43 
3.5.6 The May 29, 1995 Arthur’s Pass earthquake (M 6.0) ..................................... 45 
3.5.7 The November 24, 1995 Cass earthquake (M 6.3).......................................... 46 
3.6 SEISMIC HAZARD EVALUATION .................................................................... 46 
3.6.1 Classification of hazards.................................................................................. 47 
3.6.1.1 Primary Hazards .......................................................................................... 49 
3.6.1.2 Transient Hazards ........................................................................................ 49 
3.6.1.3 Secondary hazards ....................................................................................... 50 
3.7 REGIONAL AND LOCAL SEISMIC HAZARD IMPLICATIONS..................... 51 
3.8 EARTHQUAKE MITIGATION METHODS ........................................................ 53 
3.9 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 54 
 
CHAPTER 4 – METEOROLOGICAL HAZARDS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 56 
4.2 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES............................................................................. 56 
4.3 THE CLIMATE OF THE SOUTHERN ALPS AND CANTERBURY ................ 57 
 vii
4.4 STRONG WINDS................................................................................................... 58 
4.4.1 Wind hazards specific to Arthur’s Pass........................................................... 58 
4.4.2 Other wind phenomena.................................................................................... 59 
4.5 THUNDERSTORMS.............................................................................................. 60 
4.5.1 Heavy rainfall .................................................................................................. 60 
4.5.1.1 Previous cases of rain-triggered damage in Arthur’s Pass National Park. .. 61 
4.5.1.2 Hazards associated with heavy rain at Arthur’s Pass .................................. 62 
4.5.2  Hailstorms.................................................................................................... 63 
4.5.2.1 Hail at Arthur’s Pass.................................................................................... 64 
4.5.3  Lightning hazards ............................................................................................ 64 
4.6 FIRE ........................................................................................................................ 65 
4.7 SNOW-RELATED HAZARDS.............................................................................. 66 
4.7.1 Heavy snowfall at Arthur’s Pass ..................................................................... 66 
4.7.2 Snow Avalanches ............................................................................................ 67 
4.7.2.1 Conditions for avalanche occurrence .......................................................... 68 
4.7.2.2 Avalanche zones and the risk to Arthur’s Pass village and surrounds ........ 69 
4.7.3  Black ice and frost ........................................................................................... 71 
4.8 CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL WARMING ............................................. 72 
4.8.1 Global climate change ..................................................................................... 72 
4.8.2 New Zealand climate change projections........................................................ 74 
4.8.3 Canterbury and Arthur’s Pass projections ....................................................... 75 
4.9 TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF METEOROLOGICAL HAZARDS..... 75 
4.10 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 78 
 
CHAPTER 5 – MASS MOVEMENT HAZARDS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 80 
5.2 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES............................................................................. 80 
5.3 CONTROLS ON SLOPE MORPHOLOGY .......................................................... 81 
5.3.1 Mass movement terrains and triggers.............................................................. 84 
5.3.1.1 Atmospherically-driven mass movements................................................... 84 
5.3.1.2 Seismogenic mass movements .................................................................... 85 
5.3.1.3 Other mass movement triggers .................................................................... 86 
5.3.2  Preconditions and causative factors of mass movement hazards .................... 86 
5.4 SLIDES ................................................................................................................... 87 
5.4.1 Landslides and rock avalanches ...................................................................... 88 
 viii
5.4.1.1 Evolution of landslides and rock avalanches............................................... 88 
5.4.1.2 Landslide dams............................................................................................ 90 
5.4.2 Minor slips....................................................................................................... 92 
5.4.3 Subsidence....................................................................................................... 93 
5.5 ROCKFALLS ......................................................................................................... 95 
5.6 DEBRIS FLOWS .................................................................................................... 97 
5.6.1 Debris flow deposits at Arthur’s Pass ............................................................. 98 
5.6.2 Debris flow identification at Arthur’s Pass using the Melton Ratio ............... 99 
5.7 SOIL CREEP ........................................................................................................ 101 
5.8 IDENTIFIABLE MASS MOVEMENT ACTIVITY AT ARTHUR’S PASS...... 101 
5.8.1 McGrath Stream catchment ........................................................................... 101 
5.8.2 Punchbowl Creek catchment ......................................................................... 102 
5.8.3 Wardens Creek catchment ............................................................................. 103 
5.8.4 Avalanche Creek catchment .......................................................................... 103 
5.8.5 Rough Creek catchment ................................................................................ 103 
5.8.6 Graham Stream catchment ............................................................................ 105 
5.8.7 Other mass movements zones........................................................................ 107 
5.9 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MASS MOVEMENTS AND OTHER NATURAL 
HAZARDS AT ARTHUR’S PASS ...................................................................... 108 
5.10 PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR MASS MOVEMENTS .............................. 109 
5.11  MASS MOVEMENT MITIGATION................................................................... 109 
5.11.1 Methods of slope stabilisation ....................................................................... 109 
5.11.2 Current treatment methods ............................................................................ 110 
5.12 SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 111 
 
CHAPTER 6 – FLUVIAL RELATED HAZARDS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 113 
6.2 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES........................................................................... 113 
6.3 THE ARTHUR’S PASS DRAINAGE NETWORK............................................. 114 
6.4 HAZARDS LINKED WITH THE FLUVIAL SYSTEM AT ARTHUR’S PASS118 
6.4.1 Fluvial flooding ............................................................................................. 118 
6.4.1.1 Flash floods ............................................................................................... 119 
6.4.2 Channel incision and surface erosion ............................................................ 119 
6.4.3 Fluvial aggradation........................................................................................ 120 
6.4.4 Channel avulsion ........................................................................................... 121 
 ix
6.5 GEOMORPHIC CHANGES TO THE DRAINAGE NETWORK SINCE 1938. 123 
6.5.1 The Bealey River ........................................................................................... 123 
6.5.2 Tributaries in the Bealey Valley.................................................................... 125 
6.6 PAST OCCURRENCES OF FLOOD-RELATED DAMAGE ............................ 127 
6.7  OPPORTUNITIES FOR FLOODING, EROSION AND AGGRADATION TO 
THE RIVERBED IN THE FUTURE.................................................................... 130 
6.8 PREVENTATIVE TREATMENT METHODS FOR RIVER-HAZARDS ......... 132 
6.9 CURRENT METHODS OF RIVER CONTROL AT ARTHUR’S PASS........... 134 
6.10 SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 138 
 
CHAPTER 7 – HAZARD ANALYSIS AND MAPPING 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 140 
7.2 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS ............................................................................... 140 
7.3 VULNERABILITY............................................................................................... 141 
7.3.1 Aspects of vulnerability................................................................................. 141 
7.3.1.1 Social vulnerability.................................................................................... 142 
7.3.1.2 Property vulnerability ................................................................................ 142 
7.3.1.3 Infrastructural vulnerability....................................................................... 143 
7.4 HAZARD ZONATION ........................................................................................ 144 
7.4.1 The multi-hazard concept .............................................................................. 144 
7.4.2 Hazard maps .................................................................................................. 146 
7.4.3 Methodology.................................................................................................. 147 
7.4.3.1 Mapping seismic hazards .......................................................................... 148 
7.4.3.2 Mapping meteorological hazards............................................................... 149 
7.4.3.3 Mapping mass movement hazards............................................................. 149 
7.4.3.4 Mapping fluvial-related hazards................................................................ 150 
7.5 ESTIMATED LIKELIHOOD OF HAZARD OCCURRENCE........................... 151 
7.6 SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 152 
 
CHAPTER 8 – THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND PREPAREDNESS 
ASPECTS OF NATURAL HAZARDS AT ARTHUR'S PASS 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 153 
8.2 PRINCIPLES OF RISK REDUCTION AND THE INTEGRATION OF HAZARD 
MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES........................................................................ 153 
8.2.1 Reduction....................................................................................................... 154 
 x
8.2.2 Readiness ....................................................................................................... 156 
8.2.3 Response........................................................................................................ 156 
8.2.4 Recovery........................................................................................................ 157 
8.3 COMMON ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH HAZARD MANAGEMENT AND 
RISK REDUCTION METHODS ......................................................................... 158 
8.4 UNDERSTANDING RISK PERCEPTION FOR HAZARD MANAGEMENT. 158 
8.4.1  Measuring public perception ......................................................................... 159 
8.4.2 Survey limitations.......................................................................................... 159 
8.4.3 Survey results ................................................................................................ 160 
8.5 CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND REDUCING VULNERABILITY AT 
ARTHUR’S PASS ................................................................................................ 161 
8.6 THE CURRENT AND FUTURE ARTHUR’S PASS EMERGENCY PLANS .. 163 
8.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REVISED ARTHUR’S PASS EMERGENCY 
PLAN .................................................................................................................... 164 
8.8  SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 166 
 
CHAPTER 9 – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS ................................................... 168 
9.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS............................................... 169 
9.2.1 Seismic hazards ............................................................................................. 169 
9.2.2 Meteorological hazards ................................................................................. 170 
9.2.3 Mass movement hazards................................................................................ 170 
9.2.4 Fluvial-related hazards .................................................................................. 171 
9.3  HAZARD MAPPING AS AN AID TO RISK REDUCTION.............................. 172 
9.4 PUBLIC RISK PERCEPTIONS AT ARTHUR’S PASS ..................................... 172 
9.5 EMERGENCY PLANNING AT ARTHUR’S PASS........................................... 173 
9.6  VULNERABILITIES AT ARTHUR’S PASS...................................................... 174 
9.7 CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................... 175 
9.8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK................................................ 176 
 
REFERENCES                          177 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A Arthur’s Pass Climate Data             189 
Appendix B Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale            202 
 xi
Appendix C Probabilistic Seismic Estimates of Ground Shaking Intensity at Arthur’s 
Pass                204     
Appendix D Assessing Public Perceptions at Arthur’s Pass - Visitor          
Questionnaire               207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
CHAPTER 1  
 
Figure 1. 1.  The organisational structure of this study                3 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Figure 2. 1.  The location of Arthur’s Pass village within the Southern Alps of New 
Zealand, along State Highway 73. ................................................................. 8 
Figure 2. 2.  Arthur’s Pass village, along State Highway 73 through the Southern Alps .. 9 
Figure 2. 3A and B. Climate patterns for New Zealand and the Arthur’s Pass              
region ........................................................................................................... 16 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Figure 3. 1.  New Zealand’s active onshore faults ........................................................... 30 
Figure 3. 2.  Distributions of shallow and deep earthquakes ........................................... 31 
Figure 3. 3. Spatial distribution of shallow earthquakes. ................................................ 32 
Figure 3. 4. Faults in the Arthur’s Pass region that contribute to the overall seismic    
risk ............................................................................................................... 34 
Figure 3. 5.  Computer-modelled isoseismal maps of past Alpine Fault earthquakes ..... 36 
Figure 3. 6. The locations of seven major earthquakes to have affected Arthur’s Pass in 
recorded history ........................................................................................... 40 
Figure 3. 7.  Isoseismal maps of historical earthquakes affecting Arthur’s Pass............. 44 
Figure 3. 8.  The classification of earthquake hazards ..................................................... 47 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Figure 4. 1.  An exaggerated account of the movement of prevailing north-westerly 
winds over the Southern Alps...................................................................... 58 
Figure 4. 2.  A mean sea level atmospheric pressure analysis showing typical South 
Island thunderstorm conditions.................................................................... 60 
Figure 4. 3.  Snow levels at Temple Basin Ski Field for the past six winters.................. 67 
Figure 4. 4.  Avalanche fatalities in New Zealand during 1860 to 1999 ......................... 68 
Figure 4. 5.  New Zealand average annual surface temperature trends for the period 1865 
to 1997 ......................................................................................................... 73 
 
 xiii
CHAPTER 5 
 
Figure 5. 1.  Varnes’ (1978) classification system........................................................... 82 
Figure 5. 2.  The Poerua Valley landslide dam that formed in 1999 ............................... 91 
Figure 5. 3.  Small-scale slope failures corresponding to man made road cuts along State 
Highway 73.................................................................................................. 94 
Figure 5. 4.  Small-scale slope failures also corresponding to man made road cuts along 
State Highway 73......................................................................................... 94 
Figure 5. 5.  A Department of Conservation rockfall warning sign located in front of a 
medium-sized rockfall deposit..................................................................... 96 
Figure 5. 6.  A medium-sized rockfall deposit forming a debris fan behind the Devils 
Punchbowl Falls lookout ............................................................................. 96 
Figure 5. 7.  Unstable slopes and cliff faces in the lower Rough Creek catchment....... 104 
Figure 5. 8.  A path of damaged and flattened vegetation showing the movement of a 
dislodged boulder down the slope into the Rough Creek tributary. .......... 104 
Figure 5. 9.  Very large boulders in the Rough Creek tributary that have been dislodged 
from adjacent slopes and traversed through alpine vegetation to reach the 
creek........................................................................................................... 106 
Figure 5. 10.  A partially revegetated debris fan in the lower Rough Creek catchment .. 106 
Figure 5. 11. Mass movement scars in the Graham Stream catchment and on the slope 
opposite Halpin Creek ............................................................................... 108 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
Figure 6. 1.  The major catchments in the Bealey River contributing to fluvial-related 
hazards at Arthur’s Pass............................................................................. 115 
Figure 6. 2.  Erosion and downcutting of the thick Punchbowl Creek alluvial fan at its 
confluence with the Bealey River.............................................................. 122 
Figure 6. 3.  The extent of the Punchbowl Creek alluvial fan showing an example of one 
of the largest aggradational deposits in the Bealey Valley........................ 122 
Figure 6. 4.  Aerial photographs and satellite images showing the gradual geomorphic 
changes to the river system........................................................................ 124 
Figure 6. 5.  A double line of ‘rip-rap’ stopbanks formed from natural riverbed gravel 
along the Bealey River in front of Crusher Loop. ..................................... 135 
Figure 6. 6.  Partially buried gabion stopbanks on the Bealey River bank opposite the 
Otira Tunnel entrance. ............................................................................... 135 
 xiv
Figure 6. 7.  Concrete retaining structures near the Avalanche Creek and Bealey River 
confluence protecting the railway embankment ........................................ 137 
Figure 6. 8.  A ‘rip rap’ stopbank along the lower south bank of Rough Creek protecting 
the police station and several houses on Sunshine Terrace ....................... 137 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
Figure 7. 1.  The interrelationships between the identified hazards at Arthur’s Pass 
between “driving” forces and “response” forces ....................................... 144 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
Figure 8. 1.  The involvement of various organisations in hazard mitigation         
planning ..................................................................................................... 155 
 
ATTACHED MAPS (in pocket) 
 
MAP 1 Regional and Local Natural Hazard Locations at Arthur’s Pass  
>2% annual exceedence probability (0-50 year return period) 
 
MAP 2 Regional and Local Natural Hazard Locations at Arthur’s Pass  
0.2-2% annual exceedence probability (50-500 year return period) 
 
MAP 3 Regional and Local Natural Hazard Locations at Arthur’s Pass  
<0.2% annual exceedence probability (500+ year return period) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xv
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Table 2. 1.  The average monthly temperatures at Arthur’s Pass village for the period 
1978 to 2006 ................................................................................................ 15 
Table 2. 2.  The wettest months of the year and their corresponding rainfall averages at 
Arthur’s Pass village for the period 1955 to 2006 ....................................... 17 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Table 3. 1.  The mean return periods at various locations for selected ground shaking 
intensities ..................................................................................................... 33 
Table 3. 2.  Projected shaking intensities (Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale) and 
corresponding return intervals for Arthur’s Pass......................................... 33 
Table 3. 3.  The recognised local faults at Arthur’s Pass................................................ 38 
Table 3. 4.  The hierarchy of hazards at Arthur’s Pass, including their associated effects 
and time frames for their occurrence and repair .......................................... 48 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Table 4. 1.  Significant avalanche zones in the Arthur’s Pass vicinity........................... 70 
Table 4. 2.  Projected climate change trends and their effect on atmospheric, 
environmental, infrastructural and social conditions at Arthur’s Pass ........ 76 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Table 5. 1.  The mass movement classification scheme with expected magnitude and 
frequency in the Arthur’s Pass area ............................................................. 83 
Table 5. 2.  External mechanisms for mass movement occurrence ................................ 86 
Table 5. 3.  Internal mechanisms for mass movement occurrence ................................. 87 
Table 5. 4.  Characteristics of each major tributary within the Bealey Valley ............. 100 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
Table 6. 1.  The location and characteristics of all major tributaries within the Bealey 
Valley......................................................................................................... 116 
 xvi
Table 6. 2.  Perceptible geomorphic changes along the major tributaries within the 
Bealey Valley during specific time periods............................................... 127 
Table 6. 3.  Major fluvial-related events in recorded history that have caused damage to 
the Arthur’s Pass village ............................................................................ 128 
 
 1
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Arthur’s Pass is a small alpine community in the central Southern Alps of New Zealand, 
positioned along the bottom of the Bealey Valley, 5km south of the Main Divide.  
 
Natural hazards in Arthur’s Pass have the potential to cause extensive damage and 
disruptions to the local township. The hazards include, but are not limited to, earthquakes, 
flooding and debris flows, landslides, river processes and avalanches. These natural 
hazards increase the vulnerability of the town as a major tourist centre throughout the year 
and as the major transport route between the east and west coasts.  
 
To date, very little investigation has been done to quantify the risks, ascertain exactly 
where the hazards exist and their probability of occurrence. There is currently only 
minimal monitoring of the known hazards in the area and work is needed to focus on the 
identification, examination and categorisation of the natural threats that could impact on 
the Arthur’s Pass township. Additionally, the community awareness and perception of the 
hazard risk is yet to be determined, and this is an aspect that could have major 
consequences on response times and community recovery in the event of a major disaster.  
 
Since the establishment of the town in 1906, only a limited amount of research has been 
carried out that applies directly to the Arthur’s Pass village. Much of the information that 
does exist relates to the threat to State Highway 73 or examination of the predominant 
geological features in the Arthur’s Pass National Park, such as active fault lines and glacial 
moraines. Investigations carried out in the park typically focus on the Otira Gorge section 
of highway several kilometres north of the township and neglect the natural hazards as a 
legitimate threat to Arthur’s Pass village. Therefore a thorough investigation of these 
hazards and their potential impacts on the Arthur’s Pass community is warranted to assist 
emergency planners in better preparing the village to cope with a natural disaster.  
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1.2 AIM AND LIMIT OF SCOPE 
 
The aim of this research is to provide a detailed vulnerability investigation of the natural 
hazards directly influencing the Arthur’s Pass township and assess the societal perception 
of the risks, in order to enable local organisations and governing bodies to make informed 
decisions about how to mitigate the hazards and better prepare for a disaster. On account of 
this, the research aims to not only provide a scientific approach to hazard identification and 
examination, but it also offers a social perspective of hazard impacts.   
 
The assessment aims to focus on the hazards directly affecting the village area but in many 
cases it is necessary to consider processes taking place over a much greater area, especially 
when hazards are sourced distantly or have widespread consequences. For this reason, an 
assessment of the hazards throughout the Arthur’s Pass National Park, that have the 
potential to impact recreational users of the park outside the village area, have been 
included as part of the analysis.  
 
The study of forthcoming hazard events is greatly constrained by the availability of 
historical and field data, which limits the scope of the investigation. Detailed records of 
previous events rarely exist so the reliability of hazard estimates based on historical data is 
restricted. Hazard occurrences are expected to continue indefinitely, so the research has not 
been limited to hazards taking place over a specific time scale; instead it divides hazard 
zonation and mapping into three main time frames.  
 
Whilst every attempt has been made to accurately portray hazard zones within the Arthur’s 
Pass township area and its surrounds, the research is by no means exhaustive and should 
not be used as a substitute for in depth engineering and geophysical investigations of 
specific sites. The hazard analysis and mapping is expected to be used as a guide to assist 
future emergency planners of the village to make better informed decisions about hazard 
management at Arthur’s Pass.  
 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
To achieve the research aim, hazards have been classified into four main groups for the 
main body of the project, and then discussed collectively in the final chapters (Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1. 2. The organisational structure of this study. 
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Chapter 2 gives an overview of the Arthur’s Pass study area in terms of its location, 
history, and physical and environmental attributes such as geology, climate and local 
vegetation. It reviews existing research on various hazard aspects within the Arthur’s Pass 
National Park and discusses the methods of research used to complete the hazard 
vulnerability assessment.  
 
Chapters 3 to 6 are hazard assessment chapters; each deals with a different hazard type. 
The overall hazard assessment structure has been adapted from a hazard reduction 
methodology set forth by Brabhaharan (1996). Each chapter aims to: 
1. Identify and explain the natural hazard types that exist in the Arthur’s Pass study 
area. 
2. Describe historical hazard events that have occurred in the study area and may have 
the potential to recur.  
3. Carry out site-specific hazard investigations to identify hazard zones.  
4. Consider the risk and impact of the hazard on the community and its infrastructure.  
5. Examine current management methods and consider other mitigation options and 
whether mitigation is justifiable.  
 
Chapter 3 analyses the local and regional seismic hazards affecting Arthur’s Pass, and 
relies heavily on historical earthquake data to indicate what is to be expected in the future. 
Chapter 4 analyses the meteorological hazards to which the Arthur’s Pass National Park is 
exposed, including the effects of seasonal weather patterns and climate change. Chapters 3 
and 4 represent the “driving” hazards; usually the initiating forces of other natural hazard 
types.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses the mass movement hazards throughout the village area and Arthur’s 
Pass National Park; these occur on a variety of spatial, temporal and volumetric scales. 
Chapter 6 analyses the hazards related to the fluvial system in the Bealey Valley, ranging 
from flooding to riverbed erosion and aggradation. Chapters 5 and 6 characterise the 
“response” hazards, which are easily influenced by other processes with hazard zones.  
 
Chapter 7 collates all the hazard information from Chapters 3 to 6 to assess the 
vulnerability of the Arthur’s Pass community and discuss the interrelationships that exist 
between different hazard types. This section culminates in a description of the uses of 
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hazard mapping as an aid to risk reduction and an explanation of the methodology used to 
construct a series of hazard maps for the Arthur’s Pass region.  
 
Chapter 8 researches the social implications of natural hazards to the community using a 
visitor questionnaire to assess public risk perceptions. These results in addition to the 
results from the hazard analysis in Chapters 3 to 6 have been used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the current emergency plan in the village and provide recommendations 
for future revisions to the plan. Chapter 9 follows with a summary of the research 
conclusions explaining the significance of the study results.  
 
1.5 TERMINOLOGY - RISK, HAZARD AND VULNERABILITY 
 
International terminology used to define natural hazards and their processes can be highly 
variable and ambiguous. Because so many hazard types exist in the Arthur’s Pass region, it 
is necessary to define hazard, risk and vulnerability as they apply to the Arthur’s Pass 
setting, because these three components form the most fundamental relationship in hazard 
assessment. Individual hazard definitions are outlined in Chapters 3 to 6. 
 
Risk can be very basically explained as a product of the hazard and vulnerability of a 
region.  
 
 
 
Risk, as it pertains to this hazard assessment, is defined as ‘the chance of something of 
human value being exposed to a natural hazard with negative outcomes’ (Keey, 2000; K. 
Smith, 2004). Furthermore, according to Elms (1998), there are three aspects of risk: 
- the possibility or probability of a hazard event occurring; 
- the consequences of the event should it happen, 
- the context of the hazard. 
 
Vulnerability is a condition determined by social, economic, physical and environmental 
factors that increases the susceptibility of a community to natural hazard processes 
(National Disaster Management Authority, 2006). To better understand the nature of risk 
and vulnerability with respect to natural hazards, Wisner et al (2004) describe the Pressure 
and Release Model; this suggests vulnerability is a result of underlying root causes 
 
Risk   =   Vulnerability  x  Hazard 
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spawned by limited access to power, structures, utilities and resources, often in politically 
and economically unstable territories. Vulnerability is boosted further by the introduction 
of dynamic pressures to the system. Pressures exist in the form of rapid urbanisation and 
population growth, devegetation, isolation and the lack of training, skills and ethical 
standards in threatened communities. When unsafe physical, economic, social and 
institutional conditions are added to the system the outcome is a highly exposed 
community with a very reduced capacity for disaster resilience and recovery (Wisner et al., 
2004).  
 
Hazard is best comprehended as a naturally occurring or human-induced process or event 
that has the ability to generate loss and damage in the future. A natural hazard is the 
causative factor in any natural disaster, and hazards to human life are rated as the highest 
priority ahead of environmental modification and property damage (K. Smith, 2004). 
 
Risk is often used synonymously, albeit incorrectly, with hazard. They differ in that risk 
takes into account the extra implication of the chance of an event actually occurring (K. 
Smith, 2004) and portrays the human response to the hazard in question (Grant, 1998). A 
disaster is the realisation of a hazard and the consequences of a hazard event.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ARTHUR’S PASS STUDY AREA 
 
 
2.1 LOCATION AND STATISTICS 
 
The Arthur’s Pass township lies within the Southern Alps on the South Island of New 
Zealand at an altitude of between approximately 720m and 760m (Figure 2.1). The village 
is confined to a narrow valley on the western bank of the Bealey River between Mt. 
Aicken and Avalanche Peak. State Highway 73, which links the east and west coasts of the 
South Island, forms the main street of the town and provides the only inward and outward 
transport route other than the railway (Figure 2.2). The village has an areal extent of 
0.6km2 (300m by 2000m) and its location on the Bealey River floodplain makes it 
accessible for field work and mapping.  
 
Arthur’s Pass village lies within the Canterbury Region and is locally governed by Selwyn 
District Council. The most recent statistical examination of the Arthur’s Pass village 
yielded a regional population count of 90, and a town population of 54 permanent residents 
(Brown, 2007). The majority of residents are occupied with running tourist services, 
namely accommodation, recreation and dining facilities (Department of Conservation, 
2002).  
 
The Department of Conservation records over 130 000 visitors each year within the Visitor 
Centre, and a road counter measures an annual traffic count of more than 250 000 vehicles 
through the town. Approximately 70-75% of visitors to the Arthur’s Pass National Park 
arrive in private vehicles. The remainder travel either in tour groups on buses or on the 
train that connects Christchurch and Greymouth or through other means such as cycling or 
hitchhiking (Espiner & Simmons, 1998).  
 
The village has its own police station, railway station, general store, chapel and helipad 
(for emergency rescue helicopters) and is the main administration centre for the 
Department of Conservation within the Arthur’s Pass National Park. There are 
approximately 142 “habitable” buildings within the town boundaries, all of which are 
clearly numbered and correspond to details in the emergency response plan. 
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Figure 2. 1. The location of Arthur’s Pass village within the Southern Alps of New Zealand, along State 
Highway 73 (basemaps sourced from (GoogleMaps 2008)). 
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Figure 2. 2. Arthur’s Pass village, along State Highway 73 through the Southern Alps, consisting of 142 ‘habitable’ dwellings and a permanent resident population of 54. 
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The town is currently a major tourist centre because of its proximity to many recreational 
facilities. It is a starting point for the numerous tramping tracks that lie within Arthur’s 
Pass National Park and is a base for people involved in mountaineering, rock-climbing, 
bird-watching, hunting and fishing. The Temple Basin ski field is a major drawcard for 
visitors during the winter months, which keeps the tourist population steady throughout the 
year. The recreational uses of Arthur’s Pass National Park are shifting. Marked changes 
have occurred since the 1980’s, when the recreational uses of the park were quite limited. 
In the last 25 years the types of activity possible in the park have diversified and new 
forms of activity have emerged, particularly for sports training purposes. The most 
common recreational activities undertaken by park visitors are day walks and sightseeing. 
Picnicking, camping and climbing are also popular pursuits in the Arthur’s Pass area 
(Espiner & Simmons, 1998). These statistics may have implications on the nature of 
hazard and emergency management within the village and national park. 
 
2.2 HISTORICAL REVIEW  
 
The formation of the Arthur’s Pass township (originally called Bealey Flat) happened out 
of necessity, rather than as a matter of preference. The pass was originally used by Maori 
traders as a route through the Southern Alps. Many years later, European settlers 
discovered Arthur’s Pass when trying to find an alternative route to the west coast in the 
midst of the gold rush. The route in use today came into existence when a surveyor named 
Arthur Dobson set out in 1864 with the aim of finding a suitable crossing of the Southern 
Alps. After only barely crossing the pass on horseback, he came to the conclusion that the 
conditions for road engineering were nearly impossible (Taylor, 2005). This did not deter 
the Canterbury provincial engineer and it was decided that a road would be constructed 
through the pass to the west coast, and work began in 1865 (Department of Conservation, 
2006). Several decades later in 1907, the Midland Railway was built to link Christchurch 
and Greymouth. The project was completed fairly quickly with the exception of the section 
between Otira and Arthur’s Pass, in which a tunnel was needed through highly weathered 
and metamorphosed rock.  
 
The township itself formed as a settlement in 1906 for labourers working on the Otira 
tunnel (Department of Conservation, 2006). It was relocated to its current location after 
conditions at nearby Klondyke Corner were found to be quite inhospitable. The initial 
buildings were flimsy and often damaged during storms or floods. Gradually the town 
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became more permanent as a rail and coach interchange until the tunnel was completed in 
1923, by which time people had started to visit the area for its beauty and recreational 
potential. Despite the subsequent closure of the horse-drawn coach houses, Arthur’s Pass 
village was further popularised by the formation of the Arthur’s Pass National Park in 
1929, when the town became the base for those interested in outdoor activities. The area 
became known for its tramping, mountaineering, skiing, bird-watching and hunting 
opportunities and attracted many enthusiasts. Since then, the area has continued to be a 
tourist and recreational centre as well as a popular stop on road and rail journeys between 
the east and west coasts.  
 
2.3 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ATTRIBUTES 
 
It is vital to have knowledge of the local physical setting in order to understand why the 
hazards exist where they do. Cave (1982) suggests that there are three main factors that 
influence the distribution and occurrence of natural hazards. Firstly, one must be aware of 
the current tectonic setting and be able to apply it to hazard assessment. Secondly, a 
familiarity with the geological features in the area is necessary because various rock types 
behave in very different ways when stress is applied to them. Lastly, climatic conditions 
are typically a major control on whether an event will occur, as it can often act as a trigger 
or catalyst for a natural disaster. Other factors such as slope gradient and vegetation cover 
also contribute to landscape stability and they have been included in this section.  
 
2.3.1 Geology 
 
The numerous geological processes currently taking place are to a great extent responsible 
for the hazard issues observed in Arthur’s Pass. One of the most important factors in this 
hazard identification is to recognise and understand the geological features of the Arthur’s 
Pass region. Examination of the rock types and structures in the Arthur’s Pass region gives 
an understanding of rock behaviour which can be applied to hazard analysis to determine 
the reaction of the landscape to future events.  
 
2.3.1.1 Lithology 
 
The rock sequence stretching along the entire length of the Southern Alps and Alpine Fault 
is geologically classified as the Torlesse Supergroup; a large sequence of sedimentary 
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strata containing a diverse range of fossiliferous traces within layers of sandstone and 
mudstone. The sequence was formed sporadically over a long period of time between the 
late Carboniferous and early Cretaceous periods (Cave, 1987). Locally it is known as the 
Torlesse greywacke. The marine sediments comprising the Torlesse greywacke have been 
subjected to intense pressures during mountain building processes which has resulted in a 
folded, faulted and highly metamorphosed lithological sequence (Coates & Cox, 2002). 
 
The Torlesse rocks within the Arthur’s Pass National Park are further subdivided into 
zones that are based on the fossil remnants within the bedded sequences and the proportion 
of fine-grained siltstone and mudstone within the sandstone deposits (Cave, 1987). To the 
east of the regional unconformity defined by the Alpine Fault is the Terebellina Zone, 
which contains alternating beds of sandstone and siltstone with preserved fossils. Next to 
the Terebellina Zone is a smaller wedge of thick-bedded sandstone called the Hokonuia 
Zone. It is characterised by thin beds of poorly sorted sandstone with outcrops of 
conglomerates. Further east, a major section of the Arthur’s Pass National Park contains 
thick sequences of homogeneous, cross-bedded and thick-bedded sandstone with thin, 
interbedded argillite deposits. This group has a relatively high content of bivalve fossils 
and some minor conglomerate deposits (Cave, 1987). It is collectively known as the 
Monotis Zone. The Arthur’s Pass township lies across the Monotis Zone on a deposit of 
overlying alluvium from the Bealey River (Cave, 1979b).  
 
The Arthur’s Pass village is confined to the narrow floodplain of the Bealey River, where 
unconsolidated greywacke boulders are observed over much of the undeveloped land. The 
underlying Monotis Zone is younger than the geologically comparable Terebellina Zone, 
and contains different proportions of sandstone and siltstone which has become indurated 
to form argillites and lithified sandstones (Cave, 1987). Whitehouse and McSaveney 
(1992) suggest that the sandstone component of the Monotis Zone is as much as 70% in 
this region, as only thin beds of argillite separate the thick-bedded sandstones. The 
numerous specimens of the fossil bivalve Monotis have been used to accurately date the 
rocks to the late Triassic period, and at some localities around the National Park, preserved 
plant materials are found within siltstone and occasional sandstone deposits that represent a 
minor lithological group within the Monotis Zone (Cave, 1987). A limited number of 
conglomerate deposits and highly deformed syn-orogenic rocks (often called flysch 
deposits) have also been recorded in areas adjacent to the village such as on the flanks of 
Avalanche Peak and at Temple Basin (Odell, McCaskill, & Adams, 1966). 
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Several surficial deposits are observed in the Arthur’s Pass village. Alluvial fan and 
riverbed sediments in the township vicinity cover a wide area and are generally 
unconsolidated. They are typically poorly sorted, ranging from fine-grained to boulder 
sized. River sediments are derived from greywacke bedrock and reflect many of the same 
lithological features as the surrounding mountains from which they came.  
 
2.3.1.2 Structural Features 
 
The Southern Alps are the region of maximum uplift in Canterbury and therefore the oldest 
rock formations are associated with this region compared to the plains and foothills 
(Yetton & McCahon, 2006). The rocks have been folded, faulted and tilted to produce 
textures that are synonymous with intense metamorphic processes. Rock outcrops in the 
region reveal significant jointing and weathering of the greywacke which make the rocks 
brittle and sometimes unstable. In his review of earthquake-generated landslides, Keefer 
(1984) describes the most susceptible rocks as those with acute weathering and intense 
jointing, fracturing and shearing. There have been numerous incidents of rockwall failures 
on many of the outcrops near the village which are responsible for the deposition of large 
volumes of material into the fluvial system.  
 
Several active fault traces have been identified that have the potential to initiate hazards in 
the vicinity of Arthur’s Pass village. Regional faults that lie within 25km of the village are 
the Alpine Fault, Harper Fault and Hope Fault. The Alpine and Hope Faults have a strike-
slip structure and the Harper Fault is a thrust fault (Chamberlain, 1996). Historically they 
are all capable of producing fairly high magnitude earthquakes. On a more local scale, the 
Poulter Fault and Kelly Fault are both more than 10km away from the township but still 
represent a high seismic threat. The smaller and possibly less dangerous faults within the 
Selwyn District are those that exist less than 10km from the village. Examples of these 
include the Scott Fault, Punchbowl Fault Zone, Aicken O’Malley Fault Zone and the Red 
Rock Fault Zone (Cave, 1982). Additionally, several unnamed minor faults around the 
village also warrant investigation.  
 
Ridge rent structures have been detected throughout the National Park; these are the result 
of the gravitational collapse of slopes along deep-seated surfaces of weakness. They are 
good indicators of fault zones that have the potential to generate rock avalanches in the 
future and highlight sites that should be monitored. Most ridge rents have been identified 
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in the Otira Gorge but smaller numbers are observed in the mountains adjacent to the 
Arthur’s Pass village. 
 
2.3.2 Geomorphology 
 
The town lies within a dynamic geomorphic system that can be quite unstable and easily 
influenced by outside factors, such as weather and climate anomalies and tectonic events 
that frequently occur in the Arthur’s Pass region.  
 
The section of the Bealey Valley in which the Arthur’s Pass village lies is characterized by 
a very distinct geomorphological signature. The slopes are generally very steep and the 
Bealey River flows along a relatively wide riverbed and floodplain to form the base of the 
valley. In the upper reaches of the Bealey Valley the river follows the route carved by 
glacial advances (Paterson, 1996). The mountains surrounding the Arthur’s Pass village 
rise to almost 2000m and the tributaries that feed the Bealey River are sourced from high 
in the catchment area and travel to the valley floor along very steep courses. Sharp ridges 
and basins with numerous scree deposits have developed on the upper reaches of the 
mountains and several of these areas have permanent snow accumulations or small glaciers 
associated with them (Paterson, 1996). 
 
The processes operating in the Bealey Valley are somewhat different from those in the 
surrounding mountains, resulting in different geomorphologies. The valley floor comprises 
thick deposits of river debris and is comparatively flat. Furthermore, it contains residual 
fan accumulations from debris flow events and stream processes, in addition to deposits 
associated with rockfalls and glacial advances (Paterson, 1996). Several glacial moraines 
have been identified within the Bealey Valley that record minor Holocene advances during 
the Holocene period (Paterson, 1996). There is very little evidence of the deposits formed 
during the major Pleistocene glaciations; only the glacial features such as the steep, U-
shaped valleys have been preserved (Paterson, 1996). Chinn (1975) further explains the 
existence of a series of lateral terminal moraines adjacent to where McGrath Stream 
intercepts the highway. This McGrath Advance, as it is known, was one of the most 
extensive advances in the area during the Holocene period and mostly occupied the upper 
Otira and Bealey Valleys and their bordering cirque basins (Cave, 1982).  
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2.3.3 Climate 
 
Arthur’s Pass has an alpine climate typical of mountainous regions (Figure 2.3A and B). 
The weather has the ability to change rapidly and without warning because of the high 
altitudes, which can make daily weather prediction difficult. The village is frequently 
exposed to north-west winds that bring huge deposits of rain or snow to the Main Divide 
before heading down the Canterbury Plains as warm, dry winds. High-intensity storms 
often unload large volumes of rainfall in a short period of time, thus concentrating the 
number of rain days during the year (Odell et al., 1966). Frosts occur throughout the year 
and nights are typically cold, with a high variation in daily maximum and minimum 
temperatures (Burrows, 1974). During winter, heavy snowfalls can blanket the town and 
increase the avalanche risk throughout the Arthur’s Pass National Park.  
 
2.3.3.1 Temperatures 
 
Complete records of temperature conditions at Arthur’s Pass date back to 1978, and are 
very well documented (National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research, 2007) 
(Appendix A). The average maximum air temperature for any given year at the Arthur’s 
Pass village is 12.0oC and the average minimum air temperature is 3.2oC (based on 1978-
2006 data) (Table 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 1. The average monthly temperatures at Arthur’s Pass village for the period 1978 to 2006 (NIWA 
2007). 
 Average Maximum 
Temperatures (oC) 
Average Minimum 
Temperatures (oC) 
January 18.0 7.8 
February 18.0 7.8 
March 15.6 6.2 
April 12.6 3.6 
May 9.4 1.8 
June 6.7 -0.8 
July 5.8 -2.0 
August 7.3 -1.1 
September 9.6 1.0 
October 11.6 3.1 
November 13.7 4.7 
December 15.7 6.7 
Average 12.0 3.2 
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Figure 2. 3A and B. Climate patterns for New Zealand and the Arthur’s Pass region between 1971 and 2000. A. Mean annual temperature. B. Mean annual rainfall (Arthur’s 
Pass – 4375mm) (Mackintosh, 2001; National institute of Water and Atmospheric Research, 2003). 
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The highest average maximum temperature between 1978 and 2006 was 13.1oC in 1999 
and again in 2005. The lowest recorded average maximum was 11.0oC in 1992. The 
highest average minimum temperature was 4.1oC in 1998 and the lowest 2.2oC in 1982. 
  
Temperature variations between night and day can be quite extreme, and often severe 
frosts are followed by a day of intense sunshine. North-west winds are frequently 
channelled through the Bealey Valley and often lower the temperature in the township 
quite noticeably (Burrows, 1974). 
 
2.3.3.2 Rainfall  
 
Detailed daily rainfall records were obtained from the beginning of 1955 to the end of 
2006 (Environment Canterbury, 2007), giving a total of 52 years of data. There are 177 
days of rain in a typical year in Arthur’s Pass village. Since 1955, the wettest year had 225 
days of rain (1956) and the driest year had only 111 days of rain (1961). Over the last 52 
years, the average has remained stable and not increased significantly (Appendix A). Based 
on daily rainfall data, the wettest month of the year is October. Periods of high rainfall are 
from September to December and throughout the month of May before the onset of snow. 
The average rainfall for these months ranges from 393.6mm to 447.0mm (Table 2.2). 
 
 Average Monthly 
Rainfall (mm) 
May 393.6 
September 396.2 
October 447.0 
November 421.8 
December 395.7 
 
Table 2. 2. The wettest months of the year and their corresponding rainfall averages at Arthur’s Pass village 
for the period 1955 to 2006 (Environment Canterbury, 2007). 
 
The driest months are February and July, where rainfall averages are 266.7mm and 
267.6mm respectively. These values are deceptively low, considering both months often 
have more than 300mm and February has had as much as 819.9mm in 1955. Similarly, the 
highest rainfall in July was up to 767.5mm as recently as 1998.  
 
There is a slightly increasing trend in annual rainfall from 1955 to 2006. This could be 
partly attributed to small amounts of missing data due to malfunctions with recording 
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instruments in the first few decades of data collection, but it corresponds to increasing 
maximum levels of the large lakes further south. Rainfall records are almost complete for 
the last 19 years with very little data missing. Consequently, the most recent entries are 
probably a more accurate representation of rainfall compared to the earlier records in the 
1950’s and 1960’s, where large amounts of rainfall data have been intermittently lost. The 
annual rainfall average calculated from all rainfall measures is 4283.7mm. The calculated 
average for the last 19 years is 4427.2mm, almost 150mm more. This could signify an 
important change in the local climate that will have implications on the incidence of 
natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass.   
 
It is also worth noting that the average rainfall in the Bealey Valley is significantly lower 
than the Otira Valley, where many natural hazards exist along the highway, particularly at 
the site of the Otira Viaduct. In comparison, the yearly average in the upper Otira Valley is 
as much as 8000mm (Robertson, 1995); a factor that could explain the high rate of erosion 
and high number of slope instabilities in the Otira Gorge.  
 
2.3.3.3 Snowfall  
 
Because of its high altitude, Arthur’s Pass is sometimes a dry, snow-covered landscape 
during the winter months. Unfortunately, snow records for the township are non-existent 
and the records that are available from Temple Basin and Bealey Spur (the nearest 
localities) are incomplete and do not go into detail about specific snow depths or duration.  
 
Information from Bealey Spur (elevation 649m above sea level) refers solely to the 
incidence of snow (whether it snowed or not, with no snow depth data at all), between 
1868 and 1880 (National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research, 2007). The 
Arthur’s Pass village post-dates this period but it is still a useful set of data for information 
on historic snow patterns. The records show that it is not uncommon for snow to fall in the 
summer months at this altitude. The number of permanent snow days each year during 
1868 and 1879 averaged 27.  
 
The Temple Basin records are more recent, stretching from 1967 to 1982. The altitude at 
the Temple Basin ski field is significantly higher than the Arthur’s Pass village so the 
information, whilst relevant, is not directly applicable to the township. The average 
number of snow days at Temple Basin (elevation 1554m above sea level) is 199 annually. 
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On 75 of these 199 days, snow fell but melted as it hit the ground, so no snow 
accumulation was recorded.  
 
Snow avalanches constitute a major hazard, particularly to trampers and skiers in the 
winter months. Increased snowfall could also impact water volumes within the surrounding 
catchments once the snow starts to melt in spring and summer. It may also be linked to 
increasing rainfall, as more atmospheric moisture accommodates the formation of snow.  
 
2.3.4 Vegetation 
 
The variety of plant species observed within the National Park is diverse and noticeably 
different on either side of the Main Divide. This is attributed to the differences in rainfall 
between the two regions as this is greatly influenced by the presence of the mountains 
(Cave, 1987).  
 
The vegetation on the eastern side of the Southern Alps is dominated by mountain beech 
forests, sub-alpine scrub and montane grasslands, which form a series of separate and quite 
distinct plant habitats. Odell et al. (1966) reports on several specific plant environments 
within the National Park boundary and suggests that they are strongly controlled by a 
number of factors such as altitude, slope gradient, exposure to the elements, soil type and 
available water resources. The vegetation zones are well defined and obvious to the 
observer because they are characterised by specific plant types that change as the elevation 
increases.  
 
The beech forest is the most widespread plant zone surrounding Arthur’s Pass, and it 
contains a very diverse number of plant species. Forested slopes below the tree line are 
chiefly covered by mountain beech, in combination with several other trees such as 
broadleaf, ivy, lancewood and celery pine (Burrows, 1977). Smaller shrubs include yellow 
wood, mapau, stinkwood, snowberry and various ferns and the forest floor is often covered 
in lichens, mosses and fungi (Odell et al., 1966).  
 
At the base of the valleys amongst the unstable fluvial deposits, the plant life is sparser 
because it is constantly having to regenerate after the river swells or changes course 
(Burrows, 1974). The riverbed is dominated by willow herbs and native mat-forming herbs 
such as scabweed. The stable areas of the riverbed have hardier and more permanent flora 
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such as patotara and some species of everlasting (Odell et al., 1966).  Another vegetation 
zone exists above the tree line where only small shrubs and grasses survive with several 
species of lichen, moss and native herbs (Parkinson, 2001).  
 
One plant species of note is matagouri, which has several unique qualities that make it a 
valuable tool for hazard analysis. Matagouri is identified as a resilient shrub with a fast 
regeneration rate, especially on freshly agitated ground with well-drained soils (Rogers, 
Walker, & Lee, 2005). It is found in many localities around the village and is particularly 
useful for recognising disturbances in the soil that may indicate the occurrence of past 
slope instabilities.  
 
Certain plant species also act to increase the fire hazard, as some native plants are 
notoriously more flammable than others. Therefore, the distribution and flammability of 
matagouri and other species of vegetation in Arthur’s Pass will be examined and 
incorporated into the hazard assessment.  
 
2.4     CURRENT AND FUTURE TOWN DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Considering that successful land use planning is one the of the chief methods of mitigation 
suggested for Arthur’s Pass, the location of future developments within the town is of great 
importance. There is limited vacant space within the Arthur’s Pass region that is suitable 
for further urban development. Although a number of planned developments aim to 
increase safety by reinforcing structures, building new structures or upgrading old systems, 
the construction of new buildings within the village area must be weighed against the cost 
of recovery following natural disaster event. As of late 2007, several developments were 
either in the process of being built or had been proposed for the village. These include: 
1. A $2 million medium-scale construction project centred around the Department of 
Conservation Visitor Centre, which includes a new public toilet facility to replace 
the former run-down toilet block, a 16-bay bus park, two carparks and road-
widening and landscaping along State Highway 73.  
2. The burial of overhead powerlines in zones affected by erosion and flooding as part 
of the visitor centre development (Selwyn District Council, 2006b). 
3. An upgrade of the sewage treatment system that services 14 sections south of 
Rough Creek. This system was installed when the houses were built along Sunshine 
Terrace in the 1950’s (Selwyn District Council, 2006a). The upgrade will lower the 
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possibility of environmental contamination and strengthen the septic tank and 
treatment plant against ground shaking and flooding.  
4. The installation of extensive river protection works to protect the railway track 
through the Bealey Valley and in the Bealey River and Rough Creek to protect 
parts of the village and transmission line poles. Also, the removal of gravel build-
up in some riverbeds adjacent to the township (Department of Conservation, 2007). 
5. Proposed road works including the Rough Creek Bridge and road realignment, road 
widening on State Highway 73 through the Bealey V alley and repair of minor 
encroachments along the highway (Department of Conservation, 2007). 
 
As for the construction of private dwellings in the village, there is only a limited number of 
freehold sections available, most of which are already occupied. No more sections would 
be formed unless there was extreme pressure to make the town bigger. Even then there is 
nowhere really for the development to go but up the mountains, which is likely to be 
detrimental to village safety (Costello, 2008). 
 
2.5 PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THEORY 
 
Hazard research within the Arthur’s Pass National Park is extensive, but much of the time 
it neglects to include any detailed assessments of the more developed areas. Arthur’s Pass 
is the largest settlement in the National Park and contains the highest resident and tourist 
population in the area, but there is yet to be a detailed investigation of the natural hazards 
that affect the community.  
 
This section contains an evaluation of previous research theory and methods, paying 
particular attention to the specific hazards that have been analysed, the effectiveness of 
research methods and identification of potential areas for further study. 
 
2.5.1 Seismic Hazards 
 
The region is part of a very dynamic tectonic system that has been thoroughly documented 
since European settlement. Many reports of the seismic hazards along fault lines in the 
Arthur’s Pass National Park have been produced since active fault traces were first 
identified. Papers by Berryman and Villamor (2004), Cowan (1989), Cowan (1991), Rynn 
and Scholz (1978), Smith and Berryman (1986), Wells et al (1999), Yang (1991), Yetton 
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(2000) and Yetton and McCahon (2006) focus on the larger faults, such as the Alpine, 
Poulter, Kelly and Hope Faults, which are more likely to produce low frequency-high 
magnitude events that have regional seismic implications for the South Island. Yetton 
(2000) quantifies the estimated magnitude and intensity and determines return periods for 
Alpine Fault ruptures.  
 
Arthur’s Pass is considered by Rynn and Scholz (1978) to be a zone of tectonic transition 
between the Alpine Fault (strike-slip movement) and the Hikurangi Trench (subduction 
movement), where there has been active deformation for the last 2 million years. Attempts 
to define the deformation associated with earthquakes in Arthur’s Pass National Park show 
some unexpected results. Large earthquake ruptures have previously been interpreted as 
occurring on faults trending north-east, however, studies by Rynn and Scholz (1978) 
conclude that the Arthur’s Pass region shows a trend of shallow earthquake occurrence in 
an east-north-east trend, which does not conform to any known fault traces. Furthermore, 
dislocation models by Arnadottir, Beaven and Pearson (1995) produce a north-north-west 
trend for the fault associated with the 1994 M 6.7 Arthur’s Pass earthquake, and suggest a 
need for re-evaluation of historical rupture traces in the region.  
 
There is some debate by geoscientists on the existence, location and activity of the Kakapo 
and Poulter Faults. Yang (1991) identifies the Kakapo Fault as a near-vertical fault much 
younger in age than the Hope Fault from which it propagates. The Kakapo Fault is further 
characterised by a dextral displacement of up to 12.1mm/yr and an approximate length of 
50km. Cowan (1989) suggests that in a comparison between the Hope Fault and Kakapo 
Fault, the Kakapo Fault is much less active and there is a lack of rupture data to make any 
accurate conclusions about the risk it poses. Berryman and Villamor (2004) investigate the 
Kakapo Fault and fail to find any evidence for recent seismic activity along the trace 
proposed by Yang (1991). They redefine the fault trace as the Poulter Fault and credit it 
with generating the 1929 M 7.1 Arthur’s Pass earthquake. 
 
Smaller localised fault traces typically generate high frequency-low magnitude events but 
they are equally important for seismic hazard studies at Arthur’s Pass. There is a lack of 
comprehensive information relating to these faults, but several are highlighted by 
Chamberlain (1996) and include the Red Rock Fault Zone, Punchbowl Fault Zone, Scott 
Fault and the Aicken O’Malley Fault. The Arthur’s Pass township is essentially at the 
confluence of two major fault zones; the Alpine Fault and the Marlborough Fault zone 
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(Smith & Berryman, 1986) which has produced a complex seismic zone with many 
unnamed and possibly unidentified faults that have the potential to generate earthquakes. 
Compared to towns sited on the Canterbury Plains, Arthur’s Pass is twice as likely to 
experience ground shaking because the seismic risk increases westwards from 
Christchurch (Soils and Foundations Ltd, 1993). Therefore, in the event of a major 
earthquake, the village is likely to be severely damaged because it lies at the centre of a 
very seismically active region (Rynn & Scholz, 1978).  
 
Some of the seismic research available focuses on specific earthquake events and describes 
the condition of the physical environment and the societal impacts that resulted from each 
earthquake. Arnadottir et al (1995), Berrill et al (1995), Chamberlain (1996), Cowan 
(1991), McSaveney (1982a), Paterson and Berrill (1995) and Speight (1933) offer 
examples of such reports. Speight (1933) was the first to report on the effects of the 1929 
M 7.1 Arthur’s Pass earthquake in which he identified fresh scarps and cracks in the 
nearby mountains. There were fairly high social implications resulting from the 1929 event 
because it caused a high degree of damage and the road was closed for months afterwards 
(McSaveney, 1982a). The 1994 M 6.7 Arthur’s Pass was one of the best-documented 
seismic events in the region and enabled geoscientists to study the complex fault system 
that caused the earthquake. Arnadottir et al (1995) used the earthquake as a case-study to 
model the coseismic displacements and subsequent location of the active fault trace.  
 
2.5.2 Mass movement hazards 
 
Studies undertaken within the National Park highlight the numerous mass movement 
events that have occurred sporadically over the last 140 years. The vast majority of 
research targets the geomorphic hazards that have led to temporary road closures along the 
highway, with limited detail given to slope instabilities that could directly affect the 
village. Owens et al (1994) group mass movements into three classes; rainfall-triggered 
failures, earthquake-generated failures and other types of failures such as ground 
subsidence.  
 
Whitehouse and McSaveney (1992) and Paterson (1996) assess slope stability along the 
highway corridor, specifically targeting the vulnerability of slopes to rockfalls, rock 
avalanches and debris flows. Drainage channels immediately south of the Arthur’s Pass 
village are recognised as being highly susceptible to debris flows, particularly during 
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periods of heavy rainfall (Paterson, 1996). Debris fans deposited by Grahams Creek, 
Rough Creek and Wardens Creek pose the biggest threat to infrastructure in the village (E. 
Smith, 2004) but smaller rockfalls are typically the most common hazard and regularly 
impair the road (McSaveney, 1982b).  
 
Earthquake-generated mass movements have been thoroughly documented by Hancox et al 
(1997), Keefer (1984), Owens et al (1994) and Whitehouse and Griffiths (1983). Keefer 
(1984) concludes that failures are more likely to occur in highly weathered or fractured 
rocks that are affected by active river erosion. The impacts that slope gradient and 
vegetation have on slope stability are also crucial factors in determining the level of risk 
that landslides and rock avalanches pose in the National Park (Cave, 1987).  
 
Several large earthquake-generated movements have occurred in the National Park, most 
predominantly in the Otira Gorge but occasionally within the vicinity of the Arthur’s Pass 
township. A narrow zone of earthquake-induced landslides was produced during the 1929 
Arthur’s Pass earthquake and identified by Speight (1933). It was later used by Berryman 
and Villamor (2004) to identify the fault segment that ruptured during the earthquake. 
They also analysed the rock avalanche deposits from Falling Mountain and reconstructed 
the sequence of events and conditions that led to such a major slope failure.  
 
Various engineering solutions have been employed to restrict the amount of damage mass 
movements can do within the National Park, particularly to infrastructure. Directly north of 
the township, road cuts have been strengthened to better cope with hazardous conditions 
(E. Smith, 2004). The Otira Viaduct and rock shelter are possibly the best example of a 
long-term mitigation solution to major mass movements. Bridges within the National Park 
and the Otira Gorge have been reinforced to withstand large forces from both earthquakes 
and sediment transport (Berrill et al., 1995). Within the township, minimal research has 
been conducted on ways of managing slope failure hazards, which is a key component of 
the present research.  
 
2.5.3 Meteorological hazards 
 
The most prominent meteorological hazards to affect the village are storms, snow 
avalanches and climate change, which has implications for weather processes. 
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Meteorological factors tend to act as a trigger for other hazards, such as mass movements 
or erosion (Kovach & McGuire, 2003). 
 
Storms occur in Arthur’s Pass several times a year and typically generate high rainfall, 
hailstorms and wind gusts, but most of the time no damage is caused (Odell et al., 1966). A 
major storm event occurred in December 1957, when high rainfall at Otira and Arthur’s 
Pass generated flooding, river aggradation, debris flows and landslides (Whitehouse & 
McSaveney, 1992). Footbridges crossing the Bealey River were washed away and the road 
was temporarily closed (McSaveney, 1982b).  
 
An account of the December 1979 storm was given by Cave (1979a). The storm produced 
very heavy and prolonged periods of rain over two days, which resulted in damage to the 
highway from washouts and gravel deposition. The drainage systems were unable to cope 
and became blocked and washed out, which increased the flooding along the highway and 
within the village (Cave, 1979a). Bridge abutments were compromised when the excess 
water flow concentrated around them and produced small washouts. The rain also triggered 
small mass movements along an extended stretch of State Highway 73. It is not apparent 
what, if any, hazard control measures were implemented after these storm events that could 
have reduced the risk in subsequent storms.  
 
Snow avalanches are a common occurrence in the winter months. Although they do not 
appear to be a direct threat to the township, they do occur in the Bealey Valley 
(Department of Conservation, 2007). Waters (1980) infers that the snow avalanche hazard 
is concentrated in the vicinity of the Temple Basin Ski Field and along major tramping 
routes that are used throughout the winter months. The Department of Conservation (2007) 
lists Avalanche Peak (forming part of the Avalanche Path), the Bealey Valley near the 
Bealey Glacier and Rough Creek as extreme risk areas. In the case of Rough Creek, wet 
snow avalanches have the potential to travel all the way to the creek bed, with flattened 
vegetation being the identifying factor of such an event (SoftRock NZ, 2008b). Since 1926, 
12 people have died in avalanche related incidents in the Arthur’s Pass National Park 
(Kates, 2008). There is currently some debate over avalanche control methods, especially 
in Canterbury ski fields where the terrain is particularly dangerous and unpredictable 
(Owens et al., 1994). The degree of risk associated with an avalanche is dependent on the 
magnitude and frequency at each avalanche site, because each locality varies considerably. 
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Site specific investigation on terrain controls and severity is necessary for an accurate 
avalanche hazard assessment (Waters, 1980). 
 
Studies on local climate change are non-existent, which highlights a need for further 
examination. Records of rainfall and temperature do show a slight trend that will be 
investigated as part of this hazard assessment.  
 
2.5.4 Flooding hazards, erosion and sedimentation  
 
Past research is typically limited to factual accounts of storm damage and brief inspections 
of changes to the local landscape. It is apparent from the numerous accounts of storm 
events that sizeable floods occur every few years at Arthur’s Pass. In an analysis of local 
geomorphic change, McSaveney (1982b) records several historical floods that have been 
significant to the Arthur’s Pass village. The storm in 1957 generated flooding that 
destroyed almost all the footbridges in the Arthur’s Pass National Park and damaged the 
railway line and roads in both the Bealey and Otira Valleys (McSaveney, 1982b). Railway 
embankments were washed away and numerous incidents of aggradation were reported. 
The December 1979 storm had a similar effect, causing widespread damage and 
weakening nearby slopes and riverbanks (Cave, 1979a). In addition to flooding, 
sedimentation and erosional processes have been identified in almost all cases of storm 
damage at Arthur’s Pass.  
 
Whitehouse and McSaveney (1992) discuss several ways in which flooding can occur that 
provide a valuable insight into potential methods of management. Common causes of 
flooding in Arthur’s Pass are blocked drains and culverts that are not able to cope with 
high water flow. Natural floods typically initiate when river banks breach or overtop and 
when low lying areas become inundated during periods of high rainfall (Owens et al., 
1994). The town is at risk of being affected by flooding because of its close proximity to 
the Bealey River. The river also has a high erosive capacity and the ability to deposit 
substantial amounts of sediment into the system which has the potential to seriously affect 
the town infrastructure (E. Smith, 2004).  
 
McSaveney (1982b) highlights the importance of precipitation as a major control on 
erosional processes. The extent to which rainfall influences erosion is variable, but 
Whitehouse and McSaveney (1992) note that scouring often has the potential to induce 
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slope failures in the National Park, which is an important consideration in this hazard 
assessment. 
 
2.6 RESEARCH PRACTICE METHODS  
 
Several approaches have been used in previous hazard assessments. An in depth 
knowledge of the field area is imperative. Past research has been completed using aerial 
photography coupled with ground reconnaissance and in-field mapping. Much of the 
literature contains first-hand observations of the hazards and the impacts they have on both 
man-made and natural features.  
 
Several researchers use both deterministic and probabilistic models to study the behaviour 
of earthquakes, climate, rivers and slopes to facilitate the prediction of future hazards. In 
order to determine frequency and predict the magnitude of future events, records of past 
events are vital. Almost all the previous research conducted on natural hazards has 
included information derived from historical data.  
 
Many of the reports identify the importance of an effective hazard response in reducing the 
risk to the community. The main objective of any hazard assessment is to identify risks. 
Once recognised, the threats to the community can be reduced by implementing successful 
mitigation measures and a employing a well-organised emergency plan.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SEISMIC HAZARDS 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is the first of four specific hazard assessment chapters. Earthquakes are a 
“driving” force and are responsible for the initiation of a number of other natural hazard 
events. They also differ from other hazards in that they are not restricted a specific 
location. The earthquake risk at Arthur’s Pass is high. In addition to several recognised 
faults, the complex fault zones surrounding Arthur’s Pass almost certainly contain many 
unidentified faults which contribute to the seismic risk. Prior knowledge of fault behaviour 
and an understanding of the mechanisms that drive fault movement are key aspects in this 
earthquake hazard evaluation.  
 
The objectives of the seismic hazard analysis are: 
1. To analyse the seismicity of the Arthur’s Pass region for the purpose of identifying 
as many faults as possible. 
2. To determine the level of risk that the faults present both individually and 
collectively.  
3. To discuss previous earthquakes that have affected the Arthur’s Pass region in 
recorded history. 
4. To conduct a seismic hazard evaluation, examining the classification of seismic 
hazards at Arthur’s Pass. 
5. To discuss the implications of both regional and local earthquakes in terms of the 
risk to people, property and essential infrastructure and access to external support 
following a disaster.  
6. To evaluate the current mitigation methods at Arthur’s Pass for earthquake hazards 
 
3.2 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
This seismic hazard assessment combines several approaches. Detection of fault traces 
using aerial photographs is a method through which high risk areas have been identified. 
For this analysis, aerial photographs from 1938, 1943, 1960, 1977, 1998 and Google Earth 
satellite images from 2007 have been used to compare changes in the geomorphic 
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landscape and monitor specific areas that are deemed to be high risk from a hazard 
perspective over the last 80 years.  
 
Integrating historical data with scientific knowledge is essential because it forms the basis 
for probabilistic seismic hazard models and gives an indication of future rupture locations. 
Seismicity is a combination of both space and time elements; the historical data make up 
the time component and the fault distribution forms the space component. The approximate 
size and extent of fault traces is inferred through the investigation of past ruptures. 
Therefore, fault locations and past earthquake occurrences have been analysed in order to 
gauge the seismicity of the Arthur’s Pass region and assist in the future prediction of 
tremors in the region.  
 
An in depth fault analysis has not been carried out in the field; most of the information has 
been collected from independent sources such as government reports, fault databases, 
journal articles, aerial photos and personal accounts of earthquake events from witnesses. 
Owing to the nature of the terrain around Arthur’s Pass, field reconnaissance is difficult 
and fault traces often go unnoticed in dense bush, but every attempt has been made to 
include all possible faults and integrate them into the overall seismic hazard.  
 
3.3 SEISMICITY AT ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
The processes that shaped New Zealand approximately 250 million years ago are also 
responsible for the formation of the Southern Alps. Periods of continental collision 
between the Australian and Pacific Plates have accommodated mountain-building 
processes and produced the high structural complexity that is observed today. 
 
Earthquakes at Arthur’s Pass are caused by sudden stress changes along subsurface faults 
that result in ground shaking and occasional rupture at the Earth’s surface. Ground shaking 
is measured using the Modified Mercalli (MM) Intensity Scale (Appendix B). Seismicity is 
a measure of earthquake activity using both the spatial and historical distribution of 
earthquakes throughout Canterbury and also the South Island.  
 
Arthur’s Pass is located at the oblique confluence of Alpine Fault and Marlborough Fault 
Zone (Figure 3.1). As a result, the seismicity of the Arthur’s Pass region reflects the 
seismic traits of both fault systems. There is an unquestionable pattern of seismicity when 
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comparing the proportion and distribution of deep (>40km) and shallow (<40km) 
earthquakes in the New Zealand (Figure 3.2). Most noticeable is the absence of deep 
earthquakes along a section of the Alpine Fault in the central South Island (Institute of 
Geological and Nuclear Sciences Ltd, 2000). This absence can be attributed to the different 
tectonic mechanisms operating along the collisional boundary and represents the 
translation of the northern subduction zone into the southern strike-slip fault zone as the 
Australian Plate meets the Pacific Plate (Coates & Cox, 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 1. New Zealand’s active onshore faults, showing Arthur’s Pass at the confluence of the Alpine 
Fault (1) and the Marlborough Fault System (2) (McSaveney, 2007). 
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Figure 3. 2. Distributions of shallow and deep earthquakes for the period 1990-1999, showing the absence of 
deep tremors in the central South Island (Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Ltd, 2000). 
 
In New Zealand, the pattern of earthquake activity does not correspond well to the surface 
geology (Smith & Berryman, 1986), so it is a complicated task to get a complete 
representation of the local seismicity simply through field observations and aerial photo 
analysis. Previous investigations on specific fault locations have been used to determine 
where faults exist and how active they are, as a detailed in-field investigation of fault 
occurrence is considered beyond the scope of this project.  
 
Earthquake monitoring stations (GeoNet) around the South Island record hundreds of 
microearthquakes in the region that characterize zones of activity. The dense spatial 
distribution of shallow earthquakes in the Arthur’s Pass region (Figure 3.3) suggests that 
the majority of earthquakes tend to be associated with zones of crustal weakness (Rynn & 
Scholz, 1978). The bulk of earthquakes are in the seismogenic zone and show an inverse 
hazard relationship; the shallower the earthquake, the greater the hazard (Bell, 1999). 
There is no shortage of historical earthquakes that provide data for future calculations of 
earthquake occurrence. There are, however, limits as to how much of the data can be used 
for the purpose of accurately forecasting earthquakes, especially because there is very little 
information on slip rates and recurrence intervals.  
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 32
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 3. Spatial distribution of shallow earthquakes (<40km depth) over M 5 in recorded history in the 
Arthur’s Pass region, which may be linked to zones of crustal weakness (Institute of Geological and Nuclear 
Sciences Ltd, 2008b). 
 
Rynn and Scholz (1978) hypothesised that the Arthur’s Pass region is in fact part of a 
developing shear zone because no surface ruptures had been found to prove otherwise. 
Subsequent examination of the faults responsible for the most recent earthquakes may 
suggest that surface expression does exist in the Arthur’s Pass region and most of the plate 
deformation is accommodated by left-lateral movement along cross-faults to the north-east 
and south-west of Arthur’s Pass village (Arnadottir et al., 1995). 
 
The high seismicity at Arthur’s Pass can explain why mean return periods for earthquakes 
that produce high intensity ground shaking in the region are short compared to other 
locations in the South Island. Based on information from Paterson (1996) and Smith 
(1990), the areas with the most frequent high-intensity earthquakes are Nelson and 
Westport, closely followed by Arthur’s Pass and Otira (Table 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arthur’s 
Pass 
 33
EARTHQUAKE INTENSITY (MM)  LOCATION IV VII VIII IX 
Nelson 5 16 56 200 
Westport 8 26 91 330 
Arthur’s Pass/Otira 9 31 100 370 
Mt. Cook 14 48 170 475 
Queenstown 12 54 250 1100 
Milford Sound  12 62 330 1800 
 
 
Table 3. 1. The mean return periods at various locations for selected ground shaking intensities (Adapted 
from (Geotech Consulting, 1998; Paterson, 1996; Stirling et al., 2007; West Coast Regional Council & DTec 
Consulting, 2002). 
 
The updated probabilistic seismic hazard assessment for the Canterbury region (Stirling et 
al., 2007) makes note of the fact that most earthquakes greater than M 6.5 occur along 
faults that are not represented in surface features and are therefore often go unnoticed by 
researchers. The lack of surface ruptures makes it necessary to rely on historical 
earthquakes and fault data (Chamberlain, 1996). There is also potential for large 
earthquakes to occur in the future along unrecognised faults. This theory is based on the 
incidence of historic tremors over M 6.5 that have yet to be assigned to specific fault lines.  
 
Hazard estimate maps generated from the probabilistic seismic hazard assessment indicate 
that the hazards have very different seismic patterns across the whole of Canterbury. The 
Arthur’s Pass region has been acknowledged by the report as the region most likely to 
experience the highest ground accelerations and shaking intensity because of its location 
close to several major plate boundary faults. It has been projected that Arthur’s Pass will 
encounter very high shaking intensities that increase as the recurrence interval increases 
(Table 3.2) (Appendix C).  
Recurrence 
Interval 
(years) 
Shaking 
Intensity 
(MM) 
31-50 VI-VII 
100-150 VIII-IX 
150-475 IX-X 
1000+ IX-X 
 
Table 3. 2. Projected shaking intensities (Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale) and corresponding return 
intervals for Arthur’s Pass (Stirling et al., 2007).  
 
Deterministic methods of earthquake prediction employ the use of field observations and 
can help to improve statistical prediction. However, New Zealand historical records are 
limited to 150 years, which is only useful for gauging the short-term risk (K. Smith, 2004). 
Unlike other hazards such as debris flows and tsunami, accurately forecasting earthquakes 
is essentially impossible and does not allow for pre-emptive warnings to be issued.  
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Figure 3. 4. Faults in the Arthur’s Pass region that contribute to the overall seismic risk. Faults within a 15km radius are considered to be local fault sources, whilst those 
outside a 15km radius are regional fault sources (fault data from (Cave, 1987; Chamberlain, 1996; Environment Canterbury, 2007; Institute of Geological and Nuclear 
Sciences Ltd, 2008a)). 
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3.4 FAULTS IN THE ARTHUR’S PASS REGION 
 
Several large-scale faults and countless minor faults exist in the South Island of New 
Zealand that contribute to the seismic risk at Arthur’s Pass (Figure 3.4).  
 
The Alpine Fault is characterised by long periods of quiescence punctuated by periodic, 
high-magnitude earthquakes. Conversely, the Marlborough Fault Zone is continuously 
producing moderate levels of seismic activity in addition to large, infrequent tremors 
(Rynn & Scholz, 1978). Active faults within roughly 50km of the village are expected to 
be the greatest threat to the township in terms of earthquake hazards. 
 
Initial observations in the Arthur’s Pass region indicate there is an underlying trend of 
predominant fault orientation in a north-east direction. The majority of faults have a dextral 
strike-slip movement and the few thrust faults that exist typically dip south-eastwards 
(Chamberlain, 1996). Cross-faulting is evident in the region and there is potential for a 
single fault rupture to initiate rupture in other adjacent faults, compounding the seismic 
hazard.  
 
By studying the location of faults, it is possible to constrain the spatial distributions of 
earthquakes and thus have the first component towards understanding the seismicity of the 
Arthur’s Pass area. A distinction has made between regional and local seismic sources 
because they create different earthquake scenarios. 
 
3.4.1 Regional faults 
 
Faults propagating more than 15km from the Arthur’s Pass village are considered for the 
purposes of this study to be regional faults. They are often larger, well-defined faults that 
have been investigated previously. The major regional faults are associated with substantial 
displacements during high magnitude, long-duration earthquakes and are expected to cause 
high levels of ground shaking across an extensive area within the South Island.  
 
3.4.1.1 The Alpine Fault 
 
The most significant regional fault generating a high seismic risk is the Alpine Fault; a 
650km long dextral strike-slip fault north west of Arthur’s Pass with lateral movement of 
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approximately 22-30mm/yr and an estimated uplift of 7-10mm/yr in the central fault 
segment (Yetton, 2000). Return periods for the Alpine Fault vary widely for two reasons; 
there has never been a recorded Alpine Fault rupture in recorded history, and only three 
past events are represented in palaeoseismic data. Estimates put the probability of a major 
fault rupture along the Alpine Fault at 65 ±15% over the next 50 years and as much as 85 
±10% in the next 100 years (Yetton, 2000).  
 
Calculations of the timing of the last two Alpine Fault earthquakes in 1620 AD and 1717 
AD have been obtained using tree-ring chronologies, trenching methods and landslide 
debris dating. Computer-modelled isoseismal maps from the two previous ruptures show 
Arthur’s Pass in the region with the highest shaking intensities (estimated at MM IX+) 
during both earthquakes (Downes & Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences Limited., 
1995) (Figures 3.5A and 3.5B). Through the reconstruction of these past events it is 
evident that the next Alpine Fault rupture will be sizeable as well. The earthquake 
magnitude is likely to be M 8+ and ground shaking near the rupture zone will reflect that 
of the last two earthquakes. Arthur’s Pass will be in the zone of highest ground shaking 
with approximately MM IX (Smith, 1990) in (Yetton, Wells, Traylen, New Zealand 
Earthquake Commission., & Geotech Consulting, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 5. Computer-modelled isoseismal maps of past Alpine Fault earthquakes. A. The 1620 AD 
earthquake showing Arthur’s Pass in the zone of highest ground shaking  intensity. B. The 1717 AD 
earthquake showing Arthur’s Pass on the edge of the zone of highest ground shaking intensity ((Smith, 1990) 
in (Yetton et al., 1998)). 
A B 
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3.4.1.2 The Marlborough Fault System 
 
The Hope Fault represents the southern section of the highly segmented Marlborough Fault 
Zone. It accommodates large amounts of deformation and stress from the transfer of the 
plate margins across the South Island (Pettinga, Yetton, Van Dissen, & Downes, 2001). 
The Kelly Fault propagates from the Hurunui section of the Hope Fault, forming a zone of 
seismicity 42km long. The southern section of this fault has been included as a major local 
fault. The Kelly Fault has been recognised as the most likely source of a major earthquake 
at Arthur’s Pass for the 475 year return period (Stirling et al., 2007) and the junction of the 
Kelly and Hope Faults is a particularly dynamic region for shallow earthquake activity 
(Rynn & Scholz, 1978). This section of the Marlborough Fault System has an interpreted 
slip rate of 11.5-14.5mm/yr and an average recurrence interval of 310 to 490 years (Yetton 
& McCahon, 2006). Future ruptures along the Hope Fault may produce earthquakes with 
magnitudes up to approximately M 7.4.  
 
Associated with the Hope Fault are the Kakapo and Poulter Faults. The Poulter Fault is a 
newly recognised dextral strike-slip fault extending almost 50km west-north-west, sub-
parallel to the Alpine Fault with an average slip rate of 1mm/yr (Berryman & Villamor, 
2004) and an extended return period of between 3500 and 5000 years (Stirling et al., 2007). 
It has been included as a local source on the fault map (Figure 3.4) because the southern 
section of the fault comes within close proximity to the village area.  
 
The Kakapo Fault is a young, 50km long fault that propagates from the Hope Fault. Return 
periods and slip rates for the Kakapo Fault are poorly understood, but assessments 
undertaken by Yang (1991) suggest an average dextral displacement of 6-6.8mm/yr. This 
has been disputed by Berryman and Villamor (2004) who cannot find any evidence for 
active dextral movement along the western division of the Kakapo Fault.  
 
3.4.1.3 Other regional faults 
 
There are currently no palaeoseismic data to support any Holocene activity along the 
Harper Fault although it does represent a potential earthquake source because of the deep 
aftershock activity it produced as a result of the 1994 Arthur’s Pass earthquake (Yetton & 
McCahon, 2006). It is characterised by a 49km-long thrust fault dipping towards the south-
east near Lake Coleridge. 
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The Porters Pass-Amberley Fault Zone propagates north-east along the base of the 
Southern Alps where the foothills meet the Canterbury Plains. Palaeoseismic data point to 
several previous large-scale earthquakes within this highly segmented fault zone during the 
Holocene. Slip rates have been difficult to verify but they are estimated at between 0.5 and 
5mm/yr (Pettinga et al., 2001). The Porters Pass Fault forms the eastern section of the fault 
system and probably has the most significant implications for Arthur’s Pass. It is 
characterised by a 40km-long discontinuous surface trace with average slip rates of 3.2-
4.1mm/yr and an estimated recurrence interval of 1500 years (Yetton & McCahon, 2006). 
It contains numerous small branches and displays juvenile behaviour. Previous attempts to 
determine whether the fault zone produces recurrent, small size earthquakes or infrequent 
large tremors to account for the displacement along the fault have been inconclusive.   
 
It is assumed that all large-scale regional faults affecting Arthur’s Pass have already been 
identified in earlier investigations. They constitute a prominent threat over Canterbury and 
Westland and throughout the South Island and therefore a certain level of preparedness is 
required because they represent such a widespread risk.  
 
3.4.2 Local earthquake sources 
 
Local faults are classified as less than 15km from the township centre. They include a large 
number of unnamed or unidentified faults, plus several recognised faults. Local faults are 
not likely to induce excessive ground shaking across an extensive area; populated centres 
close to the epicentre are likely be the only localities affected. Information collected from 
the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS) Active Faults database and from 
the records of Environment Canterbury have assisted greatly in constructing fault maps 
showing as many potential seismic sources as possible. There are several recognised local 
faults propagating through the Arthur’s Pass region (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3. 3. The recognised local faults at Arthur’s Pass (Cave, 1982; Chamberlain, 1996). 
Fault Name Fault Sense Orientation Dip angle and 
direction 
Bruce Fault Dextral NE Unknown 
Aicken-O’Malley Fault Unknown NNE Unknown 
Scott Fault Unknown N to NE Unknown 
Punchbowl Fault Zone Dextral NNE 70-90°, west 
Waimakariri-Rolleston Fault Zone Reverse and sinistral NE 80-90°, west 
Red Rock Fault Zone Reverse N to NE 45-70°, west 
Kelly Fault (southern end) Dextral NE Unknown  
Newton Fault Dextral ENE Unknown 
Hura Fault Dextral ENE Unknown 
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The Bruce Fault, which lies to the south of Arthur’s Pass, is one of the larger and more 
extensive fault traces within the local source classification. The Scott Fault, Punchbowl 
Fault Zone and Red Rock Fault Zone come to within very close proximity of the village 
itself. The Waimakariri-Rolleston Fault Zone propagates throughout the area defined by 
Mt. Rolleston to the east and similarly the Aicken-O’Malley Fault is splayed throughout 
the Mt. Aicken and Mt. Franklin area to the west of the village. The Newton Fault and 
Hura Fault may also be of seismic significance to the Arthur’s Pass village given their 
location near the southern segment of the Kelly Fault, close to the Alpine Fault. The 
majority of local faults are dextral strike-slip faults. There is no evidence of thrusting along 
any of the faults mentioned above. 
 
Adding to the complexity of the local tectonic landscape is a series of faults forming a 
complex north-south shear zone approximately 750m upstream of the Rough Creek river 
mouth identified by Cave (1982). Due to lack of surface evidence, fault movement could 
not be established but the north-east oriented faults are thought to postdate all other faults 
in the area.  
 
Specific data on slip rates, return periods, average displacements per event and elapsed 
time since the last event are widely unknown for these faults. Consequently, it is not 
possible to employ the probability models to determine the probabilistic risk that exists 
from local sources in this instance. The increasing number of known local faults implies 
that there are still many unknown local faults that have an unlimited capacity to generate 
earthquakes. There will always be a constant background risk of unknown probability 
associated with the faults around Arthur’s Pass, so preparedness rather than prevention is 
the best form of mitigation. 
 
3.5 HISTORICAL EARTHQUAKES  
 
Past earthquakes that have affected Arthur’s Pass constitute the second component of the 
seismicity study. The historical distribution of earthquakes is an important consideration 
when predicting the possible time and location of future fault ruptures because they 
provide information on fault positions, recurrence intervals and future magnitudes. 
 
There are limitations to using historical data for probability models because the earthquake 
information in New Zealand is no more than 150 years old. Many of the larger regional 
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faults have a return period longer than 200 years, so the historical data are not a totally true 
representation of the seismic activity in the country. The earthquakes discussed below 
represent those that had a high enough magnitude to cause damage close to the Arthur’s 
Pass township (Figure 3.6). There is some conflict in the literature on specific magnitudes 
for several earthquake events. For continuity purposes all magnitudes have been taken 
from the GNS Active Faults Database (2008a).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 6. The locations of seven major earthquakes to have affected Arthur’s Pass in recorded history 
(map courtesy of (New Zealand Tour Maps, 2008)). 
1929 Murchison 
M 7.8 
1929 Arthur’s Pass 
M 7.1 
1995 Arthur’s Pass  
M 6.0 
1994 Arthur’s Pass 
M 6.7 1888 Amuri M 7.0-7.3 
1995 Cass 
M 6.3 
1946 Lake Coleridge 
M 6.2 
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3.5.1 The September 1, 1888 Amuri (North Canterbury) earthquake (M 7.0-7.3) 
 
The largest earthquake ever to occur in Canterbury was the 1888 Amuri earthquake that 
ruptured along the Hope River Segment of the Hope Fault associated with the Kakapo 
Fault near the Hanmer Plains (Berryman & Villamor, 2004). Cowan (1989) estimated the 
magnitude at 6.5-6.8 but it was later expressed by Yetton and McCahon (Yetton & 
McCahon, 2006) as 7.0-7.3. The village at Arthur’s Pass had not yet been established in 
1888 but intensities reached MM VII-VIII at the village site (Figure 3.7A) and the road 
sustained considerable damage from landslides and small rockfalls that closed the road for 
several days (Cowan, 1989).  
 
3.5.2 The March 9, 1929 Arthur’s Pass earthquake (M 7.1) 
 
The Arthur’s Pass earthquake is the largest recorded earthquake in Selwyn District since 
European settlement (Yetton & McCahon, 2006). It was felt throughout the South Island. 
The ground shaking intensity was estimated at MM IX at Arthur’s Pass (Figure 3.7B), and 
damage was quite extensive throughout the town. A previous investigation by Yang (1991) 
suggested that the cause was a fault rupture along the Kakapo Fault. This was later 
dispelled by Berryman and Villamor (2004) who concluded that it in fact occurred along 
the newly identified Poulter Fault, at an epicentre approximately 34km north-east of 
Arthur’s Pass village, with a focal depth of 11km.  
 
The earthquake occurred at night when most of the community were at a social dance in a 
building that sustained only minor damage and consequently, no deaths were reported. The 
duration of the shaking was over four minutes, which was enough to cause people to lose 
their footing and for furniture and home contents to be shifted considerable 
distances(Yetton & McCahon, 2006). The aftershocks began almost immediately after the 
main event and they continued for several weeks after the initial earthquake (McSaveney, 
1982a).  
 
The earthquake caused critical structural damage to houses, loss of power to the township 
and generated a state of panic amongst the residents. Other damage included collapsed 
brick chimneys and burst water pipes (Yetton & McCahon, 2006). The railway line was 
warped and broken and the signal wiring damaged. Cracks appeared in concrete at the yard 
and a 1.5km long fissure followed the railway line towards the pass. However, within two 
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days, the railway line had been repaired and the train schedule resumed as normal 
(McSaveney, 1982a). The road was severely damaged by rock debris and in several places 
was completely buried or rigorously cracked. Approximately 1km south of the village, the 
road had been removed by a large rock slide, and numerous oversized boulders had fallen 
from the steep slopes and dented the road (Yetton & McCahon, 2006). Repairs to the road 
took several months before it was reopened, and included restoration of a substantially 
damaged section of highway in the Otira Gorge.  
 
All the bridges leading to Christchurch survived but most sustained ground subsidence at 
the base of their abutments and were unapproachable. The Otira tunnel remained intact and 
the only related damage was some cracks found in the railway embankments at the Otira 
end of the tunnel entry (McSaveney, 1982a).  
 
Further investigation of the landscape uncovered a number of landslides and rockfalls in 
the surrounding hills, which continued for up to four years after the initial earthquake 
(Pettinga et al., 2001). Possibly the most significant of these was the Falling Mountain rock 
avalanche in which 60 million cubic metres of greywacke rock sheared off a 900m ridge 
into the Otehake River valley (SoftRock NZ, 2008b). Speight (1933) was the first to 
document the scientific implications of the earthquake, in which he identified a narrow belt 
of approximately 40km long by 4km wide within the National Park that showed an 
intensified susceptibility to landslides and rock instabilities compared to the surrounding 
areas. To account for this anomalous landslide distribution, it was suggested by Berryman 
and Villamor (2004) that this zone represented the locality of the fault trace, which is 
estimated at 16-36km long. This is further substantiated by fresh scarps that were identified 
in this landslide zone that contradict the Kakapo Fault trace proposed by Yang (1991), 
along which no active fault rupture could be found (Berryman & Villamor, 2004).  
 
Other geomorphic changes included the appearance of huge dislodged boulders that 
travelled down the slopes to rest behind many of the houses. They can still be observed on 
School Terrace amongst the hostel buildings. The Devil’s Punchbowl Falls were 
dramatically transformed when the earthquake caused the front rock face to shear off, 
which deposited large amounts of debris into the rock pools below. There was also a minor 
slip nearby that choked the stream and forced the water to travel through the debris to 
reach the Bealey River (McSaveney, 1982b). 
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3.5.3 The June 17, 1929 Murchison (Buller) earthquake (M 7.8) 
 
The timing of the Buller earthquake shifted much of the focus from the Arthur’s Pass 
earthquake because of its large size and extent. It was centred on the west coast of the 
South Island (outside Selwyn District) approximately 15km north of Murchison (West 
Coast ELifelinesG 2006). It became the second largest recorded earthquake in New 
Zealand history and was felt over the entire Canterbury region (Yetton & McCahon, 2006). 
Shaking intensities at Arthur’s Pass were approximately MM VI (Downes & Institute of 
Geological & Nuclear Sciences Limited., 1995) (Figure 3.7C), but damage was limited to 
items falling off shelves and minor interruptions to telephone and electricity lines (Yetton 
& McCahon, 2006). Geomorphic changes that occurred as a consequence of this 
earthquake at Arthur’s Pass were minimal because much of the unstable material had been 
dislodged in the earthquake three months earlier (McSaveney, 1982b).  
 
3.5.4 The June 26, 1946 Lake Coleridge earthquake (M 6.2) 
 
The Lake Coleridge event was comprised of a number of confirmed tremors recorded over 
several days (Stirling et al., 2007). Numerous unconfirmed reports also surfaced that 
indicate there were hundreds of small earthquakes, which were not captured by recording 
instruments. The M 6.2 was the principal earthquake and was preceded by a M 4.3 tremor 
only minutes prior, and followed by numerous aftershocks that continued sporadically until 
the end of 1949 (Eiby, 1990). The extent of the shaking was widespread, and it was felt 
over most of the South Island. The epicentre was determined to be near Mt. Cheeseman in 
the Castle Hill Basin (Yetton & McCahon, 2006) and maximum intensities reached MM 
VII within a 50km radius of the epicentre (Eiby, 1990) (Figure 3.7D). At Arthur’s Pass the 
maximum intensity was MM VI but no damage was recorded in the area.  
 
3.5.5 The June 18, 1994 Arthur’s Pass (Avoca River) earthquake (M 6.7) 
 
The Arthur’s Pass earthquake became the first well-documented seismic event in the 
Arthur’s Pass region. The epicentre was located along a north-north-west trending fault 
approximately 13km south-west of the village (Berrill et al., 1995). Two M 5.8 and 5.6 
aftershocks were recorded within three days of the first tremor and located approximately 
15km south-east of initial epicentre (Arnadottir et al., 1995). Shaking reports extended 
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throughout the South Island and along the southern half of the North Island, with 
intensities at Arthur’s Pass up to MM VII (Yetton & McCahon, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 7. Isoseismal maps of historical earthquakes affecting Arthur’s Pass. A. 1888 Amuri earthquake,  
B. 1929 Arthur’s Pass earthquake, C. 1929 Murchison (Buller) earthquake and D. 1946 Lake Coleridge 
earthquake (Pettinga et al., 2001). 
A 
Arthur’s 
Pass 
B 
Arthur’s 
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Arthur’s 
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Whilst structural damage to houses was limited, there was contents damage in many of the 
buildings (Berrill et al., 1995). In the Bealey Valley, the road was slightly affected and 
remained closed temporarily while minor cracks in the bitumen were filled and small 
rockfalls cleared away. Some embankment slumping was evident on the road in addition to 
rock debris from flows and dislodged boulders (Yetton & McCahon, 2006). Berrill et al 
(1995) also documented the high number of joint openings in highly jointed rocks near 
Bealey Spur and noted that many avalanches were triggered nearby. Local residents 
reported several fresh scars that appeared on the hill slopes surrounding the township and 
identified huge boulders in Rough Creek that had fallen to land in the creek bed (Vaile, 
2007).  
 
Berrill et al (1995) resolved that high rainfall was responsible for putting strain on unstable 
slopes and embankments prior to the earthquake, generating mass movements in the 
months before the earthquake. This accounted for the lack of earthquake-triggered slope 
failures that occurred as a result of the tremors.   
 
3.5.6 The May 29, 1995 Arthur’s Pass earthquake (M 6.0)  
 
Although the 1995 Arthur’s Pass earthquake had a lower magnitude than the earthquake a 
year previously, there were major differences in the severity and scope of slope failures in 
the Arthur’s Pass National Park, with the 1995 earthquake causing the most damage 
(Paterson & Berrill, 1995). The earthquake had an epicentre approximately 14km west of 
Arthur’s Pass and 17km north of the 1994 event (Yetton & McCahon, 2006). It was felt 
over most of the South Island.  
 
The highway incurred the most damage but the village remained relatively intact. Two 
aftershocks of magnitude M 4.5 and 3.9 occurred almost immediately after the first 
earthquake (Pettinga et al., 2001). The epicentre had a closer proximity to Arthur’s Pass 
than the 1994 event and as a result the steep, unstable slopes were most affected (Paterson 
& Berrill, 1995). Major damage was sustained along the Zig Zag section of the Otira 
Gorge road which was subsequently closed for several days due to debris flows and 
slumping. The road was closed again several weeks later when rainstorms caused 
additional failure of the earthquake-weakened slopes in the valley (Yetton & McCahon, 
2006). South of Arthur’s Pass, the shaking caused some reactivation of debris fans and 
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slumping along the road but it was not severe enough to restrict traffic flow in the area 
(Paterson & Berrill, 1995).  
 
3.5.7 The November 24, 1995 Cass earthquake (M 6.3) 
 
The Cass earthquake is the most recent large-scale earthquake in Selwyn District, and was 
felt as far away as Blenheim and Timaru, with an epicentre very close to the Cass 
settlement. The epicentre was in fact closer to the Arthur’s Pass village than the 1929 
Arthur’s Pass earthquake although it did not cause any reported structural damage at 
Arthur’s Pass (Gledhill et al., 2000). Some minor slope movement was triggered by the 
principal earthquake followed by a M 5.2 aftershock a day later (Pettinga et al., 2001). 
 
3.6 SEISMIC HAZARD EVALUATION 
 
The timing and location of future earthquakes affecting Arthur’s Pass cannot currently be 
predicted with any degree of certainty. The combination of widespread earthquake 
distributions and numerous source locations identify earthquakes as a dispersed hazard, 
which makes the prediction of future tremors difficult. There are methods of improving on 
“best guess” scenarios using probability models, which can assist in preparing 
communities for often inevitable earthquakes, but obtaining a conclusive value for the 
exact time and place of the next earthquake is impossible.   
 
Historically, the most serious earthquake damage occurs in regions around the world with 
two features in common: 
1. Environmental exposure to mountainous terrain and areas susceptible to frequent 
ground failure; 
2. A degree of human vulnerability due to poorly constructed buildings and high 
population densities in dangerous areas.                    (K. Smith, 2004) 
 
Arthur’s Pass is sited on an area with high physical exposure to steep, unstable slopes 
formed of highly-weathered greywacke, containing numerous faults. The permanent 
resident population ranges from 54 to 90 people throughout the year, but the large number 
of tourists that pass through the village expand the population significantly. Thus, the 
population density is comparatively high within the small section of land that bounds the 
 47
village. Using this logic, Arthur’s Pass village is sited in a very dangerous region in terms 
of earthquake hazards.  
 
3.6.1 Classification of hazards 
 
Earthquake hazards can be grouped into 3 categories; primary, transient and secondary 
(Figure 3.8). Primary effects are sustained immediately along the fault trace as a result of 
the fault rupture. In most cases the close proximity to the fault trace results in changes to 
the physical environment along the fault. Transient hazards rapidly follow initial rupture 
and are typically associated with ground shaking. Secondary effects occur seconds to days 
after the initial fault rupture, as a consequence of primary and transient processes (Kovach 
& McGuire, 2003). Tertiary and quaternary hazards follow some time later and are largely 
discussed in subsequent hazard chapters (Table 3.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 8. The classification of earthquake hazards into five main categories based largely on the timing of 
the effects during and after the initial earthquake event. It demonstrates that the impacts from seismic events 
have serious ramifications to other aspects of the region, and that they are long-term and have major 
implications with other hazard processes (adapted from (Kovach & McGuire, 2003)). 
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Table 3. 4. The hierarchy of hazards at Arthur’s Pass, including their associated effects and time frames for their occurrence and repair (based on (Bell, 1999). 
 Consequences of subsurface 
fault rupture 
Features resulting from consequences of fault rupture Time frame of 
consequence 
Time needed to 
restore/repair 
 
 
PRIMARY 
EFFECTS 
 
 
Surface rupture 
- Scarp formation 
- Changes in ground elevation 
- Offsets in previously linear features 
- Ground shaking 
Seconds to minutes 
Seconds to minutes 
Seconds to minutes 
Seconds to hours 
(aftershocks) 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
Ground shaking 
- Building damage 
- Loss of exterior lifelines (medical aid, 
telecommunications, food supply) 
- Disconnection of utilities (water supply, electricity, 
sewage, gas supply) 
- Damage to infrastructure (roads, railways, powerlines, 
bridges) 
Seconds to hours 
Seconds to hours 
 
Seconds to minutes 
 
Seconds to hours 
Hours to months 
Hours to weeks 
 
Hours to weeks 
 
Hours to months 
 
 
 
 
 
TRANSIENT 
EFFECTS 
 
 
Social panic 
- Disorder and general hysteria 
- Health issues pertaining to shock, post-traumatic stress 
and anxiety attacks 
Seconds to hours 
Minutes to months 
Minutes to days 
Minutes to months 
 
 
 
Building damage 
- Houses shifting or moving off foundations 
- Walls, windows and doorframes becoming warped or 
skewed 
- Brick chimneys toppling 
- Contents damage 
Seconds to hours 
Earthquake duration 
 
Earthquake duration 
Earthquake duration 
Days to weeks 
Days to weeks 
 
Days to weeks 
Hours to weeks 
 
 
 
 
SECONDARY 
EFFECTS 
 
 
Slope failure 
- Landslides 
- Debris flows 
- Avalanches 
- Slumping 
Seconds to days 
Minutes to days 
Seconds to days 
Seconds to days 
Days to weeks 
Days to weeks 
Days to weeks 
Days to weeks 
 
 
Landslide dam failure 
 
- Breach of landslide dam 
- Flash flooding 
- Slow leakage of water and sediments into the village 
area 
- Partial or total destruction of village 
Hours to weeks 
Hours to weeks 
Days to years 
 
Days to years 
Days to months 
Weeks to years 
Days to years 
 
Weeks to years 
 
 
 
TERTIARY 
EFFECTS 
 
Large-scale rock avalanches 
- Large volumes of sediment moving into the fluvial 
system or directly over the village area 
- Partial or total destruction of village 
Days to months 
 
Days to years 
Weeks to years 
 
Weeks to years 
 
QUATERNARY 
EFFECTS 
 
 
Long-term river aggradation 
- Severe build-up of material near village area, blocking 
river channel. 
- Alteration of mass movement and fluvial patterns.  
- Eradication of entire village. 
Months to years 
 
Months to years 
Months to years 
Weeks to years 
 
Months to years 
Years 
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3.6.1.1 Primary Hazards 
 
The lack of any active fault traces through the village area suggests that primary damage 
sustained directly from a fault rupture is unlikely. Scarp formation and changes in ground 
elevation on the slopes of surrounding mountains such as Mt. Aicken, Avalanche Peak and 
Mt. O’Malley may occur due to the movement of local faults, but they are not major 
concerns in terms of the seismic hazard in the village. 
 
3.6.1.2 Transient Hazards 
 
The effects of transient hazards are a very real issue to the community at Arthur’s Pass. 
Depending on the size of the earthquake, intense ground shaking is very likely near the 
earthquake source, and based on the high number of earthquake sources surrounding the 
town, visible surface waves may be observed during an earthquake. Ground shaking is 
directly responsible for the majority of earthquake hazards. It can sever crucial lifelines 
such as roads, railways, bridges, powerlines and telecommunication links. Past experience 
shows that the roads, railways and bridges are particularly susceptible along State Highway 
73. The road surface and bridge abutments can deteriorate from intense shaking and 
reinforcement of the structure is one of the only methods through which the severity of the 
damage can be reduced.  
 
Because local site conditions (such as soil type, lithology, rock thickness and depth to the 
water table) can influence the severity of ground shaking, it is possible to deduce that the 
Arthur’s Pass region may have the potential to reduce some of the shaking intensity of an 
earthquake because of its local ground conditions. The greywacke bedrock forming the 
Southern Alps is comparatively hard but at Arthur’s Pass it is highly weathered, which 
makes it brittle and more prone to shearing and collapse. However, the water table is deep 
and there is minimal sediment material vulnerable to liquefaction processes. The soil also 
accommodates fertile plant habitats which produces a high degree of slope stability against 
minor events. In many instances, however, the ground shaking will originate from a close 
or large enough source that high intensity ground shaking will be unavoidable and 
uncontrollable. 
 
Liquefaction processes are most pronounced on the sediment-laden Canterbury Plains, 
rather than in the Southern Alps. The hard rock that makes up the Arthur’s Pass region 
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makes it far less susceptible to liquefaction, and there has never been a reported incident of 
liquefaction in the town since first settlement. Therefore, it is it not considered a serious 
threat. 
 
Social panic often accompanies a natural disaster because of the unfamiliarity and danger 
associated with the event. Hysteria and general disorder are typical human reactions in 
times of distress so it is important to have people in the area (often local residents) who 
have been trained to deal with the situation and can take on a leadership role. The 
permanent residents of Arthur’s Pass have witnessed countless natural disasters on a range 
of different scales, and they are aware that they reside in a vulnerable position. They are 
often very willing to learn ways of managing the risks better and are often capable of 
dealing with disasters as they occur. Residents in leadership roles are able to instruct the 
tourist population on what to do when a major earthquake occurs and can keep them as 
calm as possible until outside help arrives. 
 
3.6.1.3 Secondary hazards 
 
The most common types of secondary hazards at Arthur’s Pass are mass movements, such 
as landslides, debris flows and avalanches, which are triggered by intense ground shaking. 
Damage to man-made structures is also a major issue because earthquakes are relatively 
harmless on their own. When buildings are brought into the situation, a hazard is created 
that is very harmful to people. Most earthquake casualties are caused by building collapse 
and mass movements induced by ground shaking (K. Smith, 2004). Mass movement 
hazards are discussed as a separate component in Chapter 4 and will not be reviewed in 
this section. However, it is important to realise that the most hazardous mass movements 
are probably earthquake generated.  The main building damage issues in Arthur’s Pass 
relate to houses moving on their foundations, warped walls and doorways, smashed 
windows, contents damage and chimney collapse. Previous earthquake activity in the 
township has not been responsible for the collapse of entire houses, although the potential 
for it exists with a large event such as an Alpine Fault rupture.  
 
Much of the building construction in Arthur’s Pass village dates back to the early 1900’s 
when minimal attention was paid to the structural soundness of residential dwellings. The 
older style houses have wooden frames, weatherboard exterior walls and tin roofs. The 
newer buildings are typically transportable models, made from either corrugated tin, 
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aluminium or fibreglass with reinforced walls. The structural quality of a building plays an 
important role in determining whether it stands up to ground shaking or not (Burby, 1998). 
Experience shows that the wood-framed buildings at Arthur’s Pass can cope with greater 
amounts of earthquake energy than the more brittle metal and stone buildings, which tend 
to easily buckle, crumble and disintegrate under stress.  
  
The New Zealand Building Code was introduced in 1935 to ensure that all buildings were 
designed and constructed with materials that could withstand the horizontal motion caused 
by earthquakes. The 2004 amendment of the 1991 Building Act states that there are limits 
to the construction and alteration of properties that are subject to one or more natural 
hazards. In the case of Arthur’s Pass, most of the houses were built before the Act was 
passed and thus did not follow any safety specifications. All buildings constructed after 
1935 have some form of earthquake resistance and now many of the pre-1935 dwellings 
have earthquake-proof improvements. The effectiveness of the original Building Code 
1935 design specifications was evident during the 1994 and 1995 Arthur’s Pass 
earthquakes, when there was no recorded structural damage to buildings; contents damage 
was the only issue for residents.  
 
3.7 REGIONAL AND LOCAL SEISMIC HAZARD IMPLICATIONS 
 
In terms of physical and consequential attributes, there are several differences between 
regional and local fault sources. A fault rupture on a regional scale will typically have a 
higher magnitude, longer duration and more intense ground shaking over a larger area 
compared to a locally sourced tremor. A regional earthquake in or near Canterbury would 
affect a large proportion of the South Island and have substantial implications on sizeably 
populated centres such as Christchurch (pop. 344 000), Timaru (pop. 43 000), Greymouth 
(pop. 10 000) and Westport (pop. 6 000) (Statistics New Zealand, 2006).  
 
The main concern with an earthquake of widespread consequence is that the resources 
available to assist small communities like Arthur’s Pass would be severely restricted. Due 
to its isolation within the Southern Alps, and the high probability of road and rail damage 
during an earthquake, the only realistic method of transport to Arthur’s Pass is by 
helicopter. If road and rail transport were possible, the help available to Arthur’s Pass from 
outside sources would still be very limited, so the community would have to cope on its 
own for an indeterminate period of time.  
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Earthquakes at Arthur’s Pass generated from local faults may still produce large-magnitude 
events but the difference is that the large towns such as Christchurch and Greymouth are 
not as likely to be critically affected by them. Consequently, there will be more help 
available to the Arthur’s Pass community from nationwide resources such as search and 
recovery teams, medical facilities, rescue helicopters, communication centres, bulldozers 
and earth movers and structural engineers. This will alleviate the stress in a shorter amount 
of time by limiting the amount of damage caused in the village and reducing the recovery 
time after an earthquake.  
 
Buildings within the village will be susceptible to shaking durations of up to a couple of 
minutes, with aftershocks lasting up to months after the initial shock, depending on the 
fault source. Heavy damage or total destruction of unreinforced masonry buildings is 
likely, chimneys will crumble and houses will move off their foundations (Stirling et al., 
2007). 
 
The roads along State Highway 73 and throughout the town are likely to become cracked, 
warped and partially removed or blocked by mass movements during a tremor of medium 
to large-scale. Damage to the road is a common problem in the Arthur’s Pass National 
Park. Temporary road closures have occurred repeatedly since the road was first 
established in the late nineteenth century, and are expected to continue well into the future.  
 
The bridges along the highway and throughout the town are essential for vehicular 
transport but are very sensitive to ground shaking. On the eastern side of the pass near the 
town are the McGrath Stream bridge, Rough Creek rail and road bridges, Avalanche Creek 
bridge, White Bridge and the Waimakariri road and rail bridges, which are all at risk. 
Rough Creek and Avalanche Creek are easily crossable on foot throughout the year and 
McGrath Stream and the Bealey River are negotiable with the right equipment. Due to the 
nature of its boulder sized bedload, Rough Creek would not be passable by vehicles if the 
road and rail bridges were out of order.  
 
The main powerlines roughly follow the highway. Disconnection of the power supply or 
uprooting of the power poles may occur as a result of ground shaking, but it is fairly simple 
to relocate powerlines that are in a vulnerable position. Relocation is a fairly common 
practice in the area and work is currently being undertaken to bury the above-ground 
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powerlines throughout the village so that while they may still be affected by widespread 
earthquake activity, they are removed from other hazard processes.  
 
Both the Vodafone and Telecom satellite towers are located in the railway yards and 
provide the village with full mobile phone coverage. Damage to these towers would result 
in the disconnection of mobile services and therefore amplify communication issues. 
Powerlines are currently above ground but are scheduled to be buried as part of the $2 
million upgrade to the town (Department of Conservation, 2007), which will reduce the 
risk to power transmission in the village from earthquakes and meteorological hazards. 
 
The drinking water is sourced locally from Avalanche Creek, and is UV-treated and 
filtered before reaching the buildings. Ground shaking may sever water pipes to individual 
houses but the lack of water is not expected to be a major issue because of the abundant 
and relatively clean river water from Bealey River, Rough Creek, Devils Punchbowl Creek 
and McGrath Stream. Contamination from sediment deposition or sewage leakage may 
occur in selected catchments, but the number of diverse water sources should provide at 
least one clean water supply for stricken residents.  
 
3.8 EARTHQUAKE MITIGATION METHODS 
 
The key to coping with any earthquake hazard is preparedness and preparation. Other than 
earthquake-proofing houses and controlling hazard zonation in the town, the only method 
of restricting the severity of damage after an earthquake event is to increase community 
resilience through hazard awareness, self-preparedness and effective response and recovery 
plans. 
 
Risk reduction is carried out using earthquake protection methods, such as hazard-resistant 
structural designs and environmental control. Environmental control is a direct method that 
acts to suppress the earthquake at its source (K. Smith, 2004). Due to the complexity and 
abundance of faults near Arthur’s Pass, this is essentially an impossible task, and more 
indirect methods are used. Engineering solutions such as the use of earthquake-resistant 
buildings have been discussed previously, and must be applied in conjunction with detailed 
soil and rock mechanic investigations. These investigations were not carried out during the 
formation of the township and as a result, the buildings are not always sited in the most 
ideal locations. The houses on the Rough Creek debris fan and on School Terrace have the 
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highest risk of exposure to secondary effects, predominately from falling debris. Secondary 
effects will be discussed further in the mass movement hazard assessment in Chapter 4. 
 
Avoidance solutions keep people and buildings away from potential earthquake prone 
areas within the town boundaries. Because of the lack of surface fault traces running 
through the town, surface rupture damage to buildings appears negligible and there are no 
specific areas that have a higher risk than others; it is assumed that the risks from primary 
earthquake hazards such as surface rupture and changes in ground level are low, but 
constant, for the entire area of the town. The main objective is to avoid zones that may be 
subject to falling debris or slope failure.  
 
Creating a resilient community at Arthur’s Pass is done by educating visitors and residents 
of the potential risks and what steps to take in an emergency. This is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 8. Most residents at Arthur’s Pass have first hand experience of earthquake 
activity and are very aware of the everyday geological risks they are exposed to. They are 
very receptive of the advice given to them about ways of managing the risk and how to 
become more prepared for a natural disaster in the village. There is currently a small 
mention of earthquakes in a corner of the Department of Conservation visitor centre, but 
many of the tourists in the town are unaware of the seismic risks and are not equipped to 
deal with a major seismic event. 
 
3.9 SUMMARY 
 
The seismicity of the Arthur’s Pass region is higher than other areas of the South Island 
due to its location at the confluence of two major fault systems, and as history has shown, 
there is no shortage of earthquake sources or events. The principal earthquake hazard 
issues identified in Arthur’s Pass demonstrate that: 
 
1. Earthquake distribution patterns show a gap in deep earthquakes along the central 
South Island that corresponds to the Alpine Fault location. Faults near Arthur’s 
Pass tend not to be represented in surface features and consequently may be 
overlooked by researchers, with potential for there to be large-scale tremors on 
previously unidentified faults.  
2. The Arthur’s Pass region has been identified as the region most likely to experience 
the highest ground acceleration and shaking intensity in Canterbury because of its 
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location, with ground shaking intensities expected to reach up to MM X during a 
large-scale event such as an Alpine Fault rupture.  
3. Both regional and local faults have been identified as potential seismic threats to 
Arthur’s Pass village. The Alpine Fault, Marlborough Fault Zone, Harper Fault and 
Porters Pass-Amberley Fault Zone represent larger faults more than 15km from the 
village, whilst the local faults within 15km of the village are the Kelly Fault, Hura 
Fault, Bruce Fault, Red Rock Fault Zone, Scott Fault and Aicken-O’Malley Fault, 
among others. Countless unnamed and unidentified faults are dispersed throughout 
the region, providing a constant background risk of potentially damaging 
earthquakes at Arthur’s Pass. 
4. Historical earthquakes provide crucial information that can be used for earthquake 
prediction and analysis. Several significant earthquakes have affected the Arthur’s 
Pass community in recorded history, with varied consequences. The most 
significant of these was the 1929 Arthur’s Pass earthquake, which resulted in 
extensive slope failures, road closures, disruption to the railway line, property 
damage and social panic. 
5. Arthur’s Pass village is in a very vulnerable position because of its environmental 
exposure to earthquake hazards. Primary, transient and secondary effects associated 
with earthquakes such as surface rupture, ground shaking, structural damage, social 
panic and earthquake-triggered mass movements have the potential to heavily 
disrupt the Arthur’s Pass community.  
6. A large-scale earthquake event is likely to have serious implications at Arthur’s 
Pass. In such an event there is likely to be loss of lifelines and services such as 
electricity, gas, communication lines, transport routes and sewage systems. 
Critically, it is possible that external resources needed for rescue and welfare will 
not be available to the village for a extended length of time after the event and as a 
result the village will have to be self-sufficient during this period.  
7. As earthquakes cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty, the best 
earthquake mitigation methods are preparedness and preparation. Non-invasive 
methods such as increasing community awareness through hazard education and 
the implementation of effective emergency plans are the most ideal methods of 
earthquake management. Additionally, risk reduction can be achieved by 
introducing hazard-resistant structural solutions to buildings and controlling land 
use in hazardous areas. As a last resort, avoidance solutions may be required to 
remove people and buildings from potential earthquake-prone areas.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METEOROLOGICAL HAZARDS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is the second of four specific hazard chapters. Meteorological events 
contribute greatly to the natural hazard risk at Arthur’s Pass and are controlled by several 
climatic processes operating throughout the region. Weather-related hazards can be 
particularly damaging because they occur frequently and repeatedly and have a 
concentrated intensity within a limited area. One of the prime advantages of weather-
related hazards is that they can be predicted with some certainty up to several days in 
advance, thus allowing sufficient time for community preparedness. In most cases the 
threat comes not directly from meteorological processes, but from conditions that are 
generated by these processes, as secondary hazards. Extreme weather events are more 
likely to be responsible for property damage and minor injuries and less likely to be the 
cause of severe injury or death compared to other natural hazards. 
 
The prime aims of this meteorological hazard assessment are: 
1. To identify and define all possible hazards caused by inclement weather at Arthur’s 
Pass village and it surrounds, including Temple Basin Ski Field. 
2. To describe and analyse historical weather events that have significantly affected 
Arthur’s Pass.  
3. To determine where the hazards are most likely to generate damage and where the 
areas most vulnerable to specific hazards are located.  
4. To analyse the projected effect of climate change and global warming on other 
natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass. 
5. To evaluate current mitigation methods at Arthur’s Pass and explore possible 
improvements to existing mitigation methods. 
 
4.2 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
The foremost method of evaluating the meteorological hazards at Arthur’s Pass is the 
examination and extrapolation of weather data. Because climate is so highly variable, it 
requires long-term observations in order to be useful. Constant monitoring of the local 
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climate for less than several years is not sufficient to show any long-term trends, therefore, 
weather information obtained from several different sources has been used to conduct this 
analysis.  
 
Raw climate data were supplied by the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric 
Research (NIWA) and extend back to 1955. Daily rainfall data and monthly temperature 
values for each year were available. Snow data were somewhat more limited and simply 
consisted of the number of days that snow fell at Bealey Spur from 1867 to 1880 and at 
Temple Basin from 1966 to 1982. The climate records were used to investigate trends in 
the daily, monthly and yearly averages at Arthur’s Pass. Daily records of rainfall allowed 
for individual storm events to be pinpointed and examined and the monthly temperature 
and rainfall data were useful in obtaining averages and highlighting overall trends.  
 
As with all hazards, past meteorological events that have caused damage or injury have 
been examined to determine the potential for the Arthur’s Pass environment to generate 
future weather-related hazards. Unfortunately, they have not been recorded in as much 
detail as earthquakes and some mass movements, but every attempt has been made to 
illustrate the number of hazardous incidents that have affected the community in the past.  
 
Determining if global climate change has an influence on weather conditions throughout 
the South Island of New Zealand and analysing the effects it does have is a complex task, 
limited in many ways by the relatively new and unexplored issues associated with global 
climate change. Searching for gradual changes in the weather system and finding trends 
that could suggest a rise in the number of harmful global events was undertaken using all 
available climatic data, journal articles, government reports, pamphlets and statements 
from local residents. Whilst climate trends were recognised in the data, it is important to 
note that they have been derived from only 53 years of climatic data and as such are not 
sufficient for long-term climate change analysis.  
 
4.3 THE CLIMATE OF THE SOUTHERN ALPS AND CANTERBURY 
 
The South Island of New Zealand is located within the “roaring forties”; a climatic zone 
predisposed to generate strong, prevailing north-westerly winds and unpredictable weather 
conditions. The prevailing winds deposit large volumes of rain on the west coast of the 
South Island before moving over the Southern Alps and travelling across the Canterbury 
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Plains as warm winds (Mackintosh, 2001) (Figure 4.1). The South Island landmass is 
positioned between a high-pressure atmospheric zone to the north and a low-pressure, 
windy zone to the south. This produces an alternating pattern of anticyclones (fine 
weather) and depressions (poor weather), delivering periods of warm north-westerly, rain-
bearing winds and strong, cold southerlies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1. An exaggerated account of the movement of prevailing north-westerly winds over the Southern 
Alps. Arthur’s Pass would be located on the eastern tip of the mountain peak (Brenstrum, 1989).  
 
It is clear that weather data fluctuate greatly between seasons and every year there are 
perceptible shifts in the trends of rain and temperature influenced by a series of climatic 
factors, including El Nino, the Interdecadal Pacific Oscillation (IPO) and global climate 
change. 
 
4.4 STRONG WINDS 
 
Strong winds are not necessarily associated with thunderstorm activity and hence are not 
always synonymous with rain and adverse weather. In accordance with the Beaufort Wind 
Scale, a strong breeze constitutes winds travelling between 40 and 50km/h. Gale force 
winds exceed 63-75km/h (Australian Bureau of Meteorology, 2007).  
 
4.4.1 Wind hazards specific to Arthur’s Pass 
 
By the time north-westerly winds reach the Arthur’s Pass village, a large proportion of rain 
has been released over the West Coast and the clouds are beginning to dissipate prior to 
their descent onto the Canterbury Plains. North-westerly winds bring the most severe 
weather conditions. They are predominantly accompanied by low intensity showers, but 
they can also be responsible for thunderstorms, giving rise to heavy rain, lightning and 
gale-force winds (Brenstrum, 1993). Southerly winds generate cold, wet conditions but are 
more predictable and usually short-lived.  
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The Southern Alps act as a barrier to the westerly winds and modify the wind patterns near 
Arthur’s Pass. The winds are typically weaker in the winter months but gusts of over 
60km/h are common through the Bealey Valley year-round (Mackintosh, 2001).  
 
Strong winds not associated with thunderstorms are particularly apparent in the Arthur’s 
Pass alpine area when a temperature inversion is present. A temperature inversion occurs 
when a thin proportion of the atmosphere (at approximately 1500m above sea level) rises 
in temperature abruptly as altitude increases, essentially trapping a dense, cold and humid 
air pocket underneath the warm inversion point and causing various weather anomalies 
(Australian Bureau of Meteorology, 2008). At Arthur’s Pass this point usually lies just 
above the highest peaks, allowing for the air to be squeezed over the mountains. However, 
if the inversion point moves below the mountain peaks but above the alpine pass the winds 
become even more confined. This effectively creates a narrow, lateral belt of very strong 
winds that can produce gusts in excess of 100km/h (Brenstrum, 1993).  
 
The most serious consequences of strong winds at Arthur’s Pass are property damage and 
injury or loss of life from flying debris. Roofs and windows are very vulnerable to strong 
wind conditions. Sudden pressure changes within a building have the potential to dislodge 
unreinforced structures and create further hazards to the community (K. Smith, 2004).  
 
Previous incidents of wind gust damage in the village have not been fully recorded, but it 
is suggested that the risk to the community is low, despite the persistence and high 
frequency of gale force winds in the Bealey Valley. The risk is rarely life-threatening if 
people remain indoors and stay away from vulnerable areas. There have been no reported 
fatalities in the Arthur’s Pass village that were the direct result of strong winds. The hazard 
is somewhat constant throughout the whole of the township, but houses situated on the 
poorly sheltered land adjacent to the Bealey River are likely to be most at risk of property 
damage.  
 
4.4.2 Other wind phenomena 
 
The number of tornadoes observed in New Zealand over the last decade suggest that the 
number of incidents is on the rise. Most tornado activity is concentrated in the North Island 
in areas such as Taranaki and Auckland and along coastal South Island, in Waitame for 
example (Reese & Reid, 2007). There is no documented evidence for tornadoes in the 
 60
Arthur’s Pass National Park. Dust storms are also unlikely because there is not enough fine 
particle material available for transport by wind. The conditions that induce dust storms 
and tornadoes rarely exist at Arthur’s Pass, hence the risk is assumed to be negligible. 
 
4.5 THUNDERSTORMS  
 
Thunderstorms occur throughout the Arthur’s Pass National Park several times a year, 
particularly during spring and summer when temperatures are warmer and storm cells are 
likely to develop (Salinger, 1998). They bring prolonged periods of intense rainfall, 
lightning, hail and wind gusts (Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4. 2. A mean sea level atmospheric pressure analysis showing typical South Island thunderstorm 
conditions. This particular storm occurred on 1-5 January 2002, bringing to Arthur’s Pass dense, moist north-
westerly winds, heavy rain and lightning followed by cooler, unstable south-westerly winds accompanied by 
rain and hail. State Highway 73 was closed for a short period due to flooding and minor slips that blocked the 
road (Meteorology Service of New Zealand Ltd, 2002). 
 
4.5.1 Heavy rainfall 
 
The Meteorology Service of New Zealand (MetService) (2001) defines heavy rain as more 
than 100mm falling in a day, or a proportional amount falling over a shorter period of time. 
Heavy rains are chiefly linked to thunderstorms and often coincide with major events such 
as flooding and debris flows.  
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The most likely time of year for rain-induced hazards to occur within the Arthur’s Pass 
National Park is early-spring through to mid-summer when rainfall is at its highest. It is not 
unusual to have thunderstorms and heavy rain sporadically throughout the year, but there 
are markedly less storms during the winter months when snow accumulation is just 
beginning. 
 
Since 1955, it has rained in Arthur’s Pass on average 177 days a year, approximately seven 
of which are days with heavy rain. The number of thunderstorms each year at Arthur’s 
Pass averages between 5 and 9, which is loosely related to the annual number of heavy rain 
days because there is a clear correlation between the two events. In 1963 there were no 
recorded days where rain exceeded 100mm, although the record is slightly incomplete. 
1958 and 1998 had the most heavy rain days at 13 each (NIWA, 2007). This demonstrates 
the capacity for there to be several events taking place during a short length of time, which 
alters the magnitude and severity of the damage sustained by the local environs. 
 
The Arthur’s Pass National Park contributes largely to the upper catchment of the Bealey 
confluence of the Waimakariri River. The largest catchments contributing to the Bealey 
River near the village include the Rough Creek (4.568km2), Punchbowl Creek (4.251km2), 
Upper Twin Creek and Twin Creek (3.750km2), Graham Stream (2.085km2) and McGrath 
Stream (3.855km2) catchments, which all cover extensive areas and transport substantial 
volumes of water to the Waimakariri River confluence. Numerous other small streams 
extend south from the pass that supply water to the Bealey River that also contribute to the 
overall potential for rain-triggered hazards. The ability of local streams to carry high 
quantities of water is limited throughout the Bealey Valley, and therefore overloading of 
the fluvial channels as a result of high sediment inputs can lead to potentially destructive 
river flooding within the Arthur’s Pass village. This is discussed further in Chapter 6.  
 
4.5.1.1 Previous cases of rain-triggered damage in Arthur’s Pass National Park.  
 
Not all major meteorological events at Arthur’s Pass have been recorded. Below are some 
examples of some of the most severe incidents caused by heavy rain in the village that give 
an indication of the risk. 
 
The highest recorded rainfall since 1955 fell on December 2, 1979. It reached 328mm 
during a 24 hour period and triggered a small landslip which landed in a flooded stream 
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channel above the camping ground at Klondyke Corner. This produced a debris flow that 
travelled down the stream channel and killed four campers during the night.  
 
A series of landslips were activated during heavy rains in the months leading up to the 
1994 Arthur’s Pass earthquake. Most occurred in uninhabited sections of Arthur’s Pass 
National Park but some small slips occurred along State Highway 73, causing undermining 
of the road foundations and forming obstructions that closed the route (Paterson, 1996). 
Consequently, damage sustained during the earthquake was minimised because the slopes 
had been denuded by the earlier rains (Berrill et al., 1995). 
 
Most recently on November 14, 2006, 266.5mm of rain fell over a 24 hour period. It was 
responsible for numerous small slips that fell over the highway and closed the road. In the 
same instance, the Bealey River breached its first stopbank and was approximately 0.6m 
from breaching the second stopbank and flooding houses on the riverbank. The culvert on 
the western side of the road became obstructed and water was inadvertently redirected 
around the back of Mountain House backpacker accommodations and through to the 
outdoor education centre, which reported flooding of approximately 0.3m (Vaile, 2007). 
 
4.5.1.2 Hazards associated with heavy rain at Arthur’s Pass 
 
The most prominent primary hazard presented by excessive rainfall is surface flooding 
(Kovach & McGuire, 2003). However, secondary hazards caused or aggravated by rain are 
perhaps the most serious. The extent to which high rainfall can cause slope remobilisation, 
river flooding, and consequential erosion of the natural environment is unconstrained. The 
type of mass movement and the transformation of slopes from a dormant to active stage is 
determined by precipitation intensity and duration (Eisbacher & Clague, 1984). Every 
slope surrounding the Arthur’s Pass township is potentially unstable, every section of the 
riverbed is exposed to scour and flooding of the river is not uncommon. The village lies in 
the centre of this highly dynamic zone, where it is very vulnerable. 
 
Surface flooding is a temporary hazard associated with heavy rainfall and can last from a 
few hours to several days at Arthur’s Pass. It is a major contributing factor to fluvial 
flooding and flash flooding. In the mountainous areas, high slope gradients generally 
provide enough drainage for excess water to flow over saturated soils and accumulate in 
the stream channels below (Wohl, 2000). Within the village, the situation is reversed 
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because of the low-lying nature of the ground and complications presented by the confined 
urban environment. Urbanisation increases surface runoff by reducing the ability of surplus 
water to infiltrate the ground because of the presence of impervious layers such as bitumen 
and concrete (K. Smith, 2004). The loss of soils into which rain can infiltrate amplifies the 
risk of surface flooding within the town and is mostly a threat to low-level buildings. The 
risk to humans from surface runoff is low, although human activities in urban areas may 
impact on the purity of river water by introducing contaminants such as sewage, fuel and 
household waste into the natural river system.  
 
Indirect outcomes of heavy rain such as mass movements and changes to the hydrologic 
cycle are the most serious threats, and are discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively. Because the Bealey Valley is a narrow, steep passage and the village lies 
directly on the Bealey River floodplain, there are restrictions on either side of the current 
river channel due to the mountains. Consequently, there is little room available for 
superfluous water flow, and flooding is the only way of accommodating the extra water.  
 
Heavy rain also diminishes visibility, produces slippery road conditions and creates 
dangerous circumstances for trampers in the national park. These factors may increase the 
likelihood of traffic and mountaineering accidents and slow down the response time of 
emergency services if they are required in the village, as storms lasting several days are not 
uncommon at Arthur’s Pass. 
 
4.5.2  Hailstorms  
 
Severe hailstorms are most common in the coastal regions of the southern South Island. 
Hail is considered to be severe if the diameter is equal to or greater than half a centimetre 
because at this size they are capable of causing major damage (Salinger, 1998). Inland 
climatic regions such as Arthur’s Pass do not generate hail-forming conditions as 
frequently as coastal zones and hence central areas are less susceptible to major hailstorms. 
Hailstorms average less than five annually in the central South Island and throughout the 
Southern Alps, whereas elsewhere on the eastern coast of South Island the average can be 
as much as 20 per year (Meteorological Service of New Zealand Ltd, 1986).  
 
Hail typically develops over New Zealand in cold and unstable southerly or south-westerly 
air masses. The winter and spring months have the highest hail occurrence, but a small 
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number of localised hailstorms occur during summer as part of convective thunderstorm 
activities over land (Williams, 2008). The warm, north-westerly winds that prevail 
throughout the summer months produce thunderstorms with distinct hail-forming 
conditions that give rise to significantly larger hail stones (Meteorological Service of New 
Zealand Ltd, 1986). The Canterbury Plains and foothills are in a prime location to receive 
these weather conditions and are consequently some of the most hail-prone areas in New 
Zealand. 
 
4.5.2.1 Hail at Arthur’s Pass 
 
Arthur’s Pass is intermittently affected by hailstorms, but most do not cause significant 
harm. Severe hailstorms are much more localised and are rare events at Arthur’s Pass. The 
main issues with hailstorms, such as personal injury and property damage, become a 
problem when the size of the hailstones is sufficiently large to cause disruption the 
community and its infrastructure. 
 
People caught outdoors in a hailstorm can usually access shelter nearby; at Arthur’s Pass 
there is usually adequate cover in the vicinity (such as trees or buildings) to shelter under. 
Minor injuries may result if people are in open spaces with no available protection. The 
risk is rarely life threatening.  
 
Elsewhere in New Zealand, hailstorms are often responsible for losses of crop and 
livestock. Arthur’s Pass has a low production potential, no livestock and no established 
crops, which limits the impact of a severe hailstorm on the towns’ economy. Tourism is 
unlikely to be affected by a hailstorm because even in extreme cases the impact will be 
moderate, have a brief duration and a short recovery time. Presently, hail is largely a 
nuisance to the community rather than a clear danger.  
 
4.5.3  Lightning hazards 
 
The peak time for lightning strikes is in the mid-late afternoon when a thunderstorm has 
built up to full strength (Williams, 2008). It is one of the few natural hazards for which 
effective protection is not readily available. Direct human contact with lightning is highly 
unlikely within the Bealey Valley, because of the abundance of taller, more conductive 
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objects within the town such as power pylons, roof antennas and trees. Therefore, the 
direct risk to humans from lightning strikes is considered to be very low. 
 
Even in small population centres like Arthur’s Pass, lightning can be responsible for power 
surges and house fires. A handful of lightning-related house fires have been documented 
since the formation of the township that have partially or fully destroyed permanent houses 
and holiday homes in the town. A “bach” on the upper northern edge of the Rough Creek 
fan was almost burnt down in late 2004 (Causer, 2007). The house at the time was 
uninhabited and the building was salvageable and later rebuilt, but this highlights the 
potential for small natural hazards to become serious risks in rare cases.  
 
Due to the difficulties in mitigating lightning hazards and the low risk factor associated 
with them, safety measures that apply to all storm hazards should be implemented as 
protection against lightning strike. 
 
4.6 FIRE 
 
Fires have many natural sources, and are often influenced by climatic factors. Within the 
urban environment of the village, sources of fire ignition due to natural hazards include 
lightning strike and disruption to electrical lines during an earthquake. Man-made sources 
such as kitchen fires and those caused by candles or heating appliances are considered to 
be the most dangerous to humans and property. They are also expected to occur more 
often.  
 
Natural scrub fires caused by lightning occur in the warmer months, although wildfires 
within close proximity to the town are unlikely to become life threatening because they are 
often noticed and dealt with whilst still in the early stages. They are fuelled by dry 
vegetation, especially during periods of drought, and the hot north-westerly winds driven 
down through the Bealey Valley.  
 
The village has a volunteer fire brigade formed of local residents with an alarm bell and 
fire shed in the centre of town. This ensures immediate action is taken in the event of a fire 
which can potentially save many lives, because there is little time for the fire to spread and 
become out of control.  
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4.7 SNOW-RELATED HAZARDS 
 
Arthur’s Pass is a popular winter recreational area because it receives a moderate to high 
amount of snow each year. The Temple Basin Ski Field is just north of the village and 
provides good opportunities for snow sports. Heavy snowfall is defined as more than 25cm 
of snow in one day, or 10cm of snow in six hours (Salinger, 1998), but in this assessment it 
also includes thick and sustained snow cover that disrupts normal community activities.   
 
It is difficult to judge the true extent of snow at Arthur’s Pass because the records are very 
incomplete and do not hold any information on snow depth or duration, nor have they been 
taken directly from within the town itself. The data supplied from Temple Basin (elevation 
1554m ASL) and Bealey Spur (elevation 649m ASL) are not representative of snow in the 
village because Temple Basin is much more elevated and therefore receives a greater 
amount of snow each year. Bealey Spur is likely to have conditions more similar to 
Arthur’s Pass, but the records document only a short interval between 1867 and 1880. 
 
4.7.1 Heavy snowfall at Arthur’s Pass 
 
Since the crossing of the Southern Alps through the Arthur’s Pass was accomplished in 
1865, the road has been subjected to frequent closure from excessive snowfalls. In the 
winter of 1878, up to 4.5m of snow was recorded at Arthur’s Pass, and heavy snows 
stopped the Cobb & Co coach company from going through the pass for three months in 
1895 (Odell et al., 1966). Throughout the 20th century, Arthur’s Pass was at the receiving 
end of a series of snowstorms that severely affected Canterbury and Otago, often closing 
the road and forcing local residents and tourists to be self sufficient for extended periods of 
time (Campbell, 1998).  
 
Heavy snowfall is a primary contributor to avalanche formation, and can lead to the 
development of very hazardous conditions for trampers and climbers in the national park. 
The village now has access to snow-moving equipment, but it is common for conditions to 
become too dangerous for road users. In these cases, gates have been installed along State 
Highway 73 that close the road to traffic until the safety problems have been fixed.  
 
Examination of the hazards resulting from snowfall were limited by the low winter 
snowfalls during the 2007 season. Very little snowfall persisted at the village ground level 
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and Temple Basin Ski Field did not open as a result of the depleted snow levels (Scott, 
2007) (Figure 4.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 3. Snow levels at Temple Basin Ski Field for the past six winters, showing great fluctuations in 
snow depths from year to year. The 2007 season was poor and ended early whilst the 2006 season was 
considered above average for snow levels (Scott, 2007).  
 
4.7.2 Snow Avalanches 
 
In the context of natural hazards in New Zealand, snow avalanches are regarded as 
relatively minor compared to more widespread threats like earthquakes and floods, and 
have received little attention until recently. In the past, there have been deficiencies in the 
level of research relating to the avalanche hazard evaluation, in terms of their causative 
factors, transport mechanisms and prediction. Additionally, the hazard awareness was 
lacking in communities with a high proportion of people undertaking recreational activities 
in snow conditions throughout New Zealand. Over the last 30 years, steps have been taken 
to rectify these inadequacies and as a consequence, a number of training courses, public 
information campaigns, emergency response plans and avalanche identification guides 
have been created to deal with these issues.  
 
Despite the introduction of several schemes designed to reduce the incidence of avalanches 
and the number of fatalities caused by avalanches in New Zealand, the annual number of 
reported deaths is increasing exponentially over time (Irwin, MacQueen, & Owens, 2002) 
(Figure 4.4). This is attributed to a rise in the number of people using the alpine snow areas 
for recreational activities. Clearly there is a need for greater efforts in educating the alpine 
 
    TEMPLE BASIN SNOW DEPTH 
 68
users and ensuring that they are taking appropriate precautions and perceiving the risk as it 
stands in the real environment. 
 
Snow avalanches are most prevalent in the Arthur’s Pass National Park during the peak 
winter months; typically between June and September. Unusually, up to 19% of avalanches 
occur during December and January in the upper alpine areas that contain permanent snow 
stores (Irwin et al., 2002). Arthur’s Pass is the second most avalanche-prone area in New 
Zealand after Mt Cook, and the majority of avalanche activity is observed in the vicinity of 
Temple Basin and in the valleys surrounding Mt. Rolleston.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 4. Avalanche fatalities in New Zealand during 1860 to 1999, showing an exponential increase in 
the number of avalanche deaths (Irwin et al., 2002). The 41 deaths recorded in 1863 are attributed to a single 
event in Otago (Nelson Examiner, 1863). 
 
4.7.2.1 Conditions for avalanche occurrence 
 
In conducting an avalanche hazard evaluation, studying the interrelationships of four key 
variables is critical:  
 
 
 
 
 
SNOWPACK – The amount and location of precipitation and its transport by wind are 
primary factors in determining snowpack conditions. The snow released during a storm 
controls the total load on the mountain slopes and the rate of loading. Initiation of slope 
failure occurs when critical loading had been reached (Dingwall, 1977). The snowpack can 
be destabilised by secondary factors such as the local meteorological conditions. The 
strength of the snow and tendency to avalanche varies greatly with different crystal types. 
TERRAIN – The ideal slope gradient for avalanche occurrence is 25° to 40°. Slope 
gradients can also influence the type of avalanche, forming slab avalanches or powder 
avalanches. Avalanches are fundamental erosional agents and have to ability to scar the 
landscape quite severely.  
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Avalanche forecasting relies on a combination of practical skills, experience, field testing 
using instrumentation and semi-quantitative analytical methods (Dingwall, 1977), all of 
which are utilised for avalanche prevention in Arthur’s Pass. There are high variations in 
the average number of avalanche events per year, with large fluctuations in the number of 
recorded incidents throughout the national park, so it is not always possible to rely on 
historical data to provide an insight into future avalanches.  
 
4.7.2.2 Avalanche zones and the risk to Arthur’s Pass village and surrounds 
 
Extreme avalanche risk zones have been identified throughout Arthur’s Pass National Park 
(Table 4.1). The township at Arthur’s Pass is not considered to be at high risk of a direct 
avalanche flow, because the slopes forming the lower Bealey Valley are typically greater 
than 50° and do not often allow for excessive snow loading to occur. Avalanches are most 
likely to form on slopes with gradients between 25° and 40°, but it is possible for them to 
form in areas as flat at 15° and as steep as 60° (Schreiber, 2003). Spindrift avalanches 
(fine-grained snow carried by wind or falling gently) can dislodge any snow accumulations 
on the slopes around the village, so large slab avalanches are much less common. Spindrift 
deposits are rarely dangerous because they transport small amounts of snow and can be 
quite predictable (Kates, 2007).  
 
Very few avalanches initiate in the forested areas – they are most often triggered in high, 
open areas covered by alpine scrubland and scree – but they do occur in lower elevations 
with seasonal snow cover. Consequently, they are not limited to the solely the upper alpine 
regions of the park (Fitzharris, Lawson, & Owens, 1999). Nevertheless, it is probable that 
the forested areas would slow down or stop an advancing avalanche before it reached the 
settlement. 
 
HUMAN FACTORS – The activities of humans in avalanche-prone areas is the primary 
factor in the incidence of avalanches. Naturally-occurring avalanches are more predominant 
in Arthur’s Pass than other areas in New Zealand but most are initiated by users of the 
national park (Atkins, 2000).  
WEATHER – 90% of avalanches occur after periods of heavy snow and during or 
immediately following a storm. Weather can be responsible for triggering an avalanche 
directly, it can increase slope stability through an increase in temperature and is able to 
induce fluctuations of the freezing level during storms (Dingwall, 1977). 
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Area Avalanche Characteristics Risk Factors 
 
 
 
 
Bealey Valley and 
Rough Creek 
 
Avalanche and avalanche-triggered 
rockfalls from treeline, and unstable 
avalanche debris throughout the valley. 
Powder avalanches can travel up to 700m 
through the base of the valley, demolishing 
trees through the Bealey Chasm. Trim-lines 
exist along the valley floor, indicating 
potential levels of fill from past and future 
flows. 
 
 
MODERATE AVALANCHE 
BEHAVIOUR. 
 
Danger to trampers and climbers, 
particularly in the upper reaches of the 
valleys where ice and deep snow is 
present, and flows have the potential 
to fill parts of the valley.  
 
 
 
 
 
Temple Basin 
 
Flows occur along Twin Creek from the 
flanks of Mt. Cassidy and on the Downhill 
Basin from Mt. Temple. Phipps Peak Basin 
and below Temple Buttress are prone to 
flows from the surrounding faces. Slab 
avalanches occur along the Blimit 
ridgelines above the ski field lodges.  
 
EXTREME AVALANCHE 
BEHAVIOUR. 
 
Danger to users of the ski fields, 
particularly in ski patrollers 
conducting checks in cross country 
areas. Destruction of ski lodge 
buildings is possible from flows 
travelling down the Blimit basin.  
 
 
 
 
Crow Valley and 
Avalanche Peak 
 
North of Crow Hut flows can occur through 
the entire valley from Mt. Rolleston, Mt. 
Lancelot and the ridges formed by 
Avalanche Peak. Flows are able to reach the 
head of McGrath Stream. 
 
EXTREME AVALANCHE 
BEHAVIOUR. 
 
Danger to trampers and rock climbers 
in the valley from avalanches and 
rockfalls caused by avalanches, 
particularly when traversing 
Avalanche Peak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Otira Valley 
 
Flows from Mt. Philistine to the footbridge 
and along Goldney Ridge and Otira Slide 
from May to November. Paths are up to 
1000m long and powder flows can be up to 
300m vertically. Flows are capable of 
travelling across the valley floor and 
crossing the Otira River. 
 
EXTREME AVALANCHE 
BEHAVIOUR. 
 
Danger to trampers on the Otira Valley 
walking track, and potential of damage 
to the footbridge cutting off access. 
Large flows are likely and can be 
initiated across most locations 
throughout the valley.  
 
 
 
Table 4. 1. Significant avalanche zones in the Arthur’s Pass vicinity. Avalanches are unlikely to reach the 
village directly, but avalanches will have indirect implications on conditions within the village and are a 
major hazard to park users outside the village area (Kates, 2007).  
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Evidence of previous avalanches can be identified by depressions in the treeline, 
particularly in the upper reaches of Rough Creek and dispersed over Avalanche Peak, but 
in some cases it is not possible to discern previous flows if they are old because the forest 
has fully recovered. Since the formation of the township, there have been no confirmed 
avalanches within the bounds of the village, although the records are somewhat incomplete 
and omit any details related to injury, property damage and disruption to communication 
lines. 
 
The chances of surviving an avalanche are low if the victim is buried by the flow 
(O'Loughlin & Owens, 1979). Despite advances in rescue techniques and response 
equipment, the chances of survival are more than 90% after 15 minutes, but significantly 
diminish to less than 30% after 45 minutes (Falk, Brugger, & Adler-Kastner, 1994).  
 
Almost all avalanche deaths within the national park have been to recreational users of the 
alpine areas. Since 1926, 12 people have been killed by avalanches (Kates, 2008). By far 
the majority of casualties are climbers, but skiers, trampers, rescue workers and people 
undergoing snow-skill training have also been killed. Temple Basin Ski Field has the 
highest population concentration in a major avalanche-prone area and regular avalanches 
occur there. Avalanche control work is currently undertaken at Temple Basin. 
 
There may be potential for isolated avalanche events within the township in the future as 
average temperatures increase and the snow becomes more unstable, but presently the risk 
is low. Away from the village, however, the risk to trampers, climbers and skiers is very 
high as they traverse across much more avalanche-prone zones.  
 
4.7.3  Black ice and frost 
 
Black ice is a concern both on the roads and on village footpaths, although it is more of an 
individual risk and is unlikely to cause injury the town on a large-scale. It is also a very 
temporary hazard and is typically only evident during the winter and early spring months 
when temperatures drop quickly enough at night for the ice to form. In the past people 
have been treated for back injuries, bruising and lacerations as a result of falling on black 
ice, and car accidents associated with black ice on the roads are a recurring hazard each 
year (SoftRock NZ, 2008a). 
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4.8 CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL WARMING 
 
Climate change and global warming have become major environmental and political issues 
throughout the world in the 21st century. Both are showing signs of having a profound 
effect on the incidence and severity of natural hazards and on their impact on physical 
resources, societal effects and the economic costs associated with more disasters.  
 
There is conclusive evidence that human activities have interfered with the Earth’s natural 
climatic patterns in the last 10 000 years (Kovach & McGuire, 2003). The effects of 
climate change manifest as direct changes to global, regional and local climate such as 
changes in temperature and rainfall averages, and as secondary effects such as damage to 
essential infrastructure and economic losses (O'Donnell, 2007).  
 
Climate change is regarded as any prolonged change or shift in climatic trends, over highly 
variable spatial and temporal scales (K. Smith, 2004). A sustained shift of more than 10 
years is widely accepted as constituting climate change. It can be caused both by natural 
processes and human activities and is fundamentally an alteration of the chemical 
composition of Earth’s atmosphere (O'Donnell, 2007). 
 
Global warming refers specifically to a consistent measured increase in the annual surface 
temperature of the Earth, which is likely to trigger changes in other climatic phases (K. 
Smith, 2004). It has far-reaching consequences for environmental hazards. Global warming 
can easily be considered as a natural hazard because it is dealt with in much the same way 
as other natural hazards. A government’s adaptation to global warming includes the 
improvement of strategic infrastructure to cope with natural hazard situations brought 
about by the effects of climate change so it is dealt with in much the same way as other 
natural hazards.  
 
4.8.1 Global climate change 
 
The general consensus among scientific experts is that human activities have been largely 
responsible for the increase in global surface temperatures in the last 50 years. There is 
overwhelming scientific data on past trends to support this statement (Figure 4.5). 
However, it is considerably more difficult to calculate the projected reaction of Earth 
systems to such climatic modifications (New Zealand Climate Change Office, 2004). 
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Several global climate changes have already been observed: 
- The 1990’s have been identified as the hottest decade since records began in 1850.  
- Average global surface temperatures have increased by approximately 0.74°C since 
1900. 
- Irreversible accumulation of greenhouse gases has taken place over the last century.  
- There has been a rise in the average global sea level of 0.17m since 1900.  
- The warming trend in the last 50 years compared to the last 100 years has almost 
doubled to an average warming rate of 0.13°C per decade.   
- There has been a marked increase in the incidence and economic, social and 
environmental consequences of natural disasters over the last few decades.  
         (O'Donnell, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 5. New Zealand average annual surface temperature trends for the period 1865 to 1997 show an 
increase in average surface temperatures which may be attributed to climate change and global warming 
((NIWA, 2007) in (Salinger, 1998)). 
 
 
Smith (2004) argues that the statistical probability of most extreme natural events is not 
well understood and that natural disasters occur infrequently enough that any perceived 
increase in weather stress could be attributed to atmospheric variation rather than global 
warming. Similarly, it is possible to reason that a percentage of natural disasters 
supposedly caused by the effects of global warming could be attributed to increases in the 
exposure and vulnerability of humans to such disasters. Also, it is impossible to precisely 
determine how much of the recorded climate change is anthropogenic and therefore how 
greatly human activities are contributing to the overall condition of the atmosphere (K. 
Smith, 2004). However, much of the most recent research shows that there has been an 
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observed increase in extreme meteorological trends, which is consistent with global 
warming (Australian Bureau of Meteorology, 2002).  
 
The effects of global warming may not be immediately apparent, and it is expected to take 
several centuries before the full effects are experienced (Australian Bureau of 
Meteorology, 2002). Similarly, once the issue of global warming has been addressed and 
action taken to reverse the effects humans have had on the environment, the trends will 
continue to increase because the environment has a lagged response to these processes.  
 
4.8.2 New Zealand climate change projections 
 
Each region in New Zealand has its own climate-related vulnerabilities and priorities due 
to variations in the local climate and environmental conditions (Wratt et al., 2004). A New 
Zealand climate change scenario has been devised by NIWA that suggests we can expect 
to experience:  
- A rise in the annual average surface temperature of +0.5-0.7°C by 2030 and +1.5-
2.0°C by 2080 (if steps are taken now to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). 
- Fewer frosts and more hot days. 
- More moisture in the air and greater evaporation of moisture in the atmosphere. 
- Windier conditions, particularly with prevailing westerly winds.  
- Changes in current rainfall patterns (more rain in the west, less rain in the east). 
- More frequent incidents of heavy rain. 
- Reduced snow cover, shorter seasonal snow episodes, glacial retreat and changes to 
snowline locations. 
- Sea level rise of 0.3-0.5m by 2100.           (O'Donnell, 2007; Wratt & Mullan, 2006) 
 
Because the significant impacts of global warming may not be experienced for some time, 
it is necessary to plan for such events in order to minimise negative impacts and take full 
advantage of any opportunities that may arise in the future (New Zealand Climate Change 
Office, 2004). The principal message for emergency planners is that the outcomes of 
climate change and global warming can be deconstructed into manageable parts and dealt 
with as part of existing council planning and operational processes (Wratt et al., 2004). 
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4.8.3 Canterbury and Arthur’s Pass projections 
 
Complex interactions exist between climate change, global warming and the Canterbury 
environment. Climate change is expected to increase the unpredictability of other natural 
hazards (Tompkins & Hurlston, 2005). The changes monitored at Arthur’s Pass as a result 
of global warming are predicted to have very different characteristics to other regions of 
Canterbury, New Zealand or the world (Table 4.2). Often these changes are acutely 
interrelated with other processes leading to the creation of feedback loops and 
dependencies.  
 
4.9 TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF METEOROLOGICAL HAZARDS 
 
Meteorological events are some of the most common hazard occurrences in Arthur’s Pass 
although they can be difficult to mitigate because they are so widespread. One advantage 
they have over other hazards is that they can be predicted, which allows time for people to 
be prepared for their arrival. Like earthquakes, they are a “driving” force and consequently 
cannot be controlled or prevented.  
 
Experience shows that the best form of physical preventative treatment for meteorological 
hazards is through the reinforcement of buildings and adequate securing of roofs and other 
vulnerable structures in high risk areas. During excessively windy periods, Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management maintains that certain steps should be taken to avoid injury 
and reduce damage to property. These include opening a window to equalise atmospheric 
pressure within the building, staying indoors away from the windows and securing outdoor 
items that may create a hazard to others if picked up by gusts of wind.  
 
Treatment of surface runoff problems requires the use and maintenance of a functional 
drainage system, free of blockages and able to cope with large volumes of water. Previous 
surface flooding within the town has been made worse by the failure of drainage culverts 
to provide an outlet for water into the Bealey River (Vaile, 2007). Additionally, the use of 
more permeable materials in town construction may limit surface floods and allow for 
better infiltration of runoff into the ground (K. Smith, 2004).  
 
 
 
 76
CLIMATE 
CHANGE TREND 
 
STATISTICS 
 
EFFECTS 
 
Rise in average 
surface temperature 
- Average surface temperatures in 
Canterbury are expected to rise +0.0-
1.4°C by 2030 and +0.0-3.9°C by 
2080.  
- Greatest warming is projected to be 
during the winter months. 
- More potential for drought. 
- Increased lightning and/or wildfire risk. 
- Melting of permafrost and glacial retreat, 
affecting soil and slope stability.  
- Increased atmospheric moisture content. 
 
More extreme hot 
days 
- Significant increases are predicted in 
the number of days per year exceeding 
25°C. 
- Hotter average temperatures. 
- Increased lightning and/or wildfire risk.  
- Increased melting of snow, leading to 
greater water flow through alpine rivers.  
 
Fewer frosts 
- Significant decreases are predicted in 
the number of frost days per year. 
- Less permanent snow at higher elevations. 
- Shorter snow season.  
- Increased average temperatures.  
 
 
 
Greater evaporation 
- Excess evaporation removes heat from 
the atmosphere, stirs cooling winds 
and leads to increased cloud cover and 
storm conditions.  
- More potential for drought. 
- Increased snow melting, glacial retreat 
and relocation of snowlines.  
- Loss of vegetation due to drier conditions, 
leading to slope instabilities.  
- Mixing of cooler winds leading to more 
severe and frequent severe wind and storm 
events.  
 
Increase in air 
moisture 
- For every 1°C increase in temperature, 
the atmosphere can hold 
approximately 8% more moisture.  
- More intense precipitation and more 
severe storms. 
- Increase in snowfall at higher elevations 
due to warmer air holding more moisture.  
 
 
Windier conditions 
- Increase in severe wind events with up 
to double the frequency of winds 
greater than 30m/s by 2080. 
- Increase in the average westerly wind 
strength and frequency across New 
Zealand are predicted.   
- Damage to lifelines, services and 
buildings. 
- More extreme wind events and severe 
storms.  
 
 
 
Increased rainfall 
- Significant increases in precipitation 
are expected in the Southern Alps, 
particularly during the winter months.  
- Extreme variations will be observed 
throughout the country.  
- The Bealey River and Waimakariri River 
could maintain or possibly increase flows 
to accommodate excess water inputs. 
- Greater incidence of extreme natural 
events, such as flooding, landslides and 
debris flows.  
- Threats to essential lifelines and services.  
 
 
 
 
More heavy rain 
events 
- Increased rainfall depth as temperature 
rises due to 8% more moisture with 
every 1°C of temperature rise.  
- Heat that comes from the condensation 
of increased moisture is expected to 
make storms more intense.  
- Increases in temperature and westerly 
wind will lead to increases in both 
maximum and average catchment 
rainfall depending on rainfall duration. 
- Increased erosion and sedimentation to 
some riverbed areas. 
- Greater frequency and distribution of 
debris flows, landslides and floods.  
- Damage to man-made drainage networks 
and sewage systems in the village area 
and destruction of property due to natural 
hazard events.  
- Threats to low-lying infrastructure and 
property.   
 
Changes in snow 
patterns 
- The elevation of the snow line is 
expected to increase as average 
temperatures increase, leading to more 
extreme snow events.  
- Reduced snow cover, shorter seasonal 
snowfall, glacial retreat and snowline 
relocation.  
- Changes in the frequency and distribution 
of avalanches. 
 
Table 4. 2. Projected climate change trends and their effect on atmospheric, environmental, infrastructural 
and social conditions at Arthur’s Pass (Revkin, 2008; Wratt & Mullan, 2006; Wratt et al., 2004). 
 
 
 77
Storm activity is a frequently recurring hazard at Arthur’s Pass and there is no way of 
removing the risk altogether. The processes of heavy rain, hail, strong winds and lightning 
pose a moderate to high risk to both individuals and the community within the village 
because the major issues they present may easily cause injury and property damage, but are 
unlikely to cause death.  
 
However, the circumstances of storm damage are different for trampers and people not in 
the urban centre of Arthur’s Pass because they are more vulnerable to the changing 
weather conditions. One of the major warnings given to park users refers to the 
unpredictability of the weather within the Arthur’s Pass National Park. On numerous 
occasions trampers and climbers have had to be rescued because of errors in judgment and 
underestimation of alpine weather conditions. Since 1926, 3 people have died from 
complications arising from bad weather conditions (Kates, 2008) and many more have 
required medical treatment.  
 
Currently, several hazard mitigation measures are in place in the Arthur’s Pass National 
Park to minimise the risk posed by meteorological hazards.  
- Daily weather information and reports on expected rainfall, wind speeds, snowpack 
conditions, and avalanche risk and avoidance zones are supplied by the Department 
of Conservation at the visitor centre in the village.  
- Regular courses aimed at identifying potential avalanche zones and training for 
avalanche rescue are conducted at Temple Basin Ski Field. 
- Emergency and evacuation plans in place within the village, although there is 
potential for them to be improved in the future. Temple Basin Ski Field has a very 
detailed emergency plan in place and regular avalanche awareness and human 
safety briefings are given to ski patrollers, mountaineering clubs and groups 
visiting the region.  
- The reinforcement of structures to comply with site-specific regulations set out in 
the Building Act 2004. Examples of these regulations include appropriate roof 
pitches to avoid snow loading and flood-proofing buildings, especially those close 
to the Bealey River bank (Costello, 2008). 
- Several publications on field safety, rescue techniques and guides to the 
identification and evaluation of natural hazard sites have been produced and are 
being distributed to park users.  
 
 78
Hazard mitigation measures are consistently being assessed and improved and show an 
advance in avalanche hazard management compared to 50 years ago, when the risks were 
deemed less significant. Ideally, elimination of the risks is the best method of treatment, 
but not always possible in public lands such as the national park. Minimising and isolating 
the hazards by informing people of the danger zones, monitoring prone areas and providing 
opportunities for advanced training are the best methods of controlling the natural hazards 
in Arthur’s Pass National Park.  
 
4.10 SUMMARY 
 
Meteorological hazards are possibly the best understood hazards in New Zealand, because 
they occur so frequently and can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty, up to 
days in advance. This allows for a greater level of preparedness at community level so the 
impact from these hazards can be minimised.  
 
Through this meteorological hazard assessment it is possible to surmise that: 
 
1.  The New Zealand climate shows unique characteristics that are conducive to the 
formation of extreme weather events. Meteorological hazards identified at Arthur’s 
Pass include strong winds, thunderstorms, heavy rainfall, hailstorms, lightning, fire, 
and snow hazards such as heavy snowfall, avalanches and black ice. Climate 
change and global warming have also been recognised as significant natural 
hazards, because they have major consequences on the frequency and severity of 
other natural hazard events. 
2. Weather-related hazards are widespread and their behaviour varies greatly. They 
form both direct and indirect hazards, although secondary effects are potentially the 
most common and harmful. Indirect effects of weather-related hazards include 
surface flooding through excessive rainfall and snowmelt, slope instabilities from 
erosion and soil saturation, fire caused by lightning strikes, the initiation of snow 
avalanches due to human activities and road closures due to heavy snowfalls.  
3. There have been many cases of extreme meteorological events at Arthur’s Pass, of 
sufficient magnitude to cause injury, property damage and even death in some 
cases. The largest threat is to users of the national park, outside the village 
boundaries, who are more vulnerable because of their greater exposure to weather 
events.  
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4. In many cases specific meteorological hazards have interactions with other weather 
related processes and form complex relationships with other natural hazards. 
Meteorological events are a primary trigger of other natural hazards such as mass 
movements and fluvial processes such as erosion, sedimentation and flooding. This 
makes it all the more important for climatic behaviour to be understood for hazard 
mitigation and prevention to be achieved at Arthur’s Pass. 
5. Climate change and global warming have become primary global issues and their 
impacts cannot be ignored. It is projected that global warming exacerbated by 
human actions will be responsible for profound climatic changes at Arthur’s Pass in 
the future, including an increase in average surface temperatures, decrease in frost 
days, windier conditions, increased rainfall and a change in snow patterns. The 
relationships between climatic conditions, global warming and natural hazards are 
complex but it is certain that climate change will increase the number of extreme 
natural events and amplify the unpredictability of such incidents.  
6. Current major treatment methods for meteorological hazards at Arthur’s Pass take 
the form of physical mitigation such as structural reinforcement, building 
adaptations and the use of capable drainage networks. Educating the public is the 
most effective way of conveying the risk to the public and preventing the exposure 
of the community to unnecessary risks. Information is given to the public at 
Arthur’s Pass via weather reports from the visitor centre every day, in regular 
training courses, through publications outlining the hazards and within the 
emergency plan distributed to resident and businesses in the community.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MASS MOVEMENT HAZARDS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is the third of four specific hazard chapters. Landslides and associated slope 
processes are some of the most prominent natural hazards in the Southern Alps. Mass 
movements, particularly landslides, are discrete events that are responsible for less costly 
but more widespread disaster events than earthquakes or floods (Bell, 1999). Not only are 
landslides a major threat to communities, but small slips affecting major infrastructure, 
debris flows threatening lives and property and soil creep altering usable land all 
negatively affect the Arthur’s Pass community in some way. Sometimes these processes 
can be catastrophic, other times they may just be an inconvenience. The mountain 
environment at Arthur’s Pass leaves the township vulnerable to both large and small-scale 
slope processes.  
 
The objectives of this mass movement assessment are: 
1. To describe various mass movements types present at Arthur’s Pass, such as slides, 
rockfalls, debris flows and soil creep. 
2. To examine mass movement controls, especially with respect to their trigger 
mechanisms, mode of transport, environmental setting and preconditions for their 
occurrence.  
3. To identify the areas at Arthur’s Pass that have a history of previous slope 
weakness and interpret which zones may be prone to slope failure in the future. 
4. To estimate the probability of occurrence for all mass movement events at Arthur’s 
Pass.  
5. To examine current mitigation methods for slope stabilisation at Arthur’s Pass and 
investigate treatment methods that may be suitable in reducing the mass movement 
risk to the village and road and park users.  
 
5.2 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
A combination of in-field investigations and remote analysis was used to recognise 
potential mass movement sites in the Arthur’s Pass area. Field reconnaissance helped to 
 81
identify landslide-prone areas and find tributaries exposed to recurrent debris flow activity. 
Records of minor rockfalls, soil creep and slumping were taken from field observations to 
assist in identifying as many hazardous areas as possible.  
 
In regions where field observations are not feasible, aerial photographs from 1938, 1943, 
1960, 1977 and 1998, and Google Earth satellite images from 2007, have been used to 
identify fresh failure scars on neighbouring mountain slopes and to search for signs of 
possible weakness that may indicate areas of failure in the future. The nature of vegetation 
on slope surfaces is used as an aid in identifying zones of past weakness. Patches of 
regenerated tree and plant cover indicate that the slope has restabilised. Conversely, fresh 
scars indicate reactivation of the mountain deposits and highlights points of interest in this 
hazard assessment.  
 
Research into mass movement hazards in the national park tends to target the Otira rock 
avalanche area (on the western side of the Main Divide) and the innumerable small-scale 
slope failures that frequently affect State Highway 73. Very little literature exists on 
specific failures in the township vicinity, so assumptions on the relative frequency and 
distribution of mass movement events have been constructed using examples from 
elsewhere in the Arthur’s Pass National Park.  
 
5.3 CONTROLS ON SLOPE MORPHOLOGY 
 
The downslope migration of slope materials can be through flowing, sliding, lateral 
spreading, falling or toppling (Duff & Holmes, 1993). International terminology used to 
define various mass movements is often ambiguous and highly variable. Varnes’ (1978) 
landslide classification scheme is one of the most widely applied schemes for New Zealand 
environments and forms the base for this hazard assessment (Figure 5.1). A comprehensive 
list of the mass movement hazards and their specific attributes at Arthur’s Pass shows that 
several different types of hazards are recognised in the region (Table 5.1).  
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Figure 5. 1. Varnes’ (1978) classification system, dividing mass movements into slides (A, B and C), falls 
and topples (D and E) and flows (F, G, H, I and J). 
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Mass 
movement 
 
Examples 
 
Type of material 
 
Transport velocities Relative frequency in Arthur’s Pass region. 
 
Expected size and extent 
Landslide 
 
A, B, C 
Predominantly bedrock with 
some debris and/or soils, and 
moderate water saturation. 
 
Slow to extremely rapid 
(1.5m/month-100m/sec) 
Small-scale landslides are very common, possibly 
even a daily occurrence. Large-scale landslides 
occur less frequently (approximately every few 
years) depending on seismicity and storm activity. 
Minor to large (several m3 
to thousands of m3). Can 
potentially occur on all 
slopes at Arthur’s Pass. 
Rock avalanche 
 
A, B 
May contain disaggregated 
rock fragments, snow, ice and 
soil debris. 
 
Moderate to extremely 
rapid 
(1.5m/day-100m/sec) 
Infrequent/rare, occurring every few thousand 
years. Several have been identified in APNP 
ranging from Crow Stream (6100yrs BP), Falling 
Mountain (1929), Otira (2000yrs BP) and Twin 
Fall Stream (1929). 
Moderate to very large 
(hundreds to millions of 
m3). Occur on large, very 
steep slopes, often above 
the treeline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SLIDES 
Rock slump 
 
A, B, C 
Weathered bedrock, soil 
debris, alluvium and colluvium 
material and/or ice and snow.  
 
Extremely slow to 
moderate 
(0.06m/yr-1.5m/day) 
Small-scale slumping is evident up to several 
times a year, coinciding with earthquakes and 
storm events. Large-scale, catastrophic slumping 
is likely to have a recurrence interval of thousands 
of years.  
Minor to very large (several 
m3 to millions of m3). Occur 
on weathered and sheared 
slopes that can 
accommodate rotational 
slumping of the material.  
Rockfall 
 
A, B 
Unconsolidated bedrock 
fragments, typically dry. 
 
 
Rapid to extremely rapid 
(2-100m/sec) 
Minor rockfalls are very common, occurring 
almost daily. Larger rockfalls typically coincide 
with major earthquakes, which may occur several 
times in 100 years.   
Minor to moderate (several 
m3 to thousands of m3). 
Common on bare scree 
slopes, near waterfalls and 
cliffs. 
 
 
 
 
FALLS AND 
TOPPLES Topple 
 
A, B 
Bedrock blocks and minor 
amounts of debris. Fluids in 
cracks may initiate failure. 
 
Rapid to extremely rapid 
(2-100m/sec) 
Similar to rockfalls. Minor to moderate (several 
m3 to thousands of m3). 
Common on bare scree 
slopes, cliffs and 
undermined rockfaces. 
Debris flow 
 
A + B 
 
Loose soil, rock fragments, 
boulders, organic matter air 
and water, forming a very 
dense slurry with up to 50% 
fine material.  
 
 
Rapid to very rapid 
(0.3-3m/sec) 
Uncommon, requires specific slope and 
precipitation conditions to occur. Restricted to a 
couple of events over 100 years.  
Moderate (hundreds to 
thousands of m3). Fairly 
localised, restricted to 
gullies and fan heads. 
 
 
 
 
 
FLOWS Soil creep 
 
C 
Typically thick loess deposits, 
including soil, organic debris 
and alluvium and colluvium 
particles.  
 
 
Imperceptible to slow 
(0.06m/yr-1.5m/month) 
Continuous and repetitive, taking place on a daily 
basis, although not to an extreme degree at 
Arthur’s Pass.  
Minor to moderate (several 
m3 to hundreds of m3). 
Typically on soil covered 
slopes without sufficient 
vegetation for support.  
Table 5. 1. The mass movement classification scheme with expected magnitude and frequency in the Arthur’s Pass area. A = Seismic-triggered, B = Precipitation-triggered,              
C = Other, slow-moving types (Cave, 1987; Highland, 2004; Kovach & McGuire, 2003; Sharpe, 1968; Varnes, 1978). 
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5.3.1 Mass movement terrains and triggers 
 
Alpine slope processes are very active in the Arthur’s Pass region and hazards from mass 
movement disasters have steadily grown as the use of mountainous land increases 
(Whitehouse & Griffiths, 1983). It has been determined by Jones (1995) that landslides and 
mass movements are more likely to take place within specific terrains, all of which 
translate to the Arthur’s Pass region and are recognised as unalterable features of the local 
setting:  
a) Areas subject to seismic shaking 
b) Mountainous environments with high relative relief 
d) Areas with high rainfall 
 
In order to accurately assess the mass movement hazards at Arthur’s Pass it is necessary to 
understand the methods through which they occur and the processes taking place in the 
local environment that contribute to the apparent risk. Owens et al (1994) group landslide 
hazards as: 
 a)   Those triggered by seismic events  
 b)  Those triggered by atmospheric events 
 c) Other, slow-moving types 
 
5.3.1.1 Atmospherically-driven mass movements 
 
In the short-term, precipitation is the most common driving force behind mass movement 
activity, and is responsible for initiating many small-scale mass movements and a number 
of large-scale slope failures. However, Whitehouse and Griffiths (1983) surmise that large 
rock avalanches in the Southern Alps have a return period of approximately 100 years and 
that very few of these are storm-related. Slope movements resulting from storm conditions 
include regolith failure, weathered bedrock failures, erosion, slides and debris flows 
(Owens et al., 1994). Flood damage is known to increase the mass movement risk by 
exacerbating slope weaknesses through undermining, erosion and water infiltration of 
rocks.  
 
Whitehouse and McSaveney (1992) hypothesise that the most critical factor in 
precipitation-triggered slope failures is the rainfall intensity and duration. Rainfall with a 
high, short-term intensity has been found to mobilise landslides and debris flows much 
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more efficiently than long duration storms with lower rainfall intensities. This theory is 
used to explain the widespread damage sustained during the 1957 and 1979 storms and the 
lack of similar damage on a more regular basis. Caine (1980) determined that a threshold 
exists between rainfall duration and shallow mass movement incidence, which Dingwall et 
al (1989) applied to New Zealand national parks. The outcome suggested that up to 85% of 
the area within a designated national park area is susceptible to failure every five years, 
dependent on suitable slope and regolith conditions.  
 
5.3.1.2 Seismogenic mass movements  
 
Earthquakes have a greater recurrence interval than storms and heavy rainfall and as a 
result they are liable to generate large-scale, localised mass movements that are not as 
easily treated as storm-driven events. Keefer (1984) studied a series of earthquake-
generated mass movements with the aim of classifying various types of landslides. The 
results suggested that there are four types of mass movements initiated by weak shaking. 
These included rockfalls, rock slides, soil falls and soil slides. Deep-seated, lateral spreads 
require strong seismic shaking, and some large-scale rock avalanches require very 
disruptive seismic shaking to initiate.  
 
Earthquakes can act directly on a slope by causing enough ground shaking to dislodge 
slope material, or they can activate secondary processes and be a catalyst in some areas 
where ground shaking dilates soil on sloped surfaces and allows for infiltration of rainfall 
more rapidly. This leads to a reduction in the shear stress of the slope materials and results 
in slope failure (Highland, 2004). Additionally, widespread rockfalls are commonly 
triggered by earthquakes that loosen the rocks and make them available for transfer. 
Earthquakes also indirectly trigger mass movements through fault activity, which can 
potentially create steep and unstable slopes along weak fracture points (Jochim & Colorado 
Geological Survey, 1988).  
 
Secondary and tertiary seismic hazards often manifest as mass movements (Figure 3.10). 
Secondary hazards initiated by earthquakes include debris flows, landslides, rock 
avalanches and slumping, whilst tertiary hazards are associated with landslide dam failures 
and large-scale rock avalanche events, illustrating that mass movement occurrences often 
rely on earthquake events.  
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5.3.1.3 Other mass movement triggers 
 
Slow-moving mass movements, such as soil creeps and slumping are also long-term 
hazards and often go unnoticed, not allowing for remedial treatment in the early stages of 
creep development. Other than minor examples of soil creep, few slow-moving types of 
mass movement have been identified in the Arthur’s Pass vicinity.  
 
5.3.2  Preconditions and causative factors of mass movement hazards 
 
Several causative elements simultaneously work together to generate mass movement 
events. These elements are frequently interrelated and are capable of generating highly 
complex slope conditions (Owens et al., 1994). They can be categorised into two groups; 
internal and external mechanisms. External driving forces place stress on the slope from 
the local environment, which acts to reduce the internal shear stress of a slope and increase 
the chance of failure (Bell, 1999). Internal mechanisms operate to reduce the shear strength 
of a slope to a point below the external forces applied to it by its environment, causing the 
slope to fail (Bell, 1999). These forces are either triggering mechanisms or pre-existing 
conditions of slope morphology (Table 5.2 and 5.3).  
 
 
EXTERNAL FORCES 
 
 
 
 
Climatic conditions 
The incidence of mass movements in the national park is heavily reliant 
on local hydrological conditions, including antecedent and persistent 
rainfall and snowmelt, which all supply high volumes of water to the 
river system (E. Smith, 2004). The frequency and magnitude of storms is 
a critical factor to the frequency and magnitude of mass movements.  
 
 
Transporting agents 
The presence of air, water and ice strongly correlates with the rate of 
sediment transport within the geomorphic environment. High quantities 
of transporting fluids have to ability to move great volumes of slope 
materials. This is illustrated by the high erosion and aggradation rates 
along tributaries in the Bealey River catchment.  
 
 
Vegetation characteristics 
It is difficult to assess the role of vegetation on slope stability, but plants 
and trees may help to bind slope materials and reduce the capacity for 
slope failure (Cave, 1987). However, in poorly consolidated areas, 
vegetation may negatively impact slope stability by placing extra weight 
on the slope that cannot be supported, leading to slope failure.  
 
Weight of slope material 
Slope materials are made heavier by the presence of vegetation and snow 
accumulations. The lithology of the slope also affects the weight of slope 
materials, as does the degree of water saturation (K. Smith, 2004). 
 
Soil characteristics The thickness, type, porosity and saturation of soil affects surface runoff, the weight of slope materials and consequently slope stability.  
 
Table 5. 2. External mechanisms for mass movement occurrence. External forces are sourced from the 
environment and place stress on a slope, causing it to fail (adapted from (Bell, 1999)). 
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INTERNAL FORCES 
 
 
 
Slope gradient 
Topographical controls such as the steepness and height of slopes 
influences the shear strength of the slope and may determine the type of 
mass movement that takes place on a slope. Different types of failure will 
occur once specific critical gradient thresholds have been reached (E. 
Smith, 2004).  
 
 
 
Tectonic stresses 
In the process of mountain building, tectonic forces gradually build up 
stresses within the bedrock and consequently play a major role in the 
landscape formation of mass movement-prone areas. Shearing and 
jointing introduce weaknesses to the rock and further decrease slope 
stability.  
 
Earthquakes 
Seismic shaking is one of the chief triggers of mass movements and 
provide a sudden release of internal stress within the slope, leading to 
immediate mass movement events in most cases.  
 
 
 
Lithology 
The geological properties of the rock masses that form the mountains and 
their susceptibility to weathering are significant controls on the stability 
of slopes at Arthur’s Pass. Specifically, the greywacke making up the 
Southern Alps is fine-grained, highly sheared and jointed and is very 
easily weathered (Cave, 1987). These properties combine to form a type 
of lithology that is able to disintegrate without great difficulty.  
 
 
Extent of weathering  
 
Water is a powerful agent for the breakdown of rocks, and the Southern 
Alps are particularly vulnerable to physical and chemical disintegration 
driven by temperature changes, freeze-thaw action, decaying organic 
matter and the reaction of water, oxygen and carbon dioxide with slope 
materials (Duff & Holmes, 1993). 
 
 
Gravity 
Gravity is a constant pressure on slope materials and is not able to be 
controlled or removed. Factors such as rock type, soil saturation and 
vegetation place greater weight onto the slope so that gravitational forces 
are able to dislodge materials and cause the slope to collapse more easily. 
 
 
Table 5. 3. Internal mechanisms for mass movement occurrence. Internal forces reduce the internal stress of 
the slope until a critical threshold is reached and the slope fails (adapted from (Bell, 1999)).  
 
 
It is extremely difficult to reliably determine thresholds for the occurrence of mass 
movements because of the complexity surrounding their triggering mechanisms (E. Smith, 
2004). The high number of internal and external variables makes it necessary to recognise 
that a multitude of specific slope conditions must exist for slope failures to take place.  
 
5.4 SLIDES  
 
The term landslide can be used to describe a variety of slope processes. Landslides 
constitute most types of downslope movements that transfer rock and soil components (K. 
Smith, 2004). They are classified according to variations in their mode of transport and the 
type of material being transported (Highland, 2004). They vary greatly in size, location, 
distribution and duration and range from rapid, large-scale rock avalanche-type movements 
to small-scale slips. Varnes’ (1978) differentiated between rotational and translational 
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landslides, but for the purpose of simplifying this hazard assessment they are examined 
collectively as one type of mass movement.  
 
5.4.1 Landslides and rock avalanches 
 
Landslides are the most common form of mass movement in the Arthur’s Pass National 
Park. Recorded detail on their timing and distribution is limited to reports on the larger, 
more damaging events and generalised descriptions of widespread damage associated with 
slides in the region, particularly along the highway corridor. They are seldom reported by 
users of the park or Department of Conservation rangers unless they are obstructing tracks 
or are a danger to people using the park. As a result, documentation of all landslide events 
in the national park is greatly lacking. As with other natural hazards, high severity events 
involving considerable deformation are very rare, but low magnitude events are recurrent 
and often persistent. Landslide distribution has historically corresponded closely to the 
location of active fault traces (Crozier, Deimel, & Simon, 1995). 
 
Rock avalanches have a similar mode of failure to landslides, but their mode of transport is 
more of a flow than a slide. They consist of a streaming mass of pulverised rock fragments 
and are caused by the failure of bedrock in competent rocks (Eisbacher & Clague, 1984). 
Keefer (1984) determined that slopes greater than 150m high and with a gradient in excess 
of 25° are the most susceptible to rock avalanche failures. Dry rock avalanche debris tends 
to travel beyond the base of the collapsed area, due to the high speeds generated during the 
descent of the slope materials, and they can travel kilometres from their original position. 
Rock avalanches are much rarer than landslides and have a more remote probability of 
occurrence in the Arthur’s Pass township area.  
 
5.4.1.1 Evolution of landslides and rock avalanches 
 
Landslides and rock avalanches are typically initiated by naturally-occurring atmospheric 
events or seismic shaking. There is a strong positive relationship between rainfall intensity 
and landslide development. The majority of landslides in the Arthur’s Pass National Park 
are triggered by precipitation and through secondary processes connected to the infiltration 
of water into mountain surfaces. Slides caused by loading, excavation or deforestation 
typically only manifest along the highway, where road cuts have interfered with the natural 
slope environment (Highland, 2004). The consequences of landslides are most likely in the 
 89
catchment zones, which then move downstream to affect areas proximal to the village. 
Many of the landslide zones in the Arthur’s Pass National Park are distant from heavy 
traffic and urbanisation, signalling that human activities represent only a minor cause of 
landslides and mass movements at Arthur’s Pass. 
 
There is also a strong positive correlation between the occurrence of earthquakes and 
landslide formation in a region such as the Arthur’s Pass National Park. Keefer (1984) 
infers that the number of coseismic landslides within a defined area is directly proportional 
to the magnitude of the earthquake. Palaeoseismic data obtained through studies of 
earthquakes near Arthur’s Pass and the relationships derived from this information 
estimate that seismic events will have a sizeable impact on the Arthur’s Pass region in the 
future (E. Smith, 2004). 
 
Numerous examples of seismogenic landslides and rock avalanches have been identified in 
the central Southern Alps that can be used to infer and extrapolate information for future 
events. More specifically, they may be able to give an indication of the expected size and 
extent of future failures, their modes of failure, and give particular details about the 
specific attributes of the slopes on which they form. They can also illustrate what the 
implications are on sediment supply in the catchment and how the environment may react 
to the formation of landslide dams. However, whilst the Falling Mountain, Twin Fall 
Stream and Otira Gorge are all locally occurring rock avalanche deposits, their relevance to 
the Arthur’s Pass village area is lacking because they are all located on the western side of 
the Main Divide, resulting in huge differences in climate, vegetation and geomorphic 
conditions. The most relevant example of a debris avalanche close to Arthur’s Pass under 
conditions similar to those seen today is the Crow Valley rock avalanche deposit on the 
other side of Avalanche Peak, to the west of the township. It is understood to have 
occurred approximately 6100+/-1580 years ago in which more than 29 million cubic 
metres of material was displaced (Cave, 1987).  
 
It is likely that previous catastrophic landslide events have been generated on slopes with 
predisposed rock defects, such as open joints and ridge rent faults (Cave, 1987). Ridge rent 
faults are common in the national park and are thought to represent the gravitational failure 
of mountainsides. Beck (1968) disputes that they are solely caused by gravity because the 
highly-weathered greywacke forming the Southern Alps is resilient enough to withstand 
the forces of gravity alone. It is suggested that earthquake activity plays an important role 
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in the formation of ridge-rent structures in the Arthur’s Pass National Park in tandem with 
gravitational forces.  
 
It has been demonstrated by Korup (2004) that a perennial supply of landslide debris in 
alpine catchment areas, such as the Bealey Valley, has been responsible for substantial 
aggradation and channel avulsion in the past. In the Southern Alps, landslides are the 
primary source of large quantities of debris into the fluvial system and have the potential to 
supply catastrophic volumes of sediment into the river (Korup, McSaveney, & Davies, 
2004). 
 
5.4.1.2 Landslide dams 
 
In the alpine region of the South Island, landslide dams are regularly forming to alter the 
natural equilibrium of the mountain environment. Tremors are often responsible for the 
localised reactivation of slump cracks on mountainsides, leading to potential threats to the 
river and village in the form of landslide dams (Paterson & Berrill, 1995). Landslide dams 
are natural barriers of slope debris formed over a water course as a result of a slope 
collapse. After formation, landslide dams evolve to create serious issues in terms of 
sediment and water release both upstream and downstream of the dam (Nash, 2003). A 
very good example of a landslide dam similar to that proposed for the Arthur’s Pass area is 
the Poerua Valley landslide dam formed in 1999 (Hancox & Institute of Geological & 
Nuclear Sciences Limited, 1999) (Figure 5.2). 
 
Dam formation is greatly dependent on several factors such as the type of landslide and the 
type of slope materials, the velocity of the landslide, the morphology of the valley and the 
distribution of landslide debris within the valley floor (Nash, 2003). The factors that 
determine the longevity of a landslide dam (and consequentially the level of risk it poses) 
are the size of the landslide and the size of the river that is dammed (Nott, 2006). Dams 
that are sufficiently large will form permanent dams (Zaruba & Mencl, 1982), but it is 
plausible that landslide dams stemming from slope collapse within the Bealey Valley are 
temporary and will eventually be eroded away or undergo sudden collapse. Once formed, a 
landslide dam is unpredictable and may last several minutes or several thousand years 
(Schuster, 1993).  
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Landslide-dammed 
lake
Landslide debris
 
 
Figure 5. 2. The Poerua Valley landslide dam that formed in 1999, showing a good example of what a 
landslide dam within the Bealey Valley may look like. Depending on the location of the landslide, the 
Arthur’s Pass village may be submerged by subsequent dam formation (GeoNet, 2000). 
 
 
There are considerable differences in the outcomes of landslide dams to the Arthur’s Pass 
village depending on whether they occur upstream or downstream: 
1. Upstream mountain collapse will dam the Bealey River and release 
unknown quantities of landslide debris, fluvial sediments and water towards 
the village. There is also the serious threat of a sudden dam breach, leading 
to a massive discharge of debris and water which would cause a large-scale 
natural disaster within the town.  
2. Downstream dam development will generate catastrophic flooding and 
aggradation in areas within a 50 metre elevation of the dam. If the Graham 
Stream or Halpin Creek areas were to dam, the village would be in a prime 
location to be destroyed by floodwaters, landslide debris and excess fluvial 
sediments.  
 
Consequences of the damming of a river also depend on whether the river is partially or 
completely blocked (Nash, 2003). The hazards associated with landslide formation are 
typically short-term, and manifest as either sudden, major flooding or gradual, low-impact 
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discharge resulting in less damage. After sampling 73 landslide dams, Costa and Schuster 
(1988) determined that 85% failed within one year of formation. However, Nash (2003) 
points out that blockages can last for several thousand years because of their natural 
stability and resistance to erosive processes. When assessing the overall stability of 
landslide dams, however, it is clear that in the Southern Alps they have a moderately low 
resistance to erosion and other sediment and water transport processes (Nash, 2003). 
Furthermore, whilst erosion of a landslide dam is a typically a gradual process, event-
related collapse and short-term consequential hazards may result, forming debris flows, 
disastrous flood outbursts, backwater pooling, channel instability and fluvial aggradation 
before the dam and river can return to a state of equilibrium (Korup, 2005).  
 
Most of this analysis assumes a large-scale event along the Bealey River. However, 
smaller-scale damming is also feasible in the other tributaries that will result in more 
localised damage. For example, Rough Creek is steep and narrow and moderate volumes 
of sediments would be sufficient to induce a blockage in the drainage channel. Obstruction 
in this manner would result in problems on the Rough Creek fan and have negative impacts 
on the properties situated on the fan.  
 
5.4.2 Minor slips 
 
Minor slips and washouts have been differentiated from larger landslides and rock 
avalanches because they are much more frequent, they have smaller volumes, and their 
modes of failure are greatly influenced by artificial or human activities. As a result they 
may have been responsible for more damage to infrastructure and property in the town, but 
this damage is not usually catastrophic and is fairly easily fixed with simple remedial 
treatments. Whitehouse and Griffiths (1983) and Paterson (1996) mapped various slope 
instabilities along the highway through Arthur’s Pass, although their main focus was on the 
Otira Gorge section containing the Otira rock avalanche. Their results conclude that the 
damage along the highway from earthquake-induced slides tends to be site-specific and 
depends on local topographic factors rather than the distance from the epicentre of the 
earthquake.  
 
Hundreds, possibly thousands of small slope failures have affected infrastructure along the 
Arthur’s Pass highway corridor since the establishment of the road through the Southern 
Alps in 1865. Those blocking the road are promptly cleared, and undermined and washed 
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out sections of road are repaired as soon as is practicable because of the importance of 
State Highway 73 as an essential transport link between the east and west coasts. Evidence 
of minor slips is discernible along the entire highway corridor throughout the national park 
(Figures 5.3 and 5.4). They are easily initiated and are often aggravated by human 
activities related to road cutting and bridge construction.  
 
Small slips always feature dominantly in post-earthquake or post-storm periods. A number 
of sites show repeated collapse and have subsequently been reinforced. Examples of 
mitigated slopes are at White Bridge, north of the village, behind Mountain House 
Backpackers on the main street of the village and along the McGrath Stream section of 
road.  
 
Minor slips are chiefly regarded as a nuisance along the highway corridor rather than a 
serious threat to lives because they tend to be reasonably localised and rarely affect 
anything other than roads, railways and bridges. They are commonly found obstructing 
tramping routes but the lack of reported casualties from small-scale slips denotes that they 
pose a lesser threat to the community than large-scale slides and rockfalls, which have 
been proven to be deadly on several occasions within the national park. 
 
5.4.3 Subsidence 
 
Subsidence is usually observed in deep alluvial deposits or in limestone terrains that are 
found in the Canterbury Plains. It is related to the slow dissolution of carbonate rocks by 
acidic groundwater (Owens et al., 1994). It is also caused by liquefaction from ground 
shaking and subsidence due to peat drainage in marshlands (Owens et al., 1994).  
 
There have been no recorded incidents in the Bealey Valley despite the presence of 
limestone caves less than 32km away in the Castle Hill Basin, a low depression bounded 
by the Craigieburn and Torlesse Ranges (Department of Conservation, 2008). Given the 
greywacke-dominated lithology of the Arthur’s Pass area, it is possible to surmise that 
there is an extremely low likelihood of subsidence in the region.  
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State Highway 73 
facing north-west
 
Figure 5. 3. Small-scale slope failures corresponding to man made road cuts along State Highway 73, 
immediately north of Arthur’s Pass village. 
 
 
State Highway 73 
facing south
 
Figure 5. 4. Small-scale slope failures also corresponding to man made road cuts along State Highway 73, 
immediately north of Arthur’s Pass village. 
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5.5 ROCKFALLS 
 
Rockfalls are comparatively frequent, small deposits comprised of loose bedrock blocks or 
boulders moving through air with very little interaction between individual rock fragments. 
In some cases, alluvial material may be included as well. Movement can be in the form of 
free falling, rolling or saltation and is simply a detachment of rock materials from slopes 
(Bell, 1999). Frost-thaw action and high intensity rainfall are two of the major causes of 
rockfalls (Whitehouse & McSaveney, 1992). Other triggers of failure include seismic 
shaking, wind, thermal changes and stress release (Paterson, 1996). In previous mass 
movement studies, rockfalls have been found to originate on slopes steeper than 40° 
(Keefer, 1994).  
 
Individual rockfalls are rarely acknowledged in the literature or on Arthur’s Pass mountain 
safety websites, but innumerable deposits have been recognised throughout the township 
area and are judged to be a moderate threat to the community. Although they represent a 
minor type of mass movement, rockfalls are potentially dangerous to individuals, 
particularly to trampers and climbers in the National Park. Four people have sustained 
injuries from rockfalls in the national park since 1998 (Kates, 2008). There are small 
shingle deposits on the slopes next to most of the major tributaries in the Bealey Valley, 
particularly along Rough Creek and Punchbowl Creek. The Department of Conservation 
has installed warning signs below a large rockfall deposit just upstream of the Devils 
Punchbowl Falls viewing deck (Figures 5.5 and 5.6), and has similar signage advising 
caution on the Mt. Bealey Track where rockfalls are a major issue.  
 
Keefer (1984) describes rockfalls as the most abundant earthquake-triggered mass 
movement in New Zealand. They occur primarily in closely jointed, weathered or sheared 
rock types; a characteristic which is seen in the shattered greywacke bedrock that exists at 
Arthur’s Pass. Minor rock displacements occur along the highway corridor on an almost 
daily basis, although the greatest damage from rockfalls is generally in the form of 
obstructions and damage to the road. However, the number and severity of rockfalls shows 
a significant increase during storm periods, and there is potential for village properties to 
incur damage from rockfall deposits in other areas of the village and on tramping routes 
during calm weather periods (Paterson, 1996).  
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Figure 5. 5. A Department of Conservation rockfall warning sign located in front of a medium-sized rockfall 
deposit (Figure 5.6) immediately behind the Devils Punchbowl Falls lookout.  
 
 
 
~25m
 
Figure 5. 6. A medium-sized rockfall deposit forming a debris fan behind the Devils Punchbowl Falls 
lookout. This particular rockfall deposit is in the vicinity of very well-used tramping tracks near the Arthur’s 
Pass village and lies behind the Department of Conservation warning sign (Figure 5.5). 
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5.6 DEBRIS FLOWS 
 
Debris flows are very rapid, downslope flows formed of water-saturated rock and soil 
debris. They are typically very dense flows because they have a high sediment 
concentration, with particle size ranging from very fine sand grains to boulders (Kovach & 
McGuire, 2003). Flows form when water is added to slope materials either immediately 
after initial slope failure, or from the mobilisation of previously failed material at a later 
stage (Grant, 1998).  
 
The advance of a debris flow is highly unsteady and comprises a series of pulses 
(Eisbacher & Clague, 1984), with the large, heavy materials forming the head of the flow 
and the fine-grained sediments dispersed towards the tail of the flow (Bell, 1999). They 
have a density 1.5 to 2 times greater than water because they can be up to 70% solids by 
weight and they almost always carry some degree of organic material in the form of timber 
or soil (K. Smith, 2004). Debris floods are classified as halfway between a normal fluvial 
flood and a material-laden debris flow.  
 
Debris flows are regarded as one of the chief eroding forces in the Southern Alps (Coates 
& Cox, 2002). They are highly destructive and their flow intensity is ranked according to 
peak velocity, rather than by their size or extent. Magnitude is determined by the total 
volume of material transported to the depositional zone during the event and relates little to 
the original size of the initiating landslide because the bulk of the debris flow material is 
collected by entrainment whilst the flow is travelling (Jakob & Hungr, 2005). Because they 
occur most often along minor tributaries, their distribution is to some degree predictable.  
 
There are three major requirements necessary for debris flow formation: 
 
1. Intense or long duration rainfall. Debris flows are fundamentally a precipitation-
triggered hazard (Jakob & Hungr, 2005), although the climatic factors influencing 
their formation have extreme spatial and temporal variability (Wieczorek & Glade, 
2005). The ability of slopes to mobilise and form an active debris flow is dependant 
on atmospheric factors. Sufficient rainfall and snowmelt is required to adequately 
saturate soils and generate runoff in order to accommodate slope failure.  
2. Geomorphic and topographic conditions suitable for debris flow evolution. A 
narrow, steep gully is more likely to accommodate a debris flow than a wide, gently 
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sloping river. The flow runout and deposition of debris flows is governed by local 
topography and the material available for transport along the path of the flow will 
greatly contribute to its total size. 
3. A collapse of surficial slope deposits or bedrock failure in mountainous regions 
(Eisbacher & Clague, 1984). Progressive failure is rapid in debris flows and there is 
rarely prior warning that a slope collapse is imminent. Retrogressive slope failure is 
common along previously weakened slopes (Bell, 1999).  
 
5.6.1 Debris flow deposits at Arthur’s Pass 
 
Angular rock fragments enclosed within a fine-grained matrix form the debris deposits in 
the Arthur’s Pass vicinity. They have chiefly been identified within stratigraphic columns 
comprising alluvial sediments and moraine deposits (observed as a miscellaneous 
accumulation of rounded pebbles and boulders with sand and clay particles), although it is 
difficult to categorically associate these deposits with debris flow activity.  
 
Erosional and depositional indicators of debris flow or debris flood activity are seen in the 
form of exposed tree roots, irregularly leaning trees, incipient embankment failures, sharp 
trim lines along creeks and scarred vegetation (Eisbacher & Clague, 1984). Several mass 
movement features have been identified near the village, in the form of debris fans. 
Graham Stream, Rough Creek, Wardens Creek and McGrath Stream all exhibit traces of 
debris flow material to some degree. Rough Creek and McGrath Stream may have 
accommodated heavier debris flow or debris flood activity because they show possible 
remnants of several debris flow indicators such as leaning trees and trim lines (Welsh, 
2007). Outside the stopbanks on the Rough Creek fan are old but very typical debris flow 
deposits, with hummocky morphology and large angular boulders. Debris flows coming 
down Rough Creek could potentially travel anywhere over the fan, to houses on either side 
of Rough Creek.  
 
The most recent record of a debris flow near Arthur’s Pass was observed during a storm on 
the 2-3rd December 1979. During the night, a debris flow initiated in a small gully above 
the Klondyke Corner campsite (5km south of the village) and killed four campers sleeping 
in a tent (McSaveney, 1982b). Other than this report and other unconfirmed minor 
incidents along tramping routes in the Arthur’s Pass backcountry, there are no examples of 
specific debris flow events within the village area in recorded history.  
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5.6.2 Debris flow identification at Arthur’s Pass using the Melton Ratio 
 
Most recently, developments have been made into the recognition of debris flow, debris 
flood and flood hazards using watershed morphologies. As part of this research, a specific 
technique has been formulated that examines catchment parameters such as watershed area 
and topographical relief within the watershed to generate a numerical value called the 
Melton ratio, which is assigned to each catchment area. The Melton ratio is a value used to 
differentiate between debris-flow, debris flood and flood prone catchments (Wilford, 
Sakals, Innes, Sidle, & Bergerud, 2004).  
 
The Melton ratio thresholds dividing debris flows, debris floods and normal floods are:  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
There are inconsistencies in the literature with regard to the assigned thresholds defining 
each category that are possibly due to the research being in its somewhat preliminary 
stages. For the purpose of this study, the thresholds used by Welsh (2007) have been 
applied because his GIS model was used to delineate the debris flow-prone areas for this 
project. Thresholds may be slightly lower in the South Island because of slightly less 
perfect environmental conditions and geological dissimilarities compared to the 
Coromandel, where much of Welsh’s (2007) research took place.  
 
This method was applied to every major contributing stream in the Bealey Valley (between 
the Main Divide and the Bealey/Kowhai confluence), resulting in the classification of ten 
streams into debris flow-prone or debris flood-prone areas. Of the ten streams studied, 
none had a ratio index of less than 0.3. All were classified as debris flow-prone streams 
with the exception of Rough Creek and McGrath Stream, which were calculated to be 
debris flood-prone (Table 5.4).  
 
 
      Very high likelihood of DEBRIS FLOWS 
         Very high likelihood of DEBRIS FLOODS 
            Very high likelihood of NORMAL FLOODS 
      Low likelihood of debris flows 0.00 – 0.30 
0.30 – 0.55 
 >0.55 – 0.60 
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Table 5. 4. The characteristics of each major tributary within the Bealey Valley. The Melton ration classifies 
each stream into debris flow or debris flood-prone based on the watershed length and relief.  
 
 
At this stage is important to note that this technique can only be used to specify the process 
most likely to take place within a catchment area, in which case it is of course possible for 
a normal flood to form along a debris flow-prone tributary, for example. However, in such 
an instance debris flows would have a much higher probability of occurrence than debris 
floods, according to the Melton ratio theory.  
 
Also, the length of the watershed influences the risk factor of each tributary. If the 
catchment is short (less than 2.7km long) there is a good chance that a debris flow 
travelling down the tributary will reach the depositional fan area (or similarly, State 
Highway 73 in areas where it parallels the Bealey River) and cause damage. Wardens 
Creek and Graham Stream have some of the shortest watersheds and may be more 
accommodating to debris flow movement, suggesting they may pose the greatest debris 
flow risk to the village area.  
 
Without any previous debris flow data on any of the ten studied tributaries it is impossible 
to give conclusions on the expected probability of debris flows and debris floods in the 
Bealey Valley. Several debris flow channels can be active simultaneously, which 
exponentially increases the threat to lives and property (K. Smith, 2004). Despite their 
speed and range of movement being highly erratic, their recurrence intervals are expected 
to be long, making the debris flow risk somewhat low. However, if a debris flow or debris 
flood was to occur, particularly on Wardens Creek, McGrath Stream or Rough Creek, the 
outcome is likely to be detrimental to the Arthur’s Pass community.  
 
 
 
TRIBUTARY NAME 
 
RELIEF WATERSHED AREA (km2) 
MELTON 
RATIO 
WATERSHED 
LENGTH (km)
Avalanche Creek 1.063 0.896 1.123 2.00 
Bealey River 1.320 3.913 0.667 3.51 
Bridal Veil Stream 1.040 1.229 0.938 2.21 
Graham Stream 1.103 2.085 0.764 2.39 
McGrath Stream 1.051 3.855 0.535 2.99 
Punchbowl Creek 1.161 4.251 0.563 3.90 
Rough Creek 1.071 4.568 0.501 3.12 
Twin Creek 0.843 0.636 1.057 2.74 
Upper Twin Creek 1.062 3.114 0.602 3.14 
Wardens Creek 0.730 0.215 1.574 2.19 
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5.7 SOIL CREEP 
 
Soil creep is considered to be an extremely slow form of downslope migration of surficial 
deposits, usually made up of unconsolidated material and soil overlying bedrock 
(Eisbacher & Clague, 1984). Soil creep at Arthur’s Pass is mostly unrecognised and poorly 
understood. Because there are very few exposed loess deposits in the area, it is difficult to 
identify slopes that are undergoing surficial creep. Some localised creep is evident on the 
terrace slopes along School Terrace and below Brake Hill Road where there is grass cover, 
but these areas are not considered to represent a significant threat to the village.  
 
Vegetation is widely known to stabilise mountain slopes and reduce the capacity for creep 
to become established on slopes (Cave, 1987). Using this logic, it is apparent that the 
Arthur’s Pass environment is primarily forested and therefore there is minimal chance of 
soil creep occurring to such an extent as to signify a serious natural risk.  
 
5.8 IDENTIFIABLE MASS MOVEMENT ACTIVITY AT ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
Comparisons to the Otira section of State Highway 73 indicate that Arthur’s Pass is ranked 
as a lower risk area for landslides, rock avalanches and rockfalls. This does not, however, 
diminish the notion that there is a very definite risk to the Arthur’s Pass community from 
these hazards. Whilst the number, size and extent of mass movements along the Arthur’s 
Pass section may be lower than the Otira section, the threat is made greater by the fact that 
there is a dense population of people within the small area that makes up Arthur’s Pass. 
Studying past mass movements give insights into the distribution and timing of future 
slope failures. Evidence of previous mass movements have been identified predominantly 
on aerial photographs and as part of field work in the Arthur’s Pass region. 
 
5.8.1 McGrath Stream catchment 
 
In the upper reaches of the catchment there is a great deal of sediment already in the 
stream. There are also countless small-scale slips and landslide scars. Pre-1938 scars have 
been slightly reactivated and because this cannot be attributed to earthquake activity, they 
are assumed to be atmospherically-triggered. There are very large landslide marks below 
the treeline in the upper catchment that formed between 1943 and 1960 (possibly 
coinciding with the 1946 Lake Coleridge earthquake). This landslide has stabilised by 
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2007 except for a newly formed, narrow section of landslide debris just above the previous 
slide. Its location does not conform to any pre-existing stream channels or identified ridges 
or fault traces.  
 
The Melton ratio for McGrath Stream indicates that it would be susceptible to debris floods 
more than debris flows. Definite evidence of a specific debris flood event along the 
tributary is difficult to find, probably because it has been removed by subsequent fluvial 
processes in the catchment. There is sufficient sediment available within the catchment to 
supply material for major mass movement events, so it is expected that McGrath Stream 
constitutes a moderate risk, especially with its location just north of the town.  
 
5.8.2 Punchbowl Creek catchment 
 
Post-1943 there are many bare slopes indicating widespread surficial failure, mostly 
involving soil and vegetation debris rather than large volumes of rock. A long belt 
containing large quantities of sediment and debris exists just above Devils Punchbowl 
Falls, which is releasing material into the fluvial system. Some new, minor slips occurred 
in the catchment area prior to 1998, which may be associated with the 1994 and 1995 
Arthur’s Pass earthquakes.  
 
A large section of the outcrop forming the waterfall sheared off during the 1929 Arthur’s 
Pass earthquake, depositing large quantities of rock into the tributary. There is also a high 
risk of smaller rockfalls and topples within the valley. A medium sized scree fan can be 
found near the Punchbowl Falls lookout, which has a Department of Conservation warning 
sign. Such scree deposits are common along many of the tramping tracks throughout 
Arthur’s Pass National Park.  
 
The Punchbowl Creek debris fan at the creek’s confluence with the Bealey River is large 
and thick and indicates that there is a large quantity of sediment available for the creek to 
transport. The Melton ratio suggests that Punchbowl Creek would be more susceptible to 
debris flows, although the morphology of the creek may make it difficult for debris flows 
to initiate and travel down into the Bealey Valley.  
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5.8.3 Wardens Creek catchment 
 
At least six pre-1938 landslide deposits are discernable in the Wardens Creek catchment, 
of which three are large-scale slides. By 2007, they are partially revegetated although the 
three major landslides are still very obvious. There are fresh scars on the flanks of 
Avalanche Peak moving into the Wardens Creek channel, and numerous small slips above 
the treeline that are depositing very large volumes of sediment into the creek. Most of the 
scars have not reactivated after 1938 which suggests they have stabilised.  
 
Wardens Creek has a moderately-sized debris fan at its mouth and a very high Melton ratio 
that suggests it would be prone to debris flows. Whilst it is narrow and the flow of water 
fairly low, Wardens Creek is suggested as another possible high risk debris flow area on 
account of its steep topography, high sediment availability and the presence of a large 
debris fan at the creek’s confluence with the Bealey River, although no depositional 
indicators have been located along the tributary to support this theory.  
 
5.8.4 Avalanche Creek catchment 
 
Avalanche Creek is not a major threat to the Arthur’s Pass village because of its size. Only 
minor slips and small rockfalls have been identified in the creek catchment since 1938 and 
therefore, the risk in this area is deemed to be low. There is very little material available at 
the head of the creek that could become available for transport which also suggests that the 
debris flow risk in that catchment is very low.  
 
5.8.5 Rough Creek catchment 
 
Rough Creek is likely to be the greatest threat to the village, not only because it is an active 
tributary with a variety of different hazards but because a large percentage of the village 
buildings are sited on its debris fan. Throughout the catchment there are sheared cliff faces 
and slip scars leading down to the tributary (Figure 5.7). There are also very obvious paths 
of flattened trees where large boulders (up to several metres in diameter) have been 
dislodged and rolled through the thick vegetation into the riverbed (Figures 5.8 and 5.9) .  
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Figure 5. 7. Unstable slopes and cliff faces in the lower Rough Creek catchment. The shaded red area 
highlights the debris deposit resulting from failure of the right slope.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 8. A path of damaged and flattened vegetation showing the movement of a dislodged boulder down 
the slope into the Rough Creek tributary.  
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This tributary contains very high quantities of landslide material, but no new major slips 
have been identified on the neighbouring slopes between 1938 and 1977. A medium slip 
appeared in the upper reaches of the creek post-1977 which may be attributed to the 1994 
or 1995 Arthur’s Pass earthquake. The Rough Creek catchment is a very dynamic system 
because there are countless small-scale slope failures in the catchment that are constantly 
active and do not show signs of revegetation. There are many small, narrow slips on the 
bank opposite the Rough Creek mouth that formed before 1938 and which correspond to 
damage sustained during the 1929 Arthur’s Pass earthquake. They are still observable on 
the slopes in 2007 but have undergone considerable plant regeneration, indicating that they 
have stabilised (Figure 5.10).  
 
The Melton ratio of Rough Creek was the lowest of the ten streams analysed at Arthur’s 
Pass, which places it in the debris-flood-prone category. The creek has a steep riverbed, a 
large quantity of sediments available for remobilisation and an extensive debris fan, 
suggesting it is very capable of generating debris floods and flows, which could travel to 
the Bealey River and destroy buildings on the fan. Evidence of more recent debris floods 
may have been buried or removed by subsequent fluvial processes or covered by foliage. 
 
5.8.6 Graham Stream catchment 
 
The slopes along Graham Stream show extensive landslides, remobilised rock fragments 
and debris. Some areas have become revegetated by 2007 below the treeline. There is a 
large protuberance at the mouth of Graham Stream that is more resistant to fluvial 
processes than the rest of the Bealey River and is potentially a site of future slumping and 
landslide dam formation across the river. There also appears to be evidence of large-scale 
slumping previously on the flank of Mt. O’Malley above Graham Stream, which could be 
an indicator of likely coseismic slope weaknesses in the future, forming a landslide dam. A 
similar slump feature has been recognised on Mt. Bealey, near Halpin Creek. The Melton 
ratio for Graham Stream places it in the debris flow-prone category however it is unknown 
whether the tributary has previously accommodated debris flow events. There is a fairly 
large debris fan at its mouth but a narrow band of vegetation runs down the centre of the 
stream near its confluence with the Bealey River, which has remained untouched since the 
first aerial photos were taken in 1938. This may suggest that the lower reaches of the 
tributary are fairly stable and more resistant to mass movements than other tributaries in 
the Bealey Valley.  
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Figure 5. 9. Very large boulders in the Rough Creek tributary that have been dislodged from adjacent slopes 
and traversed through alpine vegetation to reach the creek. A. is approximately 2m in diameter. B. is 4-5m in 
diameter and has left a path through the vegetation on the northern slope after being dislodged during the 
1994 Arthur’s Pass earthquake (Figure 5.8).  
 
 
 
Recent revegetation on 
debris deposit
 
Figure 5. 10. A partially revegetated debris fan in the lower Rough Creek catchment. The stage of 
revegetation can give an indication of how recently the slope was active. 
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5.8.7 Other mass movements zones 
 
A medium-sized, elongate landslide has been identified directly behind the houses on 
School Terrace. It formed before 1938 and was revegetated by 1977. An inspection carried 
out in the field confirmed that there are no older trees in the area affected by the School 
Terrace landslide, and that the majority of regrowth is small ferns and shrubs. School 
Terrace has been identified as a glacial moraine deposit but there is a thin deposit of mass 
movement material up to one metre thick overlying the moraine deposits. Both deposits are 
further covered by a thick sheet of loess.  
 
Numerous, recurrent slips along the highway are continuously observed that pose a 
moderate threat, especially to town infrastructure. South of the village boundaries, there 
are plenty of possibilities for sediment dumping into the Bealey River from slopes on both 
sides of the river between Graham Stream and Halpin Creek that will have considerable 
impacts on the township (Figure 5.11). In the past, shallow sections of Halpin Creek have 
been buried by gravel during storms (Whitehouse & McSaveney, 1992).  
 
There is a large-scale slope failure downstream of the village between Brett Stream and the 
bank opposite Halpin Creek. This zone is potentially a major landslide dam threat. It also 
has a protuberance at its base that shows a similar resistance to fluvial erosion as the 
Graham Stream protuberance. Additional zones of weakness exist north of the village in 
several locations adjacent to the highway, particularly along Rome Ridge and Goldney 
Ridge which may have the capacity to give way and form a landslide dam upstream of the 
township.  
 
The combination of different mass movement processes at Arthur’s Pass gives rise to 
complex mountain conditions and provides a number of hazard scenarios. Single landslides 
can exhibit a variety of downslope velocities, and they may occur in conjunction with other 
environmental processes to generate complex geomorphic events (Kovach & McGuire, 
2003). For example, a landslide may contribute sediments for the formation of a debris 
flow, during a storm, or a landslide may block the river system and generate flooding and 
aggradation in the local vicinity of the dam.  
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Figure 5. 11. Mass movement scars in the Graham Stream catchment (left) and on the slope opposite Halpin 
Creek (right), viewed from the Rough Creek riverbed. These particular instabilities are constantly active, and 
have shown only partial revegetation over the last 80 years.  
 
 
5.9 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MASS MOVEMENTS AND OTHER 
NATURAL HAZARDS AT ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
Fluvial hazards, atmospheric conditions and mass movements have a very close 
relationship and often work in unison at Arthur’s Pass. Fluvial responses in the Bealey 
Valley are greatly controlled by precipitation. Sediment generation is a fundamental 
concern for hazard managers in the Bealey Valley because the fluvial system is more 
capable of draining excess water if it does not contain suspended sediments. Once 
sediments are introduced into the system, massive aggradation, increased flood-frequency 
and large-scale channel avulsion will result (Korup et al., 2004).   
 
By comparing New Zealand to other seismically-active regions, it is possible to deduce 
that the impact of seismogenic landslides on long-term erosion hazards is significant. 
Keefer (1994) demonstrated that the Southern Alps have some of the highest rates of 
erosion from earthquake-triggered mass movements, along with Hawaii, San Francisco 
Bay and western New Guinea. This illustrates the bearing that slope processes have on 
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fluvial hazards. Alternatively, Crozier (1995) used landslide distributions to analyse 
palaeoseismicity in the North Island of New Zealand. He concluded that the main 
requirement for this to be a success is that landslides are correctly identified as 
seismogenic landslides. Speight (1933) used this technique to locate a new fault rupture 
after the 1929 Arthur’s Pass earthquake. The signature landslide distribution within a 
narrow strip of area suggested that the landslides were caused by a proximal earthquake 
source. The fault was later identified by Berryman and Villamor (2004) as being the point 
of origin of the earthquake. 
 
5.10 PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR MASS MOVEMENTS 
 
Mass movements often have a high spatial variability, which can be difficult to translate 
into a suitable risk assessment. This lowers the likelihood of accurately assessing the mass 
movement risk at specific Arthur’s Pass sites and makes it very difficult to mitigate for 
these hazards. Furthermore, a lack of definitive landslide data in the national park 
diminishes the possibility of accurately determining probability estimates. The nature of 
the national park is such that large events with great significance to a natural hazard 
analysis may be left unnoticed for an indefinite length of time, and those that are reported 
are not done so with a high degree of detail, so it is difficult to assess local mass 
movements using only these criteria. 
 
Without the benefits of an in depth engineering investigation of current slope stability, it is 
not possible to quantitatively pinpoint which slopes are conclusively the most prone to 
failure in the future. As with any natural hazard, the aim is not on predicting the exact 
arrival of an event, but accurately estimating its potential frequency and expected severity 
so as to assist in the preparedness of communities at risk of disaster.  
 
5.11  MASS MOVEMENT MITIGATION 
 
5.11.1 Methods of slope stabilisation 
 
There are two approaches in the mitigation of mass movement hazards: 
 
• PASSIVE METHODS – These are non-invasive methods and tend to be 
preventative measures.  Passive methods include the practice of effective land use 
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planning and monitoring of the dynamic slope environment for indicators of 
impending mass movements.  
• ACTIVE METHODS – These are invasive methods of mitigation directed towards 
stabilisation and control of slopes. They are implemented when human infringement 
on areas susceptible to mass movements pose an unacceptable risk (Eisbacher & 
Clague, 1984). Examples are the installation of buttresses, chains and cables, 
anchored mesh nets and rock shelters. Alternatively, stabilisation may be achieved 
through benching, scaling, trimming and excavation (Jochim & Colorado 
Geological Survey, 1988).  
 
Physical stabilising practices are typically only practicable on smaller slopes within close 
proximity to human activities, such as along road cuts and throughout sections of the 
village. In the case of Arthur’s Pass, the size and scale of slopes make it impossible to 
reliably and cost-effectively mitigate every potentially unstable slope. Hence, the 
suitability of active mitigation methods is questioned because of the isolated and 
unpopulous nature of the area, taking into account the moderate to high mass movement 
risk. High frequency events are less likely to be catastrophically damaging and are more 
easily prevented and rectified. Whilst the risk of a catastrophic mass movement is very 
low, there is a very real possibility that it could occur in the next fifty years, so this 
scenario must be factored into any hazard assessment of Arthur’s Pass.  
 
The economic cost of mass movement mitigation measures is a primary consideration 
when mitigating mass movement hazards. The implementation of a mitigation strategy 
should cost considerably less than the total value of the property to be protected (Eisbacher 
& Clague, 1984). However, economic issues may have to be forsaken when human lives 
are at risk.  
 
5.11.2 Current treatment methods 
 
There are no known monitoring systems currently in place at Arthur’s Pass to identify 
imminent slope failures. It is possible that the cost of maintaining such a system outweighs 
the benefits because life-threatening mass movement disasters are expected to occur very 
rarely. The lack of an adequate mass movement warning system in the township is a 
significant disadvantage and might result in the loss of lives and damage to property that 
could otherwise have been avoided.  
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Road builders along State Highway 73 diminish the stability of the slopes by producing 
road cuts (McSaveney & McSaveney, 1998). The mass movements that occur as a result of 
human activities greatly contribute to the highway maintenance costs and are responsible 
for major road reconstruction along several sections of the highway (Paterson, 1996). 
Consequently, anchored mesh nets, buttresses and retaining walls have been positioned 
along vulnerable sections of the highway corridor to minimise the risk to road and park 
users. Road cuts associated with failures between the village and Jack’s Hut to the north 
have also been reengineered in recent years, effectively reducing the potential for mass 
movement damage along that selected section of highway (E. Smith, 2004). 
 
Gabions have been used in some areas of the village to stabilise smaller slopes. There are 
up to three stacks of gabions present at ground level behind Arthur’s Pass Mountain House 
backpacker accommodation, which have been supplemented by two fences further upslope 
to limit rockfalls surrounding the building. These control methods have been in place for a 
couple of years and during this time have been successful at controlling rockfalls. 
 
5.12 SUMMARY 
 
Mass movement processes at Arthur’s Pass are complex and it is clear that they offer 
significant risks to the local community, road users and individuals within the national 
park. This mass movement hazard assessment determined that: 
 
1. Slope stability is largely dependent on external and internal slope conditions and 
mass movement events are more likely to happen in specific terrains that are 
conducive to slope failure, such as that at Arthur’s Pass, which has high rainfall, is 
seismically active, is within a steep mountainous region and which has a thick 
covering of loess deposits.  
2. Mass movements can be classified according to their initiation mechanisms. 
Atmospheric-triggered events are the most common, and in the short-term, rainfall 
is responsible for the vast majority of slope failures. Seismic-triggered events are 
more prone to generating large-scale mass movements because their probability of 
occurrence is greater than rainfall-triggered events. Other, slow-moving mass 
movements are long-term hazards and often go unnoticed. All three occur in the 
Arthur’s Pass region.  
 112
3. The incidence of mass movements is heavily reliant on a variety of preconditions 
and causative factors. Such slope failure factors are both internal and external and 
include the climatic conditions, soil and vegetation characteristics, weight the slope 
material, transport agents, slope gradient, lithology and tectonic stresses, 
gravitational forces and the extent of weathering.   
4. Mass movement events can be used to determine the incidence and location of 
other natural hazards. Landslides and rock avalanches can be examples of indirect 
evidence for past earthquake shaking and mass movement distributions can 
correspond to previously unrecognised climatic conditions. Mass movements also 
have a strong interrelationship with fluvial hazards at Arthur’s Pass because they 
supply and transport slope materials into tributaries within the Bealey Valley. 
5. The Melton ratio calculated for ten tributaries within the Bealey Valley indicated 
that 80% of the streams are debris flow-prone, whilst Rough Creek and McGrath 
Stream are debris flood-prone. Not all tributaries within the Bealey Valley 
accommodate debris flows and debris floods. The creeks that show possible debris 
flow activity in the past (in the form of debris fans or depositional and erosional 
indictors) are Rough Creek, Wardens Creek, Graham Stream and McGrath Stream.  
6. Several zones of slope weakness have been identified within each catchment. The 
major types of slope instabilities are weathered bedrock failures, surficial loess 
failures, fault zone failures, failures along road cuts and rockfalls. Rough Creek, 
Punchbowl Creek and McGrath Stream have the most dynamic catchments because 
they are steep, have large quantities of sediment available for transfer and display a 
wide range of previous mass movements such as rockfalls, landslides and debris 
flows. There is also potential for large-scale landslide damming throughout the 
Bealey Valley, which would have catastrophic consequences on the village.   
7. Probability estimates for various mass movement events are very difficult to 
determine because of the lack of landslide data and the high spatial variability that 
they have within a large unpopulated area like the Arthur’s Pass National Park. 
Whilst it may be possible to identify the location of future slope failures, it is 
almost impossible to determine the expected frequency and severity of these events, 
so the risk remains high. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
FLUVIAL-RELATED HAZARDS 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is the final of four specific hazard assessment chapters and examines fluvial-
related hazards at Arthur’s Pass. The Bealey River and its tributary streams are some of the 
most prominent features of the Arthur’s Pass landscape. Accordingly, they are also 
responsible for some of the most frequent natural hazards in the region. For the last 80 to 
100 years humans have lived on the river system at Arthur’s Pass, contributing greatly to 
fluvial-related hazards. River hazards can take the form of surface floods, flash floods and 
fluvial floods, in addition to erosion and aggradation of sediments in the riverbed. Surface 
flooding has been discussed as part of the meteorological hazards in Chapter 4, and debris 
flows are included as part of the mass movement section in Chapter 5.  
 
The objectives of this river-related hazard assessment are: 
1. To describe the characteristics of the Arthur’s Pass drainage network to better 
understand the fluvial processes and factors that make the Arthur’s Pass area 
susceptible to river-related natural hazards.  
2. To explain the fluvial-related hazards identified at Arthur’s Pass, including fluvial 
flooding, flash floods, channel incision and surface erosion, fluvial aggradation and 
channel avulsion.  
3. To investigate changes to the drainage network within the Bealey Valley over the 
last 80 years and to document the location, severity and outcomes of past fluvial-
related hazards in the Arthur’s Pass area with the aim of identifying past issues and 
potential hazard areas in the future.  
4. To describe possible scenarios of flooding, erosion and aggradation and the 
implications they might have on Arthur’s Pass village in the future.  
5. To examine mitigation methods for fluvial-related hazards that may be required in 
the future and describe current methods of river control at Arthur’s Pass.  
 
6.2 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
 
In the case of river-related hazards, fundamental studies of the dynamic river system are 
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achievable using several wide-ranging methods. Investigations relating to aggradation and 
erosion are greatly supported by reconnaissance carried out in the field because the rivers 
and streams being examined are, for the most part, easily accessible on foot. From 
November 2006 to early 2008, the subtle, yet important, geomorphic changes occurring 
along the Bealey River and its local tributaries were monitored to gauge the response of the 
fluvial system to various influences such as rainstorms, snowmelt, slope failures and 
human activities. 
 
The changes identifiable on aerial photographs spanning several decades are equally 
critical. Photographs from 1938, 1943, 1960, 1977 and 1998, and 2007 satellite images 
extracted from Google Earth capture transformations made by the Bealey River system 
over time and give a sound insight into the geomorphic processes working at Arthur’s 
Pass. The 1977 and 1998 images offer limited information because they are high altitude 
photographs and do not show the village in specific detail.  
 
Examining the vegetation along the Bealey River and its tributaries is particularly 
important for interpreting zones of recent activity and highlighting areas that have become 
stabilised and are therefore less liable to changes in the foreseeable future. Study of the 
interrelationships between plant cover, fluvial processes and the landscape has been 
completed using remote sensing methods and data obtained from in-field interpretations 
throughout the year.  
 
Several reports and journal articles provide historical evidence on individual flooding 
events and the consequences they have on town infrastructure and community safety. This 
allows for assumptions to be made on the potential location, timing and severity of future 
events at Arthur’s Pass. In addition, correspondence with several of the local residents 
affords the opportunity to understand the flooding issues from a community perspective 
and provides vital information on specific incidents and recurring issues that are not able to 
be sourced from the literature.  
 
6.3 THE ARTHUR’S PASS DRAINAGE NETWORK 
 
The Waimakariri River catchments are characterised by broader and flatter valleys than 
their west coast counterparts and are dominated by shingle alluvial sediments (Cowie, 
1957). Since the cessation of the most recent glaciations, the Bealey Valley has been 
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heavily modified by fluvial erosion and aggradation processes (McSaveney, 1982b). The 
lower reaches of the Bealey Valley are heavily dissected by fluvial channels (Figure 6.1). 
The Bealey River is sourced from the Goldney Glacier on Mt. Rolleston and acts as the 
chief water course through the area. It transports all water and shifting sediments from the 
local tributaries to the Waimakariri River further south (McCallum, Lovis, Cowie, Glennie, 
& Mason, 1986). Local streams contributing directly to the Bealey River in the vicinity of 
the township include Rough Creek, McGrath Stream, Avalanche Creek, Graham Stream, 
Punchbowl Creek, Bridal Veil Creek and Wardens Creek (Table 6.1). 
 
Figure 6. 1. The major catchments in the Bealey River contributing to fluvial-related hazards at Arthur’s 
Pass (map sourced from (GoogleMaps 2008)). 
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Table 6. 1. The location and characteristics of all major tributaries within the Bealey Valley. All distances are referenced to the Department of Conservation Visitor Centre, 
located in the centre of the village on State Highway 73.  
 
Tributary Name Location of confluence with Bealey River 
 
Flow attributes 
 
Distinguishing characteristics 
 
 
Bridal Veil Creek 
1.4km north of the DOC 
Visitor Centre, just north of 
town boundaries on eastern 
side of valley. 
- Medium flow rate 
- Moderate depth (0.5-1.0m) 
- Moderate width 
- Moderate erosive capabilities 
• Steep riverbed gradient. 
• Two waterfalls (60m and 108m). 
• Moderately confined channel, particularly in lower reaches.  
 
 
McGrath Stream 
1.3km north of the DOC 
Visitor Centre, outside of town 
boundaries on western side of 
valley. 
- Medium to fast flow rate 
- Moderate depth (0.5-1.0m) 
- Moderate to wide width 
- Moderate to high erosive capabilities 
• Steep riverbed gradient with both large boulders and fine-grained sediments. 
• Noticeable channel incision along the riverbanks. 
 
 
Punchbowl Creek 
0.9km north of the DOC 
Visitor Centre, directly north 
of numerous dwellings on 
eastern side of valley. 
- Fast flow rate 
- Moderate to high depth (>0.5m) 
- Moderate width 
- Moderate to high erosive capabilities 
• Very steep riverbed gradient. 
• Has produced a very large alluvial fan at the Bealey River confluence.  
• Devils Punchbowl waterfall (131m) a short distance upstream. 
• Largely confined by steep rock walls and vegetation.  
 
 
Wardens Creek 
0.9km north of the DOC 
Visitor Centre, on western side 
of valley, directly opposite 
Punchbowl Creek confluence. 
- Slow flow rate 
- Shallow depth (<0.5m) 
- Narrow width 
- Low erosive capabilities 
• Very steep riverbed gradient. 
• Channel largely confined by thick vegetation.  
• Mostly comprised of moderate sized boulders. 
• Has produced a small debris fan but does not have a high flow of water through 
it. 
 
 
Avalanche Creek 
 
0.2km north of the DOC 
Visitor Centre, between the 
chapel and the outdoor 
education centre on western 
side of valley.  
- Slow flow rate 
- Shallow depth (<0.5m) 
- Narrow width 
- Minimal erosive capabilities 
• Very steep riverbed gradient with numerous small waterfalls.  
• Flows under a small road bridge in the centre of town. 
• Source of the town’s water supply, through a gravity-fed filter system. 
• Largely confined in hillslope areas by thick vegetation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Rough Creek 
0.9km south of the DOC 
Visitor Centre, adjacent to the 
Arthur’s Pass Police Station 
and surrounded by numerous 
dwellings. Flowing down 
western side of valley. 
- Slow to medium flow rate 
- Shallow to moderate depth (<1.0m) 
- Wide width 
- Moderate to high erosive capabilities 
• Bedload is mostly comprised of large debris boulders along the whole length of 
the creek. 
• Flow is variable and fluctuates greatly with rainfall and season.  
• Has produced a very large debris fan on which numerous houses have been 
built. 
• Contains huge boulders deposited during and after major earthquakes in the 
area.  
• Controlled by stopbanks. 
• No evidence of erosion on opposite bank of river mouth.  
• Gets its name from the boulders that would flow down the creek during floods. 
 
 
Graham Stream 
1.2km south of the DOC 
Visitor Centre, immediately 
south of town boundaries on 
eastern side of valley. 
- Medium to fast flow rate 
- Moderate depth 
- Wide width 
- Moderate to high erosive capabilities 
• Very steep riverbed gradient. 
• Has produced a thick alluvial fan at the confluence with the Bealey River.  
• Incision of the opposite riverbank where it meets the Bealey River, producing a 
wide floodplain. 
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The smaller, unnamed creeks and gullies that feed the larger streams within the very large 
catchment area are also significant contributors to the catchment. Within the alpine 
environment at Arthur’s Pass, the steep topography acts as a funnel for surface runoff into 
the narrow tributaries of the Bealey River catchment (McCallum et al., 1986). The river 
and the majority of its tributaries are covered by deep alluvial sediments and the formation 
of alluvial fan deposits at the confluence of tributaries is common (McSaveney, 1982b). 
The alluvial fans are often the primary source of material for sediment transfer during 
periods of peak water flow. 
 
There are a multitude of factors that make the Bealey Valley particularly susceptible to 
flooding in the Arthur’s Pass district. 
 
1. The large size of the catchment area 
For the purpose of this study, the Bealey catchment has been divided into two 
sections; the upper Bealey catchment in which all water and sediment transport 
takes place through or very close to the village area, and the lower Bealey 
catchment further downstream, in which river processes are not likely to affect the 
village. The upper catchment is approximately 44.8km2 and the lower catchment 
16.8km2. All runoff within the catchment is diverted to the Bealey River, leaving 
the village in a prime location for damage. When put into context, the Bealey 
catchment alone makes up about 1% of the total Waimakariri River catchment area 
(McCallum et al., 1986).  
2. Climatic conditions  
Arthur’s Pass is exposed to high-intensity and long-duration rainstorms several 
times each year, causing flood-related issues in the Bealey Valley. There is a direct 
relationship between the size of the watershed and the duration and intensity of 
rainfall in producing flood conditions (Wohl, 2000). Snowmelt is another major 
cause of flooding, particularly during warm periods or after a large snowfall. The 
contribution of snow melt is often delayed until the summer months.  
3. Lack of adequate storage facilities for excess water 
There are no natural or man-made storage areas such as lakes or artificial reservoirs 
within the Bealey catchment that can accommodate large volumes of water. The 
mountains provide temporary water storage but are not suitable for collecting large 
volumes of water (Wohl, 2000).  
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4. Constraints placed on the floodplain by the village  
Development on the floodplain has rendered a large proportion of the area 
unavailable to the active river, which does not allow for natural channel avulsion or 
overflow of water to take place in the area now occupied by the village. Hence, 
flooding will continue to threaten the town area as long as there is insufficient 
space for natural channel widening.  
 
6.4 HAZARDS LINKED WITH THE FLUVIAL SYSTEM AT ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
Flooding and river sediment transport processes are similar, because they are the product 
of very similar mechanisms. The difference is that they take place over separate time 
scales; floods develop relatively quickly, typically occurring minutes to days after the 
triggering event. Erosion and aggradation may be exacerbated by flooding events, but 
ultimately these sediment transport processes take place over a much longer period of time, 
usually weeks to years.  
 
6.4.1 Fluvial flooding 
 
Floods are the most recurrent and costly environmental hazard in New Zealand, although 
they tend to threaten property more than lives in the case of Arthur’s Pass (Salinger, 1998). 
Flooding occurs at Arthur’s Pass when the volume of water available within the Bealey 
River catchment exceeds the total capacity of the rivers and streams within the catchment 
(Wohl, 2000). Encroachment onto the floodplain by the village exaggerates the natural 
fluvial processes and creates a continuous threat to the community (Australian Water 
Resources Council, 1985). The floodplain is expected to make adjustments both in the 
short-term and long-term to accommodate variable flood discharges, causing the 
morphology of the floodplain to change accordingly (Bell, 1999). Only rarely are the 
floods within the village severe enough to cause loss of life; the principal issue lies with 
property damage, temporary loss of amenities and the consumption of valuable emergency 
resources. 
 
Analysis of the rainfall records of the past 50 years indicates floods do not follow any 
seasonal patterns. However, the effects of snow melt as a contributor to river flooding are 
typically seen with the onset of the warmer months. This is especially evident after a 
winter season with very heavy snowfalls. Often there is a delayed influx of water because 
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the temporary snow accumulations require warm conditions to melt the thick snow packs 
(K. Smith, 2004).  
 
6.4.1.1 Flash floods 
 
Flash floods form rapidly with little or no advance warning, often in areas with steep 
terrain. They typically develop as a result of intense rainfall and are often characterised by 
high flow velocities (Kovach & McGuire, 2003). Flash floods are particularly common in 
the Bealey River and tend to occur every few months during heavy rain periods.  
 
In terms of flash flood occurrence and severity, the most important consideration is not the 
size and capacity of the fluvial channel but the difference between the peak floodwater 
discharge and the average annual discharge (McCallum et al., 1986). With its large 
catchment area, the water level in the Bealey River has the potential to rise rapidly during 
periods of heavy rain. Consequently, water flow in the streams can rise to a critical level in 
a short amount of time, catching many people unaware.  
 
Flash floods have a time scale of several seconds to several hours and occur with little or 
no warning. They have very high flow velocities and may generate a rapid rise in water 
levels, targeting the village site. Small streams in particular have an elevated risk of flash 
flooding if they exist within a steep area with thin soil cover and intense local rainfall, 
producing ideal conditions for the production of flash floods (McCallum et al., 1986). 
 
6.4.2 Channel incision and surface erosion 
 
At Arthur’s Pass, erosion is synonymous with the widespread, continuous depletion of 
natural gravel materials and soil by water, wind or ice (Kovach & McGuire, 2003). 
Channel incision relates to the removal of fill material in the Bealey Valley tributaries by 
the flow of water (Figure 6.2). This creates localised erosion that results in the deepening, 
widening or flattening of the riverbed (K. Smith, 2004).  
 
River erosion is a long-term hazard and is liable for the degradation of slope stability and 
protective embankments along the river. There are several causes of erosion in the Bealey 
River at Arthur’s Pass. By far the most dominant of these is precipitation. Extended wet 
periods saturate the soil and increase surface runoff within the Bealey River catchment, 
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whilst increased river levels increase the turbulence and sediment transport capabilities of 
the river (McCallum et al., 1986). Secondary processes contributing to the sediment yield 
of the Bealey Valley and the severity of erosion rates are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both erosional and depositional processes are easily identified at lower elevations because 
they form well-defined marks in the vegetation cover. Stable areas show revegetation and 
unstable areas exhibit scars due to recent activity. Channel incision at Arthur’s Pass is 
present as downcutting of the alluvial fans, scouring of stream banks and where 
impediments such as bridge supports form obstructions which increase the flow turbulence 
and aid in erosional processes. Erosion resulting directly from human activities is almost 
imperceptible within the Arthur’s Pass National Park, except on road and trail areas.  
 
Surface runoff is one of the leading causes of erosion, but it is limited on the mountain 
slopes because infiltration rates are high, and the abundant vegetation acts as a deterrent 
and slows down or reduces surface runoff (Wohl, 2000). Erosive processes are dominantly 
confined to the open floodplain area, where vegetation is sparse. Additionally, urbanisation 
plays a role in the severity of surface runoff and subsequently erosion within the town, 
especially if man-made stormwater drainage outlets fail to cope with high water levels.  
 
6.4.3 Fluvial aggradation 
 
Aggradation of the river system is defined in this hazard assessment as the modification of 
a rivers’ natural gradient through the increased deposition and accumulation of sediments 
GEOLOGY –  At Arthur’s Pass, the bedrock is highly weathered 
and fractured greywacke which is prone to 
shearing, reducing the level of energy required for 
erosion to occur. 
 
RELIEF –  Slopes over 50° are common in the valley. Slope 
gradient controls the velocity of surface runoff, 
thereby lowering the energy required for erosion 
to occur by reducing the failure threshold of the 
soil. 
 
VEGETATION –  Below tree line, very dense beech forest exists 
within the valley. Vegetation reduces erosion by 
anchoring soil particles on slopes and absorbing 
water, therefore reducing runoff. 
 
SOIL -  Thin soils with a high saturation rate occur on the 
slopes near the village. The degree of erosion on 
slopes is dependent on soil characteristics such as 
the grain size, bulk soil density and the friction 
coefficient of the soil (Liu, Chen, & Li, 2001). 
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(Kovach & McGuire, 2003). It typically follows major storm activity and is the product of 
sediment transport by external agents such as air, water or ice utilising gravitational forces. 
Bell (1999) suggests that the floodplain is essentially a sediment storage area which 
remains in equilibrium except during periods of dramatic, short-term change. Aggradation 
is a temporary process and signifies that the river is out of equilibrium. Erosion and 
aggradation processes work in unison; the environment has to be stripped of sediment 
through erosional processes in order to supply the particles for sedimentation. Similarly, 
they work on the same time scale because they are controlled by the same environmental 
parameters such as climate, geomorphology, geology and vegetation.  
 
The numerous alluvial fans observed in the Bealey Valley tributaries are good examples of 
aggradational deposits (Figure 6.3). They are vulnerable to downcutting, which increases 
the sediment supply elsewhere in the fluvial system, and oversteepening, which reduces the 
availability of material downstream. Oversteepening may result in the sudden collapse of 
aggradational deposits and cause a considerable change in river geomorphology 
downstream of the slope failure (Wohl, 2000). Vertical accretion in the alluvial fans is 
most predominant during and immediately after floods when sediment loads in the river 
are at their highest (Bell, 1999). 
 
6.4.4 Channel avulsion 
 
Shifting channels can seriously threaten communities and Arthur’s Pass is no exception. 
The floodplain is approximately 300m wide and can accommodate a certain degree of 
channel shifting within the active riverbed, but long-term redirection of the river which 
could directly affect the central township area may persist, especially if radical or 
inappropriate human activities occur. Avulsion is a partial contributor to the flood risk 
because it affects the proximity of the river to people and properties. However, the 
movement of channels within the floodplain is moderated by stopbank placement and it is 
envisaged that protection works primarily aimed at reducing flood damage have thus far 
effectively mitigated the hazards posed by channel avulsion at Arthur’s Pass. However, a 
large sediment input may have the capability to easily overwhelm the banks in the future.  
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Figure 6. 2. Erosion and downcutting of the thick Punchbowl Creek alluvial fan at its confluence with the 
Bealey River.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. 3. The extent of the Punchbowl Creek alluvial fan showing an example of one of the largest 
aggradational deposits in the Bealey Valley. 
 
Facing north-east 
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The Bealey River is known to have avulsed a number of times in the past several decades, 
often placing greater strain on the roads and railway at the town site. In many cases the 
changes are gradual, but sudden flash floods may temporarily and suddenly shift the active 
channel to cope with the high volumes of water and sediment flowing through the 
catchment area.  
 
6.5 GEOMORPHIC CHANGES TO THE DRAINAGE NETWORK SINCE 1938 
 
Modifications in the landscape from fluvial processes over the last 80 years are useful 
indicators of processes that can be expected in the future. Most notably, changes that take 
place over several years can have detrimental effects on the village and can signal areas 
requiring further monitoring. The Bealey River is the biggest tributary in the catchment 
and is the most susceptible to large-scale fluvial modifications. Its position on the wide, 
open floodplain makes any geomorphic changes more easily discernable from aerial 
photographs and permits in-field inspections along the Bealey River to be done. 
 
6.5.1 The Bealey River 
 
Most changes to the Bealey River along the village bounds occur at sites of convergence 
between major contributing tributaries in the valley. Overall, the river has undergone major 
channel avulsion over several decades and is sensitive to changes brought about by man-
made structural modifications of the floodplain, such as roads, railways and housing 
developments (Figure 6.4).  
 
The active floodplain area is very wide at the northern end of the village. It narrows 
slightly at the rail bridge before expanding further downstream. At the Rough Creek mouth 
the Bealey River becomes partially restricted by the Rough Creek fan, which is possibly 
made worse by the rail bridge that crosses the river at the site. Major channel avulsion has 
taken place on the wide floodplain where Graham Stream meets the river, and erosion and 
downcutting of the opposite bank of the floodplain and the alluvial fan have been observed 
periodically in the area. Similarly, downcutting of the Punchbowl Creek fan is a 
continuous process. Rough Creek does not appear to greatly influence the movement or 
location of the Bealey River at its confluence and apart from a small slip observed in the 
earlier photographs, there is no evidence that the incoming tributary has contributed to 
scour of the opposite Bealey River bank.  
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Figure 6. 4. Aerial photographs and satellite images showing the gradual geomorphic changes to the river system in the Bealey Valley during the last 80 years.                        
1. McGrath Stream. 2. Punchbowl Creek. 3. Wardens Creek. 4. Avalanche Creek. 5. Rough Creek. 6. Graham Stream. 
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The bridge supports in the Bealey River reduce its carrying capacity to a small degree, 
because they constrict the movement of water through the river. Therefore, flooding can be 
more severe at the Rough Creek confluence, which is the narrowest point of the river. 
Three bridges are located in this area and there is little room for the water flow to traverse 
the floodplain.  
 
It is uncertain when the stopbanks were installed on the banks of the Bealey River and 
Rough Creek. By 1960, the main branch of the Bealey River flowed dangerously close to 
town properties, on the very near side of the active floodplain, and the stopbanks may have 
been a response to that encroachment. In later years, aggradational processes have been 
identified the same area near the opening to the Otira Tunnel, which has more recently 
been subject to scouring.  
 
The braided channels of the Bealey River observed in the 1960 aerial photographs had 
merged into one channel by 2007. Revegetation has begun on the area of floodplain left 
abandoned by this process, behind the railway station. Other sites along the river have 
either remained unaltered or have undergone geomorphic changes that are indiscernible 
from the aerial images.  
 
6.5.2 Tributaries in the Bealey Valley 
 
The bulk of this section was completed using remote sensing methods, in particular aerial 
photographs and satellite image analysis. These methods are by no means exhaustive and 
have multiple limitations. They are often dependent on image quality, scale and timing; the 
time gaps between sets of images are large enough to allow important geomorphic changes 
to be unrecorded. Also, variations in the images brought about by the effects of shadow, 
snow and season can alter the perceptions of certain areas. The 1977 and 1998 photographs 
were of limited use in this tributary analysis because of poor picture quality and the high 
altitude from which they were taken, which minimised the amount of detail available.  
 
The perceptible morphological changes along the Bealey Valley tributaries over the last 80 
years are widespread (Table 6.2).  
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Time Period 
 
Rough Creek 
 
 
 
 
1938-1943 
• Minimal identifiable change in the tributary and vegetation cover.  
• There is a small, hook-shaped slip on the slope opposite to the river mouth which has 
produced a small fan and which is contributing sediments to the Bealey River.  
• The road bridge was not in existence yet and a diagonal track passes through the river 
upstream of the current road bridge. 
• There is some widening of the active riverbed at the railway bridge due to erosional 
processes operating on the north bank. 
 
 
 
 
1943-1960 
• Beginning of development of depositional bank approximately 300-400m upstream of river 
mouth, on south side of tributary.  
• Hook-shaped slip has been revegetated and the fan has stabilised and been overtaken by 
plant cover.  
• Stopbanks have been positioned on the northern bank of the creek. 
• A large sediment terrace-like feature has been identified on the northern bank approximately 
200m upstream of the rail bridge. It is approximately 200m long and 50m wide. 
• No significant changes can be observed in the vegetation cover. 
 
1960-1977 • Stabilisation and partial revegetation of depositional bank on the northern bank of the creek.  • No discernable changes to active river processes or vegetation cover.  
 
 
 
1977-1998 
• Increase in building development on northern side of Rough Creek fan. 
• Some narrowing of channel in the lower 500m of the creek. 
• Formation of a large aggradational bank on the southern side of the river approximately 
300-400m upstream from the rail bridge, sized approximately 150m long by 50m wide.  
• Installation of stopbanks on the southern side of the creek. 
• Vegetation largely unchanged.  
 
 
1998-2007 
• Some housing areas on the northern side of alluvial fan remain revegetated. Revegetation 
has occurred on other areas on the fan, however.  
• Small hook-shaped slip and resultant fan is completely concealed and stabilised by 
vegetation.  
 
 
 
Time Period 
 
McGrath Stream 
 
 
1938-1943 
• Several small slips have been observed that may be contributing sediments to the river, with 
some scars becoming reactivated, showing a reduction in vegetation cover.  
• Channel widening approximately 50-100m upstream from the road bridge. 
 
1943-1960 • Restabilisation of scars on slopes, showing a reduction in sediment input.  • Plant regrowth between the road bridge and river mouth on both sides of the stream.  
 
1960-1977 • Noticeable loss of vegetation inside the loop formed by the road.  • The active channel widens slightly when it reaches the Bealey River confluence. 
 
1977-1998 • Regeneration of the channel between the road bridge and the river mouth.  • Channel narrowing in the same area. 
 
 
1998-2007 
• Channel avulsion is evident along the lower reaches of the stream. 
• There is a change in the regrowth pattern downstream of the road bridge due to aggradation 
of the stream. 
• The sediments in the riverbed spread out before they reach the town, which appears to have 
prevented aggradation within the village area.  
 
 
 
Time Period 
 
Punchbowl Creek 
 
1938-1943 • Northern half of alluvial fan is partially revegetated.  
 
1943-1960 • Small patch of new plant cover is observable on the northern toe of the fan. • Minimal change in the geomorphology of the river. 
 
1960-1977 • Small slip scar near Devils Punchbowl Falls. • No other discernable changes in the vegetation of active riverbed. 
 
1977-1998 • Alluvial fan attributes remain unchanged. • Slips evident in the 1977 photos are stabilising by 1998. 
1998-2007 • Fan head still active, has split into two channels, with significant downcutting to the fan toe. 
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Time Period 
 
Wardens Creek and Avalanche Creek 
 
 
 
 
1938-1943 
• Wardens Creek shows some minor slips supplying sediments and aiding alluvial fan 
development. 
• Avalanche Creek has undergone minor revegetation and minor stream avulsion.  
• There is an increase in the housing on the banks of Avalanche Creek downstream of the 
main road. Main road is over Glasgow Bridge (behind current site of chapel). 
 
 
 
1943-1960 
• Wardens Creek appears stable, with no discernable changes evident. 
• New road bridge formed along highway. 
• Large-scale erosion of the floodplain on the northern side of the Avalanche Creek/Bealey 
River confluence, immediately north of the railway bridge.  
• A small scoured patch is observable just downstream of the new road bridge. 
• Housing development increasing around Avalanche Creek.  
 
1960-1977 • Some regrowth and stabilisation on Wardens Creek fan. • No other significant changes. 
 
1977-1998 • Reactivation of a small, southern section of the Wardens Creek fan. • Avalanche Creek appears unchanged.  
 
 
 
1998-2007 
• Wardens Creek shows a slight pattern of downcutting at the site of the road. 
• The active channel has shifted and narrowed. 
• Avalanche Creek has stabilised and the channel has narrowed.  
• There is a large quantity of sediment accumulated near where the rail bridge and Avalanche 
Creek meet, resulting in a steepening of the riverbed at the site.  
• Avalanche Creek is surrounded by fairly dense housing and is partially revegetated. It has 
very little impact on river hazards and sediment deposition.  
 
Table 6. 2. Perceptible geomorphic changes along the major tributaries within the Bealey Valley during 
specific time periods.  
 
 
6.6 PAST OCCURRENCES OF FLOOD-RELATED DAMAGE 
 
Several times a year the river receives enough rainfall and snowmelt to raise the river at 
Arthur’s Pass to a critical level. The majority of these cases do not develop into damage-
causing floods or erosion in the town. In rare instances, the combination of high rainfall, 
 
Time Period 
 
Graham Stream 
 
 
1938-1943 
• Channel avulsion occurring on the alluvial fan at the mouth of the stream. 
• Small scars on edge of tributary have started to revegetate.  
• Scouring on opposite river bank, causing Bealey River to shift. 
 
 
1943-1960 
• Aggradation at mouth of stream and on opposite bank.  
• Major avulsion and initiation of braiding along the Bealey River at the Graham Stream 
confluence. 
• Large scars on slopes upstream have started to stabilise. 
• Some scour of the fan toe by the Bealey River. 
 
1960-1977 • Minor channel avulsion of the Bealey River along the fan toe.  • No major changes to the vegetation along the stream. 
 
1977-1998 • Small aggradational patch on the fan. • No other changes discernable. 
 
 
1998-2007 
• Several areas on the fan have only a light covering of tussock grass, suggesting they have 
been active in the last few years.  
• There is evidence of a remnant braided channel along western edge of active channel. 
• Active channel of the Bealey River is now pushed up against the fan, causing some erosion 
of the fan deposits.  
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saturated soils, predetermined elevated river levels, slope gradient and geological factors 
provide ideal conditions for flood generation and sediment transport processes in the town. 
 
There is a poor correlation between periods of high-intensity rainfall and recognised 
geomorphic changes brought about by flooding (Cave, 1987). Also, a detailed evaluation 
of significantly damaging river-related events in Arthur’s Pass history is greatly limited by 
the lack of documentation post-1980. It is difficult to quantify the recurrence interval of 
widespread flooding with significant gaps in the literature. It is noted, however, that large-
scale events such as the storms and subsequent floods similar to those seen in 1957 and 
1979 are expected to have been reported in newspapers and journal articles. The lack of 
available articles between 1980 and 2006 suggests that there may not have been a storm or 
flood of a similar nature during this period, which accounts for the lack of specific details 
of fluvial hazards in the village.  
 
A collection of the more serious flood events that have caused damage, injury or 
evacuation highlight the high frequency of these incidents (Table 6.3).  
 
Date Details of incident 
 
1930 Heavy rains destroyed the bridge over the Bealey River on the Devils Punchbowl Falls track.  
1932 Heavy rains eroded the Bealey River banks along the village area. 
 
1938 Heavy rains caused the Bealey River to flood and erode along the riverbank adjacent to the village.  
 
25-29 Feb. 1940 650mm of rain fell over less than 4 days at Arthur’s Pass. Four families were evacuated from their homes.  
1941 Heavy rains cause flooding throughout the township. 
 
23-27 May 1950 
775mm of rain causing severe damage to State Highway 73 and the railway near 
Arthur’s Pass. Large sections were scoured out and approximately 90 000m3 of shingle 
debris was deposited onto the road. The road was closed for several days for repair.  
 
1950 The bridge crossing the Bealey River on the Devils Punchbowl Falls track is partially damaged. 
 
 
26-27 Dec. 1957 
Heavy rains caused flooding in the Bealey and Otira Valleys which closed the highway 
in Otira Gorge for several months. During the same storm, bridges and railway lines 
were heavily damaged, roads were washed out and undermined, whilst the railway 
embankments became major sediment sources. Bealey River partially aggraded.  
Jan. 1964 Some flood damage was sustained in the township. 
~1968 (exact date 
unknown) 
Extensive flooding caused by heavy rains in the national park caused two houses to be 
destroyed in the village. 
1975 Heavy rains cause flood which destroys bridge on Bridal Veil track.  
 
2-3 Dec 1979 Heavy rains and subsequent floods washed away a temporary bridge at Rough Creek, and both McGrath Stream and the Bealey River aggraded. 
 
14 Nov. 2006 
Heavy rains cause Bealey River to swell and break the first stopbank along Crusher 
Loop. Houses protected by sandbags. A drainage culvert fails near Arthur’s Pass 
General Store and floods the outdoor education centre.  
 
Table 6. 3. Major fluvial-related events in recorded history that have caused damage to the Arthur’s Pass 
village. (Beaven, 2006; Cowie, 1957; McSaveney, 1982b).  
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The Bealey River and other streams in the Arthur’s Pass National Park have been a 
significant hazard to trampers in the past, especially those crossing tributaries unassisted. 
Numerous trampers and climbers have had to be rescued by emergency services, rescue 
aircraft or volunteer personnel on foot after being stuck by swollen rivers, particularly in 
heavy rain. 26 deaths by drowning have been recorded in the park since 1926 (Kates, 
2008), several of which took place whilst attempting to cross a river in flood or during 
flash flooding in fluvial areas. Since 1998, 12 non-fatal flooding incidents have occurred in 
the national park (Kates, 2008).  
 
Heavy rain and subsequent flooding have previously damaged sections of State Highway 
73 on both sides of Arthur’s Pass, cutting off transport in the area (Whitehouse & 
McSaveney, 1992). Much of the local infrastructure is vulnerable to washouts and water 
damage which has severely hindered emergency and welfare efforts in the past. 
Disruptions to the road are particularly evident in the Otira Gorge. Since the construction 
of the viaduct and rock shelter the risk has been minimised, but flooding and erosive 
processes are regularly functioning and will continue to be problematic in the future.  
 
Sedimentation of the Bealey River was most evident after the December 1957 storms. 
Between 1960 and 1977, erosional processes removed much of the accumulated sediment 
as the river moved back into equilibrium and the small alluvial fans along the river were 
naturally revegetated, suggesting that they had become inactive shortly after the storm. 
Since then only minor aggradation has been observed in the river, most of it short-lived. 
Whitehouse and McSaveney (1992) propose that the Wardens Creek fan aggrades every 
three to four years and that the Rough Creek and Halpin Creek confluences are vulnerable 
to moderately frequent, large-scale aggradation.  
 
The embankments surrounding the railway station and rail yard have the potential to 
become significant sediment sources. The section of rail immediately south of the tunnel is 
artificially raised and significantly modified. The volume of riverbed sediments on the 
southern side of the rail bridge near the Avalanche Creek confluence is variable because 
built up material is intermittently washed away by the Bealey River. The fluctuating 
volumes of sediment in this location are attributed to the narrowing of the river caused by 
the bridge abutments, which restrict the flow of water and riverbed materials until they 
have passed under the bridge and can move unobstructed along the remainder of the 
Bealey River.  
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Some areas of the village are low-lying and typically less than a couple of metres above the 
active river level. Previous hazard events signal where high-risk zones may be located in 
the future:  
- most buildings on the east side of the highway, particularly properties on Crusher 
Loop and near the Devils Punchbowl Falls carpark. Buildings positioned on high 
ground or with specialty protective works installed, such as the railway station, are 
exempt from the high-risk zones. 
- houses located on the Rough Creek fan, particularly the northern side where the 
stopbanks are not as efficient as other areas. 
- properties along State Highway 73 that may be vulnerable to flooding from 
stormwater drain pipe blockages, such as the outdoor education centre and 
Mountain House backpackers.  
 
6.7  OPPORTUNITIES FOR FLOODING, EROSION AND AGGRADATION TO 
THE RIVERBED IN THE FUTURE 
 
Three realistic scenarios are suggested for the Arthur’s Pass region that may initiate 
flooding within the village in the future:  
1. Surface overflow of rivers and streams due to excess supply of water, lack of 
natural and man-made storage areas and reduced water transport capabilities due to 
sediment. This would cause temporary flooding to low-lying areas of the village, in 
the same way it has occurred previously, with impacts to both the physical and 
urban landscape. This also introduces potential water quality issues from road and 
rail traffic and sewage. However, due to the familiarity of the community to this 
type of hazard, they are well equipped to deal with recurrent floods of this nature. 
There is expected to be an increase in the severity and frequency of river-related 
events, which is attributed to changes brought about by global climate change. 
2. Landslide damming both downstream and upstream of the village. The most 
vulnerable slopes identified coincide with the Graham Creek and Halpin Creek 
confluences with the Bealey River, downstream of the village. Upstream, numerous 
potential landslide dam sites have been identified between the village and the pass, 
originating from Mt. Cassidy, Rome Ridge and Goldney Ridge. The possibility and 
distribution of landslide dams in this area has been discussed in Chapter 5. The 
ramifications associated with landslide dam formation at Arthur’s Pass are severe, 
albeit rare. The valley floor is steep yet highly constricted by the mountain slopes 
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on either side. Material obstructing the natural flow patterns of the river would – 
depending on the extent of the blockage – have catastrophic effects on the village.  
3. Failure of the man-made drainage system in the urbanised area. Blockages and 
breakage of pipes and stormwater drains mostly aggravates an already present 
problem caused by excessive precipitation throughout the upper Waimakariri 
catchment. If drainage systems are impeded or not able to cope with the volume of 
water, potential flooding will occur. Surface runoff will also be exacerbated in the 
urban area as there is little opportunity for ground saturation.  
 
Possibilities for erosion and channel incision in the future will be directed by: 
1. An increase in annual precipitation due to global climate change, forcing a rise in 
the volume of surface runoff and intensifying the erosive capacity of the Bealey 
River catchment.   
2. Confliction between the natural environment and urban sprawl encroaching on the 
floodplain, initiating channel avulsion and requiring the use of additional flood 
control measures.  
3. Loss of vegetation through slope failure, continued erosion on the floodplain and 
clearing for developmental purposes. Vegetation acts to stabilise the river and its 
local environs and removal of vegetation would heighten the possibility for erosion 
in the future. 
 
Possibilities of aggradation and sedimentation in the future are through: 
1. Slope failures such as landslides, debris flows and minor slips that will contribute 
large volumes of sediments to the river.  
2. The erosion of railway embankments, which may cause aggradation downstream 
because they have the potential to become significant sediment sources.  
3. Channel avulsion that allows for sediment build-up in previously erosional zones.  
4. Debris coming from the upper Punchbowl catchment may allow the Punchbowl 
Creek fan to build up to its original height (marked by an incised terrace). This 
would shift the river towards the highway and cause many problems for the village.  
 
The small size of the town and the community involvement in assisting other residents 
allows emergencies to be responded to promptly and efficiently, using local resources. 
However, this could also be the town’s downfall, as only limited resources are available 
and the village relies heavily on outside organisations for assistance and response 
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equipment when required. Because river-hazards are very localised, the implications of the 
town’s isolation are not as acute as they would be in the case of a widespread earthquake. 
The main concern would be access issues during peak flood periods.  
 
Further expansion of the town is anticipated to be low because of the low number of 
freehold sections available in the village and because of restrictions imposed by the 
National Park Management Plan 2006, which aims to maintain the integrity of the natural 
environment. Nevertheless, several yet to be approved proposals are currently under 
consideration that could elevate the risk. These include several realignment projects, 
focusing on the Rough Creek road bridge, the Rough Creek to Snow Creek section, the 
village to McGrath Stream section and along minor encroachments throughout the vicinity 
of the settlement. Landscape improvement has been recommended for the Arthur’s Pass 
railway yards, the village river protection works and at the Devils Punchbowl Falls carpark 
area to the north of the village. It is not known whether any additional buildings within the 
settlement are anticipated or whether any proposals would gain building approval due to 
the vulnerability of the village and the lack of suitable land for development.  
 
The redevelopment of the public toilets, bus parking and rest stop opposite the DOC 
Visitor Centre was completed in late-2007. It has resulted in the repositioning of sewage 
works closer to the Bealey River, which may create unforseen issues regarding sewage 
treatment, disposal and contamination of the river system. Other sewage treatment areas, 
particularly those servicing the Sunshine Terrace area, have had recent maintenance work 
carried out to ensure they are safe and unlikely to contaminate the local environment. It is 
thought that the safest place from flooding would be at the train station and rail yard. This 
area is on higher ground than other areas directly next to the river and it is protected on 
almost all sides by stopbanks and large embankments built to safeguard the railway line 
into the tunnel.  
 
6.8 PREVENTATIVE TREATMENT METHODS FOR RIVER-HAZARDS 
 
Control and protection measures used in flood-prone areas around the world are not 
necessarily applicable to Arthur’s Pass, because river problems in the village have arisen 
out of poor placement of human activities in a region where natural processes such floods 
and channel avulsion would normally continue uninterrupted. Smith (2004) describes six 
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methods of flood-proofing vulnerable regions. When applied to the Arthur’s Pass field 
area, only three are realistically possible: 
? DRY FLOOD PROOFING – Sealing the property so flood waters cannot penetrate 
the building. 
? RELOCATION – Moving the building to higher, less-vulnerable ground. 
? DEMOLITION – Removing a building in a flood-prone area and either rebuilding a 
flood-proof building in the same site or rebuilding in safer area.  
? FLOODWALLS – Building a flood-proof wall around the building to protect it 
from river overflow. 
? ELEVATION – Placing a building above the river flood level on stilts so it is 
protected from incoming water.  
? WET FLOOD PROOFING – Making ground level sections of the building resistant 
to flood damage and allowing water to enter during floods.  
 
Dry flood proofing, relocation and demolition are the most realistic and attainable flood-
proofing measures at Arthur’s Pass, although there are limitations to each of these because 
of building codes, land-use regulations and provisions set out in the Resource Management 
Act 1991, Building Act 2004, Selwyn District Plan and Canterbury Regional Plan. Also, 
they may apply more to slow-moving type floodwaters and less to the fast-moving types 
present in the Arthur’s Pass region.  
 
It is difficult to assess whether implementation of flood protection measures such as these 
are cost-effective enough to be put into practice on Arthur’s Pass properties. Periodic 
damage to houses is very localised and often minimal. Relocation and demolition are 
extreme reactions to a problem that may not be severe enough to warrant such actions. 
However, developers of any future buildings should consider incorporating more long-term 
measures such as dry flood proofing and elevation to assist in reducing the flood hazard. 
Appropriate land-use planning and preparedness are also key factors in lowering the risk of 
river-hazards in the community.  
 
Severe events similar in nature to the 1957 and 1979 storms are expected to have a return 
interval of between 25 and 100 years. Because the Building Act 2004 requires structures to 
have a design life of at least 50 years, it would be necessary to plan and mitigate for events 
of comparable magnitude and severity that may take place in future.  
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Home evacuation has taken place rarely in the past and is typically a used as a final 
measure when all preventative remedies have been exhausted. Many of the houses at 
Arthur’s Pass are holiday homes and have only transient guests, so many remain 
uninhabited for long periods of time, further reducing the probability of building 
evacuations being required. Stopbanks are considered to be the most satisfactory means of 
controlling the river because they can be manufactured out of locally sourced river gravel 
and are comparatively low-cost. The use of several generations of stopbanks over the last 
90 years have proven adequate protection in the vast majority of river-related events, 
especially when used in conjunction with other methods of defence such as sandbags.  
 
6.9 CURRENT METHODS OF RIVER CONTROL AT ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
Extensive river protection methods are aimed at safeguarding the village and its adjoining 
land, and infrastructure such as power transmission lines, the state highway and the railway 
track through the valley. The Arthur’s Pass National Park Management Plan 2006 outlines 
the use of natural gravel stores to form these protection works where possible in order to 
retain the integrity of the natural environment. It is also noted that removal of gravel from 
the riverbed is permissible because it has a low environmental impact as there are large 
volumes of gravel available in the Bealey Valley where the material is regularly 
replenished by natural fluvial processes. 
 
The most featured engineering method of river control at Arthur’s Pass village is ‘rip-rap’ 
stopbanks. The term ‘rip-rap’ simply means large boulders that are accumulated along 
areas in need of protection. At Arthur’s Pass, ‘rip-rap’ stopbanks are evident for long 
stretches along the Bealey River in front of the village (Figure 6.5). In several cases, there 
are two or three sets of stopbanks, functioning as a backup system if the first stopbank 
fails. Examples of this are observed near buildings on Crusher Loop and on the northern 
side of Rough Creek beside dwellings situated on the Rough Creek alluvial fan. The 
stopbanks commence at the top of the Devils Punchbowl carpark area and continue 
intermittently before ceasing at the Graham Stream river mouth south of the village.  
 
Gabions are a supplementary means of stopbank river control and only appear at Arthur’s 
Pass in small groups, many of which have been partially buried over time (Figure 6.6).  
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Figure 6. 5. A double line of ‘rip-rap’ stopbanks formed from natural riverbed gravel (left and centre) along 
the Bealey River (right) in front of Crusher Loop. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 6. Partially buried gabion stopbanks on the Bealey River bank opposite the Otira Tunnel entrance. 
 
Facing north 
Facing north-west 
~1.5m 
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The placement of gabions within the village is typically perpendicular to the ‘rip-rap’ 
stopbanks, most likely to assist in the redirection of flood waters away from the ‘rip-
rap’/permanent stopbanks, much like a groyne diverts water at the beach and alleviates 
sand build-up in certain areas. The ‘rip-rap’ stopbanks, particularly the more established 
ones, are less permeable than the gabions and provide a marginally better defence against 
rising river levels than the gabions, which is possibly why they have been favoured.  
 
Similarly, the Midland Railway Company constructed site specific embankments to shield 
the rail network, railyards and station from flood waters. The highest of these 
embankments runs underneath the railway line between the Arthur’s Pass railway station 
and the Otira Tunnel. Between the Bealey River and the station there is a 5-6m drop (i.e. 
the station has been placed on high ground). Approximately every 10m, gabions measuring 
up to 5m in length align perpendicularly from the bank. Nine were counted in total in this 
area. Gabions also constitute part of the stopbanks on both sides of Rough Creek. There are 
generally only two or three stacks high and extend up to 5m in length. Both Transit NZ and 
New Zealand Railways Corporation are responsible for many power transmission lines and 
river protection works around the railway track and rail yard. The Arthur’s Pass 
Association and Selwyn District Council also contribute to stopbank funding and 
maintenance (Beaven, 2006). 
 
On the opposite bank to the tunnel entrance there is a line of concrete block retaining 
structures in the form of 1m3 concrete blocks with large steel rods protruding from each 
side (Figure 6.7). However, they are positioned at such an angle and in such a location so 
as to offer little protection and therefore would not contribute greatly to flood control along 
the Bealey River. 
 
Depending on the severity and duration of the rain, the flooding may breach stopbanks and 
reach houses on the riverbank. During isolated incidents, sandbagging is a common 
practice among the town residents and is used as a method of controlling the river water by 
blocking and diverting incoming flood waters if they breach the stopbanks along the 
Bealey River and Rough Creek. Even moderate increased water flow in the Bealey River is 
enough to significantly increase the river levels and aggravate erosion along the riverbed. 
Along Crusher Loop, the developed land lies only metres above the active river level. It is 
difficult to assess the ability of Rough Creek stopbanks to protect from debris flows, as the 
highest point of the stopbanks is only 2-5m above the riverbed (Figure 6.8).  
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Figure 6. 7. Concrete retaining structures near the Avalanche Creek and Bealey River confluence protecting 
the railway embankment (to the left out of picture). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 8. A ‘rip rap’ stopbank along the lower south bank of Rough Creek protecting the police station 
and several houses on Sunshine Terrace.  
Facing west 
Facing south 
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There are some doubts as to the protective capabilities of the outer stopbanks in Rough 
Creek and along the Crusher Loop section, particularly because many appear to be old and 
not adequately maintained. Past experience, however, demonstrates that the inner 
stopbanks may act to reduce the volume of incoming water enough to allow for alternate, 
temporary reinforcements, such as sandbagging, to be installed.  
 
Observations taken of the river level progressively throughout the year indicate that the 
flow of water is seldom more than an easily-crossable stream along the riverbed formed of 
large boulders. Conversely, the size of the Rough Creek deposits is representative of the 
debris that the creek is capable of transporting. Some of the houses on the fan, particularly 
along Sunshine Terrace, have remained undamaged since the formation of the town. No 
confirmed debris flows or damaging floods have been recorded along Rough Creek in 
documented Arthur’s Pass history.  
 
From a social perspective, the Department of Conservation and most customer services in 
the town release daily cautionary information to visitors, advising of the river conditions in 
the national park. This is currently the only form of pre-emptive information available with 
up-to-date river conditions and currently serves its purpose well.  
 
6.10 SUMMARY 
 
The fluvial system within the Bealey Valley is very dynamic and somewhat unpredictable. 
The numerous river hazard events that have taken place in the past suggest that river-
related issues are ongoing and continuous, and therefore must be mitigated at Arthur’s 
Pass. The results of this fluvial-related hazard assessment demonstrate that: 
 
1. The Bealey Valley is formed by fluvial channels and is highly vulnerable to river 
flooding, erosion, aggradation and channel avulsion. Factors that make the Bealey 
Valley susceptible to these fluvial processes include the large size of the catchment, 
the wet and windy climatic conditions in the region, the lack of adequate water 
storage both natural and man made and the encroachment on the floodplain by 
human activities.  
2. Many geomorphic changes have been recorded in the river system in the Bealey 
Valley, most of which give an indication of what is to be expected in the future. 
The Bealey River is the largest tributary in the valley and it is on the Bealey River 
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floodplain that the village is located. The river is constantly being naturally 
modified but it is particularly sensitive to human impacts brought about by urban 
development and the installation of roads and bridges.  
3. Perceptible changes in contributing tributaries in the Bealey Valley show that 
numerous cycles of erosion and aggradation have taken place within the valley. A 
number of previously active zones have become stabilised and revegetated, and 
other previously stable zones within the floodplain area have become remobilised 
over time. 
4. The documentation of past fluvial-related events impacting the village is limited, 
but several major events have been recorded. These include the December 1957 
storm, the May 1950 storm, the Dec 1979 storm and the November 2006 storm, 
most of which resulted in extensive flooding in the village, minor slips closing the 
road and damage to bridges and buildings. 26 people have drowned in the Arthur’s 
Pass region since 1926, several of which were during heavy rain periods, and 12 
non-fatal injuries have been attributed to floods in the last decade.  
5. Future issues associated with the river system in the Bealey Valley will continue to 
be surface flooding within the village and erosion and aggradation of the riverbed. 
More serious potential hazards have been recognised in the form of landslide dams, 
which would be catastrophic to the village, the avulsion of the active channel 
towards the developed village area and failure of man-made drainage systems so 
they are not able to cope with high volumes of surface runoff.  
6. Preventative treatments for river-related hazards at Arthur’s Pass range from less 
invasive methods such as dry flood proofing buildings to drastic measures such as 
relocation and demolition of affected buildings. The cost effectiveness of such 
measures may not make them ideal for the Arthur’s Pass environment.  
7. Current methods of river control at Arthur’s Pass include extensive stopbanks, 
gabions and occasional sandbagging. There is possibly a lack of adequate physical 
barriers which suggests that there is potential for river-related hazards to be 
managed better in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
HAZARD ANALYSIS AND MAPPING 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to investigate the natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass on a broad scale and 
introduces the use of hazard maps to assist in hazard management. An understanding of the 
behaviour of hazard processes is a fundamental requirement of any hazard analysis. If the 
hazard is not understood it is not possible to make realistic assessments of community 
vulnerability, which increases the chance of an unreliable estimate of the natural hazard 
risk being made (Nott, 2006). 
 
The specific objectives of the hazard analysis chapter are: 
1. To explain aspects of vulnerability and assess the areas at Arthur’s Pass most 
vulnerable to social, structural and infrastructural impacts from natural hazards. 
2. To discuss the interrelationships between seismic hazards, meteorological hazards, 
mass movement hazards and fluvial-related hazards at Arthur’s Pass and how they 
influence each other.  
3. To outline the methods used in the construction of three hazard maps of Arthur’s 
Pass and justify the designation of hazardous zones within these maps. 
4. To discuss probability estimates for all the natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass and 
explain the limitations associated with these estimates. 
 
7.2 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
Natural hazard analysis is often based around the notion that the behaviour of natural 
systems and the incidence of past hazard events can be used to forecast events likely to 
take place in the next 50 to 500 years (Grant, 1998). Several centuries of data is required 
for a long-term hazard assessment to be reliable and to constrain recurrence intervals of 
most hazard events (Cowan, McClure, & Wilson, 2002). Acquiring estimates of hazard 
occurrence with any statistical precision is impossible in the Arthur’s Pass region because 
of the lack of long-term historical hazard data, which makes the use of this method alone 
unsuitable (Nott, 2006). Current records of seismic and landslide data are only appropriate 
for capturing the short-term or immediate risk. As the local hazard record for the village 
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only extends back 100 years at best and the national hazard record 150 years, there is 
insufficient data available to reliably and confidently estimate probabilities.  
 
Undertaking a hazard assessment of the Arthur’s Pass landscape and producing a series of 
hazard maps which can be used by local agencies is a difficult task. Producing such hazard 
zonations has severe limitations because of the extremely volatile and changeable nature of 
the geomorphic, tectonic and atmospheric processes that exist in the area (Grant, 1998). 
 
There are also major limitations to this research in terms of the determination of exact 
probability estimates and expected magnitude and severity of events. In certain cases there 
is even difficulty ascertaining definite locations that are vulnerable to hazard processes. 
This problem could be partially alleviated with the implementation of geological and 
geotechnical data from in depth investigations. Such an investigation goes beyond the 
scope of this study but would form a basis for future research.  
 
7.3 VULNERABILITY 
 
The vulnerability of a community is a fundamental consideration when assessing risk 
factors and preparing hazard zonation maps in a village such as Arthur’s Pass. Specific 
weak points in the management of emergency situations need to be addressed so that the 
town and its residents can be better prepared for a natural hazard event. Several social and 
infrastructural vulnerabilities exist at Arthur’s Pass. They are outlined below.  
 
7.3.1 Aspects of vulnerability 
 
Vulnerability is initially generated by economic, political and social processes. The degree 
of vulnerability and loss also depends on the population distribution and the environmental 
conditions in the region, natural or otherwise (Bell, 1999). The more resilient a community 
is to natural hazards, the lower its vulnerability. In comparison to other global regions, 
New Zealand has a stable government, a profitable economy and well-developed social 
systems, and Arthur’s Pass specifically has a moderate to low population density. This 
would lead to the assumption that Arthur’s Pass has a low vulnerability. However, the 
attribute that makes Arthur’s Pass exceedingly vulnerable to natural disasters is the highly 
dynamic geomorphic environment within the Southern Alps, which the village is a part of. 
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Currently the most prominent flaw in the hazard mitigation of the township that perhaps 
contributes to its vulnerability is the lack of total self-sufficiency. The village is not 
equipped to deal immediately with major medical emergencies, aerial searches and rescue, 
transporting large numbers of people or earthmoving; all services that may be required 
after a natural disaster in the area. Obviously the town is not large enough to cost-
effectively support these kinds of permanent services onsite. However, following a large 
magnitude regional event, the village is likely to be cut off indefinitely from other South 
Island regions and be without life-saving resources for extended periods. Other vulnerable 
aspects of the Arthur’s Pass village relate to people, property and infrastructure, all of 
which may serve to increase the loss due to a natural disaster. 
 
7.3.1.1 Social vulnerability 
 
The safety of people within the national park and village is the highest priority in this 
hazard analysis. Several factors contribute to the social vulnerability of the village: 
- Most people in the village are non-residents who have little prior knowledge or 
experience of the hazards within and immediately surrounding the town. There may 
also be issues created from the language barrier with tourists in the town, which 
would make a coordinated evacuation more difficult.  
- Individuals within the village and in other areas of the national park are more 
vulnerable to small-scale hazards such as rockfalls and flooding, but the community 
as a whole is also vulnerable to rare catastrophic disasters such as landslide 
damming and high magnitude earthquakes that will cause widespread and 
numerous casualties, primarily because of the lack of nearby rescue equipment and 
welfare items. 
- The town is very isolated and confined to the Bealey Valley with only one major 
thoroughfare. If the main transport routes become blocked, people will effectively 
become trapped.  
 
7.3.1.2 Property vulnerability 
 
All new buildings and renovations to previously existing structures at Arthur’s Pass must 
conform to regulations set out in both the Building Act 2004 and Resource Management 
Act 1991. Furthermore, it is mandatory for local and territorial agencies to monitor and 
record natural hazards in the village and disclose this information to interested parties, as 
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well as restrict or prohibit developments in regions deemed unacceptably hazardous 
(Grant, 1998). Vulnerabilities to structures exist in the form of:  
- The 142 buildings within the village boundaries that are categorised as ‘habitable’; 
all are included in emergency procedures. They comprise mostly flexible wood and 
aluminium frames but a few buildings are built using rigid masonry, which is prone 
to crumbling during earthquakes. Many of the buildings have brick chimneys which 
have historically been one of the major structures damaged during earthquakes.  
- Houses in the township that are at risk of being lost or damaged in flood events, 
from fires caused by lightning strikes, as a result of seismic shaking and from 
strong wind gusts (Beaven, 2006).  
 
7.3.1.3 Infrastructural vulnerability 
 
Elements of infrastructure and buildings within the town are most likely considered to be 
affected even by small-scale events. Arthur’s Pass town infrastructure consists of: 
- Roads, particularly the State Highway 73 corridor between Halpin Creek and the 
Otira Gorge, but also smaller dirt tracks and access roads around the village.  
- The railway track, Otira rail tunnel and the Arthur’s Pass Station and rail yard. Both 
cargo trains and passenger trains pass through the village several times every day.  
- Communication links, including the landline digital exchange connected by 
underground fibre optics to the parent exchange in Darfield, the television 
broadcast repeater on the flanks of Mt. Rolleston and the Vodafone and Telecom 
mobile phone towers located adjacent to the rail yard (SoftRock NZ, 2008a).  
- Electricity towers and power poles stretching along the length of the village and the 
Arthur’s Pass Power Substation in the southern region of the village.  
- Sewage pipes on sections south of Rough Creek, which are connected to a small 
waste treatment plant at the southern end of Sunshine Terrace. It is assumed that 
areas north of Rough Creek have individual septic tanks and treatment systems 
because no treatment plant exists north of Rough Creek.  
- The water supply, which is gravity fed from Avalanche Creek.  
 
Landslides and rockfalls generated by seismic shaking present a serious threat to both 
underground and overhead infrastructure within the town. Such severe damage to services 
has the potential to seriously alter the success of the recovery phase following a natural 
disaster (Environment Canterbury, 1990). 
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7.4 HAZARD ZONATION 
 
Hazard zonation and land-use planning are methods of adapting to natural hazards. They 
are also key factors in the development of community resilience. The integration of 
effective land use planning and hazard mitigation is a necessary step towards reducing the 
risk to the Arthur’s Pass community (Burby, 1998). The multi-hazard concept describes the 
interrelationships between the various natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass so that hazard 
behaviour can be better understood and integrated into hazard management programs 
(Figure 7.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. 1. The interrelationships between the identified hazards at Arthur’s Pass between “driving” forces 
(seismic and meteorological hazards) and “response” forces (mass movement and fluvial-related hazards). 
The changes brought about by climate change and gravity also influence meteorological, mass movement and 
fluvial hazards.  
 
7.4.1 The multi-hazard concept 
 
Hazards occur randomly and show a high variability in time scale, intensity and 
magnitude. It is acknowledged that seismic and atmospheric hazards have distal sources 
and are linked to external processes that originate away from the hazard affected area. 
Fluvial and mass movement hazards are sourced proximally and are internally structured, 
so that the hazards tend to initiate in the same area that they affect. Both mass movements 
and fluvial hazards are easily modified by external forces. They are the “response” 
hazards. Seismic and atmospheric hazards are the “driving” hazards and produce the forces 
required to trigger mass movement and fluvial responses.  
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It is possible to establish that in many cases the identification of specific hazards is likely 
to be a precursory signal for other hazard types. For example, the spatial and temporal 
distribution of landslides is related to the distribution of fault lines and the distribution, 
duration and intensity of meteorological events. Using this logic, it is clear that 
simultaneous hazard occurrence is extremely common throughout the Arthur’s Pass region.  
 
Multi-hazard scenarios that are regarded as significant to the Arthur’s Pass area are 
numerous and involve complex relationships. For example: 
- According to Environment Canterbury (1990), extensive storm-induced mass 
movement events take place in Southern Alps catchments at least once in a 100 
year period. Such widespread mass movements are also expected to be associated 
FLUVIAL-RELATED HAZARDS and flooding occur over varying time scales and are 
highly dependent on the occurrence of meteorological and mass movement hazards. They can be 
modified, controlled and prevented to some degree, and they can usually be forecast in the short-
term. In much the same way as mass movement hazards, they consist of both one-way and two-
way dependencies with other hazard types. In both mass movements and fluvial hazards, a 
reinforcing feedback loop is created, in which the occurrence of one increases the occurrence of 
the other (Keey, 2000).  
SEISMIC HAZARDS are wholly independent; they are not affected, influenced or 
controlled by human activities or other hazard mechanisms. Their prediction is extremely 
difficult and can not be estimated with any degree of certainty, especially in the short-term. 
Furthermore, seismic hazards can be described in general terms as having a one-way dependency 
(they trigger other hazard events but they themselves are not caused by other hazards) (Seville, 
2006). 
METEOROLOGICAL HAZARDS are independent from other hazards (except perhaps 
volcanic hazards) but they can be affected by long-term human factors, such as global warming. 
They are highly seasonal and can be predicted days in advance. They also have a one-way 
dependency. 
MASS MOVEMENT HAZARDS have a number of both natural and man-made causative 
factors and they can to some extent be influenced, controlled and prevented by human activities. 
They are known to occur in specific conditions, such as during storms or after a seismic event. 
Unstable slope locations can be pinpointed, but the exact timing of occurrence of mass 
movements, particularly large-scale events, cannot be predicted with great accuracy. Mass 
movements produce both one-way and two-way dependencies (when the occurrence of one 
hazard affects the occurrence of the other and vice versa). An example of a one-way dependency 
is that landslides are caused by rainfall, but rainfall levels are not affected by landslide 
occurrence. As a two-way dependency, mass movements can alter river processes and contribute 
to fluvial hazards. Conversely, fluvial hazards play a role in the initiation and distribution of 
mass movement events (Seville, 2006).   
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with flood scour and debris depositional processes in regions such as Arthur’s Pass.  
- Landsliding and flooding are closely allied at Arthur’s Pass because they both are 
related to precipitation, ground saturation and runoff (Jochim & Colorado 
Geological Survey, 1988). They often occur simultaneously under similar 
atmospheric conditions and both affect the prevalence of fluvial hazards, 
particularly along the Bealey River adjacent to the township.  
- Debris flows occur in narrow gullies throughout the Southern Alps and are often 
mistaken for floods. Rough Creek and McGrath Stream are more likely to 
accommodate debris floods, which represent the midpoint between debris flows 
and regular floods (Welsh, 2007). However, there is definite evidence of debris 
flows on the fan, indicating that both processes may occur in the area.  
- High-magnitude rupture of faults within 10km of Arthur’s Pass may potentially 
trigger landsliding on more than 60% of slopes in the area, having a major impact 
on transport routes and the function of town services (E. Smith, 2004). 
- Existing earthquake data suggest that earthquake intensities of more than MM 9 
would be required to initiate a rock avalanche in the Arthur’s Pass area, and that 
ground shaking intensities above approximately MM 6 would be enough to initiate 
slope failures around Arthur’s Pass that would cause considerable damage to the 
highway (Paterson, 1996). 
- Storm events are responsible in part for the intermittent aggradation of Wardens 
Creek, Halpin Creek and Rough Creek. Wardens Creek is expected to aggrade 
every three to four years. Rough Creek and Halpin Creek tend to experience 
aggradation on a more frequent basis (Whitehouse & McSaveney, 1992). 
 
7.4.2 Hazard maps 
 
The most accessible means of conveying the degree of risk for specific hazards is through 
hazard mapping. Ideally, all hazards should be represented on the same map, although this 
is not always possible. Complications arise when multiple hazards are evident in a risk 
zone, more so when the occurrence of one hazard is linked to the occurrence of another, as 
is the situation at Arthur’s Pass.  
 
Most of the hazards that exist at Arthur’s Pass are rapid-onset events that contribute only a 
minute percentage of the overall hazard risk throughout New Zealand (Wisner et al., 2004). 
Despite this, site-specific maps showing the status of hazards at Arthur’s Pass are vital 
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because of the comparatively dense distribution of hazards in such a small yet populous 
area. The locational approach to hazard mitigation aims to reduce life and property losses 
from future disasters by placing limits on the urban development and usage of hazardous 
areas (Burby, 1998). This notion has been employed as a major objective in the 
construction of hazard maps showing hazard vulnerabilities at Arthur’s Pass.  
 
Additionally, the Building Act 2004 stipulates that the design life of structures is at least 50 
years, to ensure the safety and durability of buildings in the long-term. Consequently, 
taking into account this minimum design life of structures was deemed important to 
illustrate the hazards both in the short- and long-term, so that natural hazards can be 
integrated into spatial planning practices and emergency preparation.  
 
The application of hazard mapping as a tool for risk reduction has previously been 
described and employed by numerous authors. Chamberlain (1996), Grant (1998), Inwood 
(1997), Paterson (1996), Smith (2004), Smith (1990), Speight (1933), Whitehouse and 
McSaveney (1992) and Yetton (2000) all give examples of hazard maps within New 
Zealand.  
 
7.4.3 Methodology 
 
Any spatial aspect of a hazard can be mapped over a variety of time scales provided that 
there is enough information available on its distribution (Bell, 1999). However, rating 
hazards on a scale of expected severity is not possible without the input of previous events.  
 
A chief objective when producing the hazard zonation map and designating areas which 
were deemed more at risk than others was to have it in a form that is comprehensible to 
both scientists and lay persons. Most often these maps are used by local government 
agencies because they provide an important tool for implementing preventative measures 
and as such need to be easily readable and understood (Ni, Liu, Wai, Borthwick, & Ge, 
2006).  
 
It became obvious early on in the mapping stage that a single map at a certain scale would 
not suffice for the representation of many different hazards occurring over highly variable 
temporal and spatial scales. In previous hazard research projects, authors have used a 
variety of mapping techniques to convey as much information as possible by customising 
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the map to fit all hazard parameters. Assessment of such mapping methods to check for 
their suitability to this project did not yield any appropriate techniques and as a result, a 
completely different approach has been taken.  
 
It was decided that three separate map sheets would illustrate the Arthur’s Pass hazard 
conditions most effectively. Each map sheet contains a regional map (covering 
approximately 250km2) and a local map (showing just the Arthur’s Pass village area – 
approximately 4km2). This format was selected to ensure that all hazards were 
accommodated at different spatial distributions. The map sheets cover three different 
probabilities of occurrence; >2%, 0.2-2% and <0.2% annual exceedence probability (0-50 
year, 50-500 year and 500+ year time intervals respectively). The time intervals are large 
enough to show considerable geomorphic changes as a result of dynamic natural hazard 
processes and also fit into Building Act 2004 regulations whilst maintaining enough detail 
on the timing of events to be useful to hazard managers.  
 
The construction of the hazard maps is restricted by wide-ranging limitations including: 
- the chaotic and long-term unpredictability of the drainage network within the 
Bealey Valley, 
- the unknown effects of seismic events on sediment contributions to the river, 
- the lack of flood and landslide magnitude and frequency data for Arthur’s Pass, 
- the as yet unknown effects of climate change on atmospheric conditions and 
patterns, and  
- the absence of a complete historical record of all natural hazard events in the 
Arthur’s Pass region. 
 
7.4.3.1 Mapping seismic hazards 
 
Both major and minor fault lines were investigated and collectively placed onto one large 
regional map. Due to difficulties in determining specific return periods for most faults 
affecting the Arthur’s Pass region, all apparent faults are shown on each of the three map 
sheets. In addition, no distinction has been made between definite, approximate and 
inferred fault boundaries because of the high uncertainty associated with many of these 
faults, but they have been divided into major and minor faults as outlined in Chapter 3.  
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7.4.3.2 Mapping meteorological hazards 
 
Apart from avalanches, no meteorological hazards have been shown on the maps because 
their occurrence is very uniform over a widespread area, with very little variation over 
much of the Arthur’s Pass National Park. Events that are presumed to behave like this 
include rainfall, snowfall, strong winds and climate change, all which take place evenly 
over a limited areal extent that includes the Arthur’s Pass township. The mapping of 
avalanches mainly took advantage of maps and descriptions of past avalanches and 
projected avalanche zones provided by Arthur’s Pass Mountaineering (2007). It is 
extremely difficult to predict the behaviour and distribution of avalanches in the future 
because of global warming and gradual geomorphic changes. Hence, the same avalanche 
zones have been illustrated on all three regional maps. Any increase or decrease in the 
frequency of avalanches is expected to be more or less solely associated with changes in 
annual snowfall and prolonged variations in snow levels brought about by processes such 
as climate change and El Nino.  
 
7.4.3.3 Mapping mass movement hazards 
 
Mass movement hazards were separated into debris flows/debris floods and all remaining 
mass movements (landslides, rockfalls, topples, rock avalanches and minor slips). For both 
the >2% (0-50 years) and 0.2-2% (50-500 years) annual exceedence probability maps, 
mass movement distribution closely follows the distribution of previous slope failures as 
observed on aerial photographs over 80 years and satellite images from Google Earth. 
Identification of mass movement zones on the map sheets has been based on the theory 
that natural hazards tend to occur in areas that have previously sustained slope failure, and 
subsequently very few new zones of weakness for these intervals have been identified. 
Larger, more catastrophic slope failures fall into the <0.2% annual exceedence interval 
(500+ years) and projected failure zones have been outlined on the corresponding map. 
 
The mass movements for the <0.2% annual exceedence probability map are fundamentally 
considered to signify catastrophic events resulting in a partial or total destruction of the 
village area, either instantaneously or progressively. These mass movement zones have 
been inferred using evidence of previous major changes to the landscape and indications of 
possible future slumping on the slopes surrounding Arthur’s Pass village. Mass movement 
mapping at an extended time scale such as this is an estimate at best, because evidence of 
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previous large-scale events are largely overprinted or absent and do not allow for 
conclusive assumptions to be made on future catastrophic mass movements.  
 
Debris flows have been omitted from the >2% (0-50 year) map because active flows have 
not been recorded in the village in the last 50 years. However, it is still possible for a debris 
flow to occur in the immediate future.  
 
7.4.3.4 Mapping fluvial-related hazards 
 
There were several components in the mapping of fluvial-related hazards that vary quite 
drastically over the three time intervals because of the highly active and changeable nature 
of river processes at Arthur’s Pass. Floods for the >2% (0-50 years) and 0.2-2% (50-500 
years) intervals were roughly positioned within the current floodplain boundaries. Extra 
data on previous flood occurrence were also used to refine the position of possible flood 
levels for these time intervals. A flood with a recurrence interval over 500+ years is 
expected to be a catastrophic event at Arthur’s Pass. Flood levels in such cases may 
submerge the village with up to approximately 50m of water and sediment, so the 
predicted flood level for this interval was projected to be along the 800m elevation 
contour. One notable point is that despite the river levels differing quite severely over the 
three mapping intervals, the flooded area remains narrowly confined for all three on 
account of the steep slopes bordering the Bealey River.  
 
Aggradation and erosion were monitored over the last 80 years using aerial photographs 
and Google Earth satellite images, and are backed up by field reconnaissance. Evidence of 
these fluvial events and some mass movements may have been modified or removed by 
subsequent fluvial processes but in many cases it is possible to identify alluvial fans built 
up over several decades or several centuries, so the occurrence of fluvial process can be 
predicted with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  
 
The mapping of channel avulsion over the three time intervals also chiefly used aerial 
photos, satellite images and field investigations. It also took into account floodplain 
elevations, the bedrock geology, alluvial sediments and moraine deposits within the valley 
and the path previous river channels have taken. Once again it is difficult to determine with 
absolute certainty the paths that the active channel will adopt in the long-term, so mapped 
channel boundaries are best estimates of future channel routes. 
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7.5 ESTIMATED LIKELIHOOD OF HAZARD OCCURRENCE 
 
Traditionally, natural hazards have been quantified using statistical methods. If it is 
possible to obtain probability estimates of a specific hazard, the estimate can be compared 
to the likely consequences of the event in order for appropriate action can be taken to 
mitigate the hazard (Yetton, 2000). However, in most cases, the natural hazards at Arthur’s 
Pass do not yield sufficient information for confident estimates of their timing and severity 
to be made. Previously, qualitative risk assessments have not been attempted for every type 
of natural hazard. This may in part be due to the high number of uncertainties that are 
attached to hazard estimates even when the risk can be quantified (K. Smith, 2004). 
However, several probability models have been developed for natural hazard analysis that 
attempt to determine the time between events and recurrence intervals.  
 
Under ideal conditions, the magnitude-frequency relationship of natural hazard events 
demonstrates that magnitude is inversely related to frequency. In practice, however, the 
highly dynamic nature of the environment is liable to generate unexpected events that may 
deem many hazard assessments using this method inadequate. Furthermore, this 
probability model is best applied only to large numbers of distinct, frequent, yet randomly 
occurring hazards (such as flooding, selected types of slope failure and some 
meteorological events) that fit into the Poisson probability model (Grant, 1998). This 
method is not particularly suited for determining details on seismic hazard occurrence 
because it assumes that earthquakes are independent events, and hence ignores elapsed 
time since the last tremor along a specific fault line (Yetton, 2000).  
 
Landslide hazard maps tend to illustrate the physical attributes of potentially damaging 
mass movement events in terms of estimated volume, frequency and failure mechanism 
(Neaupane & Piantanakulchai, 2006). Physical calculation of quantitative values for these 
parameters is highly challenging at Arthur’s Pass given the lack of conclusive and reliable 
data. Determining such values is considered outside the scope of this study but it is noted 
that there is a constant background risk of these hazards taking place at any time.  
 
Disaster patterns can become evident over short time periods, such as 50 years, but for any 
realistic, long-term frequency-magnitude estimates, detailed records dating back several 
centuries are essential. On account of the lack of such data pertaining to the Arthur’s Pass 
area, it is impossible to make any precise calculations for the likelihood of natural hazards.   
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7.6 SUMMARY 
 
All natural hazards present at Arthur’s Pass are interconnected and have variable effects on 
other natural hazard processes. By analysing the characteristics of historical events and the 
relationships that exist between hazard processes it is possible to better understand hazard 
behaviour. This can then be used to construct hazard zonation maps which assist in hazard 
management and planning for the future at Arthur’s Pass. The results of this hazard 
analysis and mapping section demonstrate that: 
 
1. Arthur’s Pass is highly vulnerable to natural hazards because of social, structural 
and infrastructural elements that may be susceptible to serious damage during a 
natural disaster. The high vulnerability and lack of total self-sufficiency of the 
village may impact on the success and timing of recovery efforts after a disaster 
event. 
2. The multi-hazard concept is used to describe the complex interactions and 
relationships that exist between different natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass, because 
all hazard processes have an effect on other hazards. Gravity, seismic and 
meteorological hazards are “driving forces” and cannot be controlled or caused by 
human activities. Mass movement and fluvial hazards are “response” forces and are 
partially caused by the “driving” forces and human activities.  
3. Hazard zonation is a method of adapting to natural hazards and the most effective 
means of displaying hazard information is in the form of hazard maps. Three 
hazard map sheets have been constructed for the Arthur’s Pass area, showing both 
regional and local scale hazards for >2%, 0.2-2% and <0.2 % annual exceedence 
probabilities (0-50, 50-500 and 500+ year average return periods). Several factors 
restrict the accuracy of hazard map development, including the unpredictability of 
environmental and geomorphic processes, the unknown effect of climate change 
and global warming on natural hazard conditions and the lack of historical data on 
previous landscape behaviour.  
4. A long record of previous event data is required to make accurate probability 
estimate for the occurrence of natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass, hence the 
comparatively short historical record does not allow for reasonable probability 
estimates to be made. Statistical methods of determining the expected magnitude 
and frequency of natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass are greatly hindered by the 
absence of detailed local event data. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND PREPAREDNESS 
ASPECTS OF NATURAL HAZARDS AT ARTHUR’S PASS  
 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter investigates the principles of hazard management and risk reduction and 
applies them to the Arthur’s Pass region. It also assesses the social perceptions associated 
with natural hazard occurrence at Arthur’s Pass and reviews the effectiveness of the 
emergency plan currently in place in the village.  
 
The chief objectives of this chapter are: 
1. To outline principles of hazard management and risk reduction, including details of 
risk management integration and the relevance of the four “R’s” to emergency 
management at Arthur’s Pass.  
2. To highlight common problems encountered by hazard managers when producing 
emergency plans. 
3. To describe why an understanding of risk perception is a crucial part of natural 
hazard management and risk reduction and to apply this concept to the situation at 
Arthur’s Pass.  
4. To conduct a visitor survey assessing risk perceptions at Arthur’s Pass and analyse 
the results to determine how much is known about the risk from natural hazards. 
5. To discuss methods of improving hazard awareness by changing public perceptions 
within the Arthur’s Pass National Park and village.  
6. To discuss the current emergency plan at Arthur’s Pass and provide 
recommendations for possible improvements to future plans.   
 
8.2 PRINCIPLES OF RISK REDUCTION AND THE INTEGRATION OF 
HAZARD MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 
 
On account of the comparatively low casualty rate directly from natural hazards in New 
Zealand, hazard management and mitigation have typically received little priority from 
authoritative organisations (Dingwall et al., 1989). More recently, however, with the 
increase of recreational activities and tourist numbers in the park, the hazards have become 
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more perceptible and have been deemed of greater importance than previously.  
 
The economy of the Arthur’s Pass township and the livelihood of its occupants relies 
largely on the tourism industry. Accordingly, visitors to the town greatly increase the 
population, particularly in the summer months when conditions in the national park are at 
their peak. It is estimated that the overnight population within the village can rise up to one 
order of magnitude from 54 permanent residents to roughly 500 occupants. 
Accommodation for this excess of people is in a multitude of places, including Mountain 
House Backpackers, the Chalet Hotel, the Alpine Motel apartments, tents and campervans, 
houses and huts. It is therefore necessary to ensure than the hazards affecting the village 
are effectively mitigated. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management uses 
the four “R’s” principle, which aims to create resilient communities, using four methods;  
 
 
 
 
 
These have been applied to the current Arthur’s Pass hazard conditions in order to 
objectively assess where there may be opportunity for improvements to pre-existing 
mitigation measures. It is necessary to take into account all involved parties and determine 
the steps required to undertake each of the four “R’s” successfully (Figure 8.1). 
 
8.2.1 Reduction  
 
By identifying the long-term risks to human life and property it is possible to lower the 
chance of emergency events occurring and reduce their potential impact (Wisner et al., 
2004). There are numerous methods of risk reduction. Those that apply to the Arthur’s 
Pass area are:  
- Removing people and property from hazardous zones, using the locational 
approach, and relocating them to safer areas.  
- Installing physical protection works, such as river stopbanks and gabions, 
stabilisation fencing and structural reinforcement. Funding for such works is 
sourced from Transit New Zealand, the New Zealand Railways Corporation, 
Selwyn District Council and the local residents group, the Arthur’s Pass 
Association (Beaven, 2006). 
 
? REDUCTION 
? READINESS 
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? RECOVERY 
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Figure 8. 1. The involvement of various organisations in hazard mitigation planning. Each group has a 
specific role in managing information and preparing the community for a hazard event (K. Smith, 2004). 
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- Employing effective land-use planning practices to restrict or prohibit development 
in hazardous zones. 
- Decreasing town vulnerability through the implementation of better education 
programs for tourists, in a variety of different formats and languages.  
- Increasing the number of warning signs within the village to alert people to local 
natural hazards. 
- Obtaining welfare and medical supplies to last several days in the case of a natural 
disaster in which people may unable to leave the town. This coincides with the 
most recent Civil Defence and Emergency Management campaign (Get Thru) to 
make people more prepared for a disaster in order to reduce the impact of hazards 
on the community (Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, 2008).  
 
8.2.2 Readiness 
 
Readiness refers to community preparedness, through the planning and development of 
operational systems and capabilities in the village before an event takes place (K. Smith, 
2004). The numerous hazard events at Arthur’s Pass in the past forced the residents to be 
very aware of the potential dangers. At Arthur’s Pass, the emergency plan stipulates that 
the local policeman and Department of Conservation field officer take on the primary 
leadership role when operating at emergency status, provided they are not injured or killed. 
Local residents have specific roles within the response and recovery operation.  
 
It is essential that the village community become as self-sufficient as possible. After a 
regional disaster, emergency resources will be dispatched to the larger populated centres 
first, which will leave Arthur’s Pass with very little assistance until resources gradually 
become available. This may be a matter of hours to weeks, depending on the severity and 
magnitude of the natural disaster in question.  
 
8.2.3 Response 
 
Whilst the speed of large-scale emergency response within the town may be hindered by 
the lack of specific onsite resources, the local volunteer services that exist within the 
village are sufficient to cope with small-scale events. These include: 
- The Arthur’s Pass Rescue and Emergency Services, which is an organisation 
responsible for the purchase and maintenance of rescue equipment and coordination 
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of local volunteers and resources (Arthur's Pass Rescue and Emergency Services, 
2008). 
- The local branch of Civil Defence and Emergency Management that meets monthly 
in the old school building to keep up to date with training and emergency 
procedures, and which will take on a coordination and communication role 
following a natural disaster in the village area.  
- The Arthur’s Pass Volunteer Rural Fire Force, which meets three times a month 
and is accountable for responding to fires, motor vehicle accidents and Civil 
Defence Emergencies (Arthur's Pass Rescue and Emergency Services, 2008). 
- The Arthur’s Pass Police, located immediately south of the Rough Creek bridge, on 
top of the debris fan. The local police officer takes a leadership role in responding 
to emergencies and co-ordinating the response to natural hazard events.  
- The Arthur’s Pass division of the Department of Conservation, which is the 
administrative centre for the Arthur’s Pass National Park. The field supervisor of 
the Department of Conservation also takes a leadership role in emergency 
management and response to emergency situations (Brown, 2006). 
 
Outside resources are also available to Arthur’s Pass. The nearest medical centres to 
Arthur’s Pass are at Darfield (in Canterbury) and Moana (in Westland). Both are 
approximately one hour away by road. Ambulances come from Darfield and the response 
time is approximately one hour. The Westpac rescue helicopter is one of the few rescue 
helicopters operating in Canterbury, but several helicopter companies are available for 
rescue operations in the event of a major disaster. The Westpac rescue helicopter can reach 
Arthur’s Pass in approximately 45 minutes. Basic first aid is available at the visitor centre 
and the police station (SoftRock NZ, 2008a).  
 
8.2.4 Recovery 
 
In a best-case scenario, the most important infrastructure (such as water and food supplies, 
telecommunications, electricity and roads) would be repaired in a relatively short time, 
depending on the extent of the damage. However, there would be a significant delay in the 
recovery time of Arthur’s Pass if it was affected by a regional disaster. Access to medical 
aid and help from Civil Defence and other external organisations would be heavily delayed 
because their priority would focus on the populated centres such as Christchurch.  
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8.3 COMMON ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH HAZARD MANAGEMENT AND 
RISK REDUCTION METHODS 
 
Some of the barriers to risk mitigation are: 
- The lack of hazard awareness and the underestimation of real risk from natural 
hazard events by both the community and government agencies.  
- The use of technical language and formats in hazard investigations that make it 
difficult for non-experts to understand or recognise the hazards.  
- The lack of detailed information on the nature and potential consequences of 
natural hazards and methods of practical hazard mitigation.  
- Insufficient evidence of hazard data that would influence governing bodies to 
mitigate for risk reduction.       
- The lack of coordination between organisations involved with hazard management 
and the community.  
- A shortage of people trained in data extrapolation, hazard identification and 
analysis of technical information. Similarly, there is lack of people with specific 
welfare, rescue and emergency skills within the affected area.        
 
Often the overall effects of a natural disaster are under-estimated because immediate loss 
estimates fail to take into account the social impact they have. Damaging events are 
typically classified according to their causes, but in order for a disaster to eventuate, 
specific human and economic effect thresholds must first be reached (K. Smith, 2004). The 
acuteness of impacts resulting from a disaster event are largely dependent on several 
factors. These take account of the magnitude and extent of the hazard, the initial 
vulnerability of the area affected and the ability of the community to remain resilient and 
recover from the disaster. Changing social perceptions and ensuring that the Arthur’s Pass 
community has an appropriate level of hazard awareness is critical to the success of hazard 
management in the village and national park. The perceptions of visitors to Arthur’s Pass 
village largely govern how successful the hazard mitigation programmes are.  
 
8.4 UNDERSTANDING RISK PERCEPTION FOR HAZARD MANAGEMENT 
 
The perception of natural hazards in society is a fundamental aspect of hazard management 
that can be manipulated for the purpose of risk reduction and used as a tool to implement 
preventative measures (Plapp & Werner, 2006). A community’s vulnerability is directly 
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proportional to how the risks are perceived and dealt with by community members. 
Because vulnerability is a function of human action and behaviour (Dept. of Economic and 
Social Affairs 2002) it is necessary to assess the community understanding of risk, 
willingness to accept the risk and personal preparedness in order to minimise the exposure 
of both tourist and resident populations at Arthur’s Pass from natural hazards. 
 
8.4.1  Measuring public perception 
 
An assessment of the social perceptions of visitors to Arthur’s Pass was carried out using 
an anonymous, two page questionnaire (Appendix D). Participants were selected at random 
in the Arthur’s Pass Visitor Centre, and represented a wide range of ages, nationalities, 
transport modes and purposes for visiting the village.  
 
The specific objectives of the questionnaire were to determine: 
a) Whether visitors to Arthur’s Pass village had any knowledge of the natural hazards 
in the village either before their arrival or subsequent to their visit. 
b) Whether visitors had observed any plans explaining evacuation procedures in the 
village since their arrival. 
c) If visitors were aware of any hazard mitigation measures currently in place in the 
village. 
d) If visitors thought the hazards were well managed or if there were any 
improvements they felt were necessary to improve public safety and hazard 
awareness within the town. 
e) How severely visitors rated the risk for all identified hazards in the village. 
f) Whether visitors would feel confident knowing what to do if a hazard event did 
occur in the village.  
 
8.4.2 Survey limitations 
 
Limitations are inevitable in a survey of this kind, but every attempt has been made to get 
the most representative results possible. The survey was conducted in early March 2008. 
Due to the timing of the survey, participants were summer-time visitors to the park and 
may not have been aware of other seasonal hazards affecting the town. Consequently, this 
may have skewed the results slightly by downplaying the relative risk of winter hazards 
compared to hazards observable during the warmer months. 
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The number of participants in the study was lower than expected due to low visitor 
numbers and unfavourable weather conditions in the region at the time. Results may have a 
higher statistical variability but they give an adequate overview of public hazard 
perceptions which has been deemed sufficient for this simple, exploratory study.  
 
The survey is only intended to give a generalised idea of the knowledge that Arthur’s Pass 
visitors have to the hazards. In many cases, survey participants had only just arrived in the 
village and had yet to make any significant observations on natural hazard issues, which 
they may have otherwise noticed had they been in the town longer.  
 
8.4.3 Survey results 
 
The survey results are expected to contribute to the revision of the emergency plan at 
Arthur’s Pass and work towards improving public safety within the park.  
 
The survey results concluded that: 
- Half of the participants had not viewed any information notifying them of the 
potential hazards at Arthur’s Pass nor did they have any prior knowledge of hazard 
issues in the village. Those that were aware of the risks had observed warning signs 
or had experienced the hazards first hand whilst visiting the town previously.  
- An overwhelming number (83%) of participants had not observed any form of 
evacuation procedures or plans since they arrived in the town. Those that were 
observed were primarily in tourist lodgings and were mostly limited to fire 
emergency protocols.  
- Almost 80% of participants were not aware of any protective measures in place to 
mitigate natural hazards in the village and park surrounds. Participants with 
knowledge of protective measures referred to avalanche shelters, warning signs and 
the periodic closure of some walks as the main methods of protection for visitors.  
- 40% of participants thought the hazards were well managed. The other 60% were 
unsure of whether there were methods in place or if they were managed effectively.  
- 54% of participants did not feel confident knowing what to do if a natural hazard 
event occurred in the village. 38% felt they could cope and would know what to do 
in a disaster situation and 8% were unsure whether they would know what to do 
during a hazard event. 
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- When asked if they could suggest any methods of improvement to visitor safety 
within the park, most participants stated that there could be more information 
describing the hazards and their distribution, severity and frequency. 
- Participants were asked to rate ten hazards on a scale of 0 to 5 (0 representing no 
risk whatsoever and 5 representing very high risk). These ratings were then 
averaged and graded in order of the greatest perceived threat. Heavy snow and 
landslides were thought to be the most hazardous events at Arthur’s Pass, closely 
followed by snow avalanches and strong winds. River sedimentation and 
earthquakes were identified by visitors to Arthur’s Pass as the least hazardous 
processes affecting the village.  
 
Observations of the community structure at Arthur’s Pass confirm that there are two 
distinct community groups; transients and residents. The transient group is largely made up 
of tourists, expected to stay in the town for a few minutes up to several months. The 
permanent population consists of the town residents who have resided in the village for 
more than one year. Transient groups are largely uninformed of the presence of natural 
hazards and possible risk factors and do not have a good understanding of emergency 
procedures. Conversely, the permanent residents are well-informed and have a good 
understanding of the hazards, their possible consequences and what actions should be 
taken in an emergency.  
 
8.5 CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND REDUCING VULNERABILITY AT 
ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
The first step in minimising community vulnerability is realising that there is a link 
between public perceptions and individual responses to an emergency event. However, 
Rogers (1997) points out that people’s perceptions differ from expert perception estimates 
(which are based on technical calculations for magnitude and frequency) because of 
additional factors, such as the scale of possible events, the public’s judgement and 
scientific understanding of the topic and whether they feel they are being voluntarily 
exposed to the hazards.  
 
Reports by numerous authors such as Dingwall, Fitzharris and Owens (1989), Dunbar 
(2007), Espiner (1999), Gough (2000), Johnston and Houghton (1995), Plapp and Werner 
(2006) and Plattner, Plapp and Hebel (2006) focus on the development of public perception 
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as an aid to improving community safety and establishing communication channels 
between communities, government agencies and emergency organisations. Information 
gained from perception studies can be applied to the development of risk communication 
(Gough, 2000).  
 
Public attitudes are ultimately what govern the outcome of any emergency situation. The 
aim in emergency management is to alter the public perception of risk and control visitor 
behaviour during an extreme event in a positive way (Espiner, 1999). Lindell and Perry 
(1993) argue that a detailed understanding of the hazard is not necessarily crucial in order 
for people to be motivated enough to prepare for a natural hazard event. They must, 
however, believe that the hazard exists and that protective measures are required. 
 
The findings from the tourist survey demonstrate that a small number of park visitors are 
aware of the risks posed by natural hazards and may even be drawn to park activities 
because of them. They also show that much of the public is largely unaware of any dangers 
until they experience or read about them. Similar observations were recorded by Dingwall 
et al (1989) when reviewing natural hazards and the safety of visitors in national parks 
around New Zealand. They also note that whilst most visitors are powerless to stop a 
natural event occurring, an individual’s personal judgement and behaviour alters with 
experience, training and by various safety measures and information provided by 
emergency and national park managers.  
 
Studies show that another critical factor in increasing public hazard awareness and 
communicating to the public about natural hazard issues is through the integration of 
quality education programs in high risk regions such as Arthur’s Pass (Johnston & 
Houghton, 1995). However, the effectiveness and success of such programs is greatly 
reliant on the way in which the information is expressed. Giving as much information as 
possible to the public in the right format allows people to make the most informed 
decisions and better prepares them for an extreme natural event should one ever occur 
(Montz, 1993). Therefore, it is very important to not only have educational information 
available on natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass but to present it in the right way so as to be 
effective. By highlighting the risks associated with the village and national park, visitors 
will hopefully modify their behaviour and subsequently lower the threat to themselves and 
others from natural hazards. 
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Research completed by Espiner (1999) into the effectiveness of signage in hazardous areas 
such as the Franz Josef and Fox Glaciers demonstrated that the use of hazard warning signs 
is also imperative in increasing public awareness of natural hazards. These results were 
mirrored in the Arthur’s Pass survey, such that the presence of hazard warning signs was 
the principal form of hazard information observed by participants .  
 
Another crucial step in achieving effective community awareness of the natural hazards at 
Arthur’s Pass is involving the resident population in discussions, gaining their trust and 
proactively increasing the confidence of the community so that they will feel prepared and 
cope well during a disaster event. Arthur’s Pass residents have been included as partners in 
risk communication and hazard management decision making for some time, as they 
constitute a large part of the emergency agencies in the village (Costello, 2008).  
 
8.6 THE CURRENT AND FUTURE ARTHUR’S PASS EMERGENCY PLANS 
 
The emergency plan currently in place at Arthur’s Pass is modelled on the Mt. Cook 
emergency management plan and tends to be more of a theoretical plan rather than a 
practical one. Also in use is the Local CDEM Arrangements (2007) distributed by the 
Selwyn District Council, which is a generic plan outlining the organisational structure of 
any emergency response and the responsibilities of emergency agencies before, during and 
after an emergency situation.  
 
Currently, there is no emergency plan employed at Arthur’s Pass dealing specifically with 
practical approaches to emergency situations within the village and national park. 
Residents have requested that there be a more detailed plan describing details of several 
aspects of any emergency scenario, in order for the village to have the greatest level of 
preparedness possible (Costello, 2008). The development of a revised and specialised 
emergency plan is currently under way and is expected to have: 
- Detailed methods of systematically searching the village following an 
emergency event. The village will be divided up into sections and each building 
will be searched one by one until that section is cleared, before moving onto the 
next section.  
- A list of Arthur’s Pass residents, their contact numbers, addresses and specialist 
skills so that rescue and recovery efforts can be better coordinated. 
- The protocols for purchasing rescue and welfare equipment and where it would 
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be stored so that fewer resources have to be brought in from outside the park 
which may be extremely difficult after a disaster event.  
- Details on the location and quantity of food supplies stored in town to help the 
village be somewhat self-sustainable following a disaster event.  
- An outline of remedial measures to be taken for the recovery of the village after 
an emergency.         (Costello, 2008) 
 
Once revised, this plan is expected to be drafted and sent out to all residents for comments 
and further suggestions. After the final draft has been prepared it will eventually be 
distributed to all house and business owners in the village. The Selwyn District Council in 
conjunction with the Department of Conservation and other emergency organisations 
within the village are required to implement all necessary measures outlined in the 
emergency plan once it has been completed (Brown, 2006). It is expected that the 
production of a new emergency plan at Arthur’s Pass will be more successful if it is 
developed and maintained as an integral part of the emergency preparedness process, 
which encourages open thinking and reduces uncertainty (Office of the United Nations, 
1986).  
 
There were plans to finish the revised emergency plan by mid-2008 but this is unlikely to 
occur because of time constraints and the resignation of the current emergency manager in 
the village.  
  
8.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REVISED ARTHUR’S PASS 
EMERGENCY PLAN 
 
When preparing an emergency plan tailored specifically to the Arthur’s Pass region, it is 
important to deal with as many aspects of preparedness as possible. The plan must 
distinguish between the anticipated behaviour of the hazards and the specific local factors 
which may affect responsive actions whilst precisely defining the situations it was 
designed for (Office of the United Nations, 1984).  
 
The United Nations (1986) asserts that several essential components make up a successful 
and operational emergency plan. 
1. It should clearly state what the assumptions are on which the plan is based, and 
define the goals that are expected to be achieved as part of the plan development.  
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2. It should discuss the organisational aspects of the plan, including responsibilities 
for project management, liaison, administrative support and maintenance of the 
plan once it is established.  
3. It should link agencies involved in the emergency process and acknowledge the 
input and support of other organisations and local groups during a disaster phase.  
4. It needs to consider the technical aspects of emergency preparedness to help with 
decision making.  
5. It should outline strategies for public education and training through information 
programmes and exercises.  
6. It should undergo regular maintenance and revision so that it meets its objectives 
and effectively manages the natural hazard threat to the Arthur’s Pass community.  
 
Possible recommendations for future planning and development to improve operational 
systems and emergency procedures at Arthur’s Pass are:  
- Include all hazards in emergency managements strategies, however insignificant, 
and be prepared for multiple hazard scenarios in a given time period.  
- Include and plan for hazards with low risk yet high consequence (such as landslide 
damming and high magnitude earthquakes) as part of a town’s hazard management 
program (Yetton, 2000). 
- Use hazard maps as a way of clearly and easily conveying hazard information to 
government organisations, local bodies and the public.  
- Aim to increase the quantity of emergency equipment and resources stored within 
the village so that fewer supplies will be required from other communities during an 
emergency. 
- Increase current public awareness schemes and ensure evacuation procedures are 
clearly legible and placed in obvious areas that have high foot traffic.  
- Prepare welfare kits to be stored in case of an emergency, particularly for transient 
guests to the village, who are unlikely to come prepared for a natural disaster event. 
- Revise land use zones and implement changes (either structural reinforcement or 
relocation) to buildings likely to be affected by natural hazards within the next 50 to 
100 years.  
- Increase the number of warning signs in areas affected by natural hazards around the 
village and within the national park to better prepare visitors for possible dangers.  
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It is clear from this evaluation of hazard mitigation at Arthur’s Pass that there are definite 
opportunities for improvement to community safety and risk reduction both in the village 
and within the Arthur’s Pass National Park. Progress towards the creation of a successful 
mitigation program at Arthur’s Pass relies on effective partnerships between government 
agencies, the community and local organisations. Such partnerships should include bodies 
from all governmental levels such as Environment Canterbury and the Selwyn District 
Council. The local Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) branch will be 
responsible for immediate action following a natural disaster and need to be fully updated 
and informed on the local hazard status at Arthur’s Pass. Other organisations within the 
community such as the Arthur’s Pass Rescue and Emergency Service, the Arthur’s Pass 
Volunteer Rural Fire Force, the Department of Conservation and local business owners 
play a significant role in ensuring the response and recovery of the village during the post-
disaster period is as efficient as possible.  
 
8.8  SUMMARY 
 
Hazard management is a complex process and requires the coordination of many different 
factors before, during and after a natural disaster. Social perceptions are a very important 
consideration and can greatly affect the success of an emergency plan. The emergency plan 
at Arthur’s Pass should be revised with this in mind and be adapted to specifically deal 
with the Arthur’s Pass region and the local community.  
 
The outcomes of this section demonstrate that: 
 
1. Natural hazards in New Zealand have been given greater importance in recent years 
due to an increase in the frequency, severity and economic cost of hazard events 
around the country. This scenario is also evident at Arthur’s Pass, where an 
increase in number of recreational users of the national park and village has 
expanded the risk from natural hazards in the region.  
2. The four “R’s” concept of hazard mitigation adopted by the Ministry of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management in New Zealand has been applied to Arthur’s 
Pass and identifies which aspects of emergency management are sufficiently 
managed and areas that might be at risk and are in need of further mitigation. It is 
suggested that the village is somewhat prepared for a disaster, but there may be 
issues in the response and recovery phases of a disaster event.  
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3. Some of the barriers to risk reduction, including the underestimation of the real risk 
posed by natural hazards in the village, the lack of coordination between governing 
and emergency agencies, the lack of detailed information on hazard areas and 
potential consequences of a hazard event all contribute to the risk factor within the 
village and national park. These issues have been addressed during the 
development of recommendations for the improvement of the Arthur’s Pass 
emergency plan.  
4. Public perceptions are an essential aspect of hazard management and in order to 
analyse the level of awareness of natural hazards and emergency plans of visitors to 
the village, a questionnaire was distributed within the Arthur’s Pass Visitor Centre. 
The results suggested that few participants had observed hazard evacuation plans or 
warning signs and most participants underestimated the risk posed by several 
hazards, particularly earthquakes and erosion. Over half of those surveyed said they 
would not feel confident knowing what to do in an emergency.  
5. Changing public perceptions with a view to reducing natural hazard risk is possible 
through several means. Appropriate education programmes and information 
supplied in various locations is one of the best methods of increasing hazard 
awareness. Studies show that the installation of warning signs in hazardous zones is 
extremely useful, and involving the community in the development of emergency 
plans has proven to increase confidence and improve emergency preparedness. 
6. The emergency plan currently in place at Arthur’s Pass has not been specifically 
tailored to the village. A revised plan is currently in development and will contain 
explicit details on systematic search methods, contact details for village residents 
and a list of their strengths and previous training, protocols for the purchase and 
storage of rescue and welfare equipment and an outline of remedial steps for the 
recovery of the village after an emergency.  
7. It is important that the future emergency plan reflects the Arthur’s Pass situation 
and effectively reduces the hazard risk. There are several essential components of 
the emergency and preparedness plan development. These include stating the 
assumptions upon which it is based, outlining the objectives and organisation of the 
plan and the responsibilities of organisations involved in the emergency effort, 
linking emergency agencies and local groups so emergency procedures are 
coordinated, discussing the technical aspects of the plan and outlining education 
strategies that will aid in risk reduction. Based on these principles, a number of 
recommendations for the future emergency plan have been presented.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS  
 
The principal aim of this research was to assess the vulnerability of the Arthur’s Pass 
township to natural hazards in order to assist governing bodies and local agencies in 
making informed decisions about emergency planning and mitigation in the village.  
 
The steps taken to achieve the aim have been: 
1. To conduct a detailed analysis of the four hazard types identified in the village; 
seismic hazards, meteorological hazards, mass movement hazards and fluvial-
related hazards.  
2. To collate the hazard analysis information and use it to construct a series of hazard 
maps showing potential risk zones based on historical events and indicators 
identified in the field.  
3. To examine methods of risk reduction and their potential for application to the 
Arthur’s Pass region.  
4. To investigate the public perception of risk from natural hazards within the village 
area. 
5. To evaluate the current emergency plan at Arthur’s Pass and offer suggestions for 
improvements to revised versions of the plan.  
 
Initially a review of the literature was completed to identify possible shortcomings in 
previous hazard and geological studies of the Arthur’s Pass region. This process revealed 
that much of the previous research focuses on slope instabilities along State Highway 73 
and through the Otira Gorge. A number of studies also investigate the complex structural 
conditions present in the region and analyse historical Arthur’s Pass earthquakes to better 
understand tectonic processes. Detailed assessments of natural hazards specific to the 
village area were, for the most part, absent from the literature, which demonstrates the 
need for such a thorough investigation to be undertaken. The result of this work (some of 
which is presented in the form of hazard maps) aims to indicate where the hazards exist 
and what steps can be taken to minimise them. Historical events have been relied on 
heavily to illustrate potential hazard issues.  
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9.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
The four hazard assessment sections (Chapters 3 to 6) comprised the main body of this 
research. Each chapter combined information from the literature, in-field investigations 
and historical data to assess the vulnerability of the Arthur’s Pass community and its 
infrastructure to natural hazards sourced both locally and distally. The hazards identified at 
Arthur’s Pass have complex interrelationships and often influence the location and 
initiation of other hazard events throughout the Arthur’s Pass National Park.  
 
9.2.1 Seismic hazards 
 
- Arthur’s Pass is located at the junction of the Alpine Fault and the Marlborough Fault 
System. As a result, the region experiences the seismic traits of both fault systems. 
The proximity of the township to such major plate boundary faults results in the 
capacity for fault ruptures to produce shaking intensities up to MM X within a 150 to 
500 year return period.  
- Shallow earthquakes generated in the Arthur’s Pass region produce a greater seismic 
hazard because they tend to generate shorter duration but more intense ground shaking 
than other locations in the South Island. These shallow earthquakes have the ability to 
amplify the hazard impacts within the village and negatively influence response and 
recovery efforts during an emergency phase.  
- The high number of historical earthquakes affecting the Arthur’s Pass township 
caused by both regional and local fault ruptures indicates that there is a moderate to 
high risk from known fault traces. There is also a constant background risk from 
unidentified or untraceable faults within close proximity to the village that cannot be 
factored into precise probability calculations. Whilst the exact timing and location of 
the next earthquake is unknown, the impacts it may have on the village can be 
forecasted to allow for appropriate emergency management to take place.  
- Major issues with seismic hazards include the risk to lives, property and essential 
infrastructure, but there are few mitigation methods for seismic hazards other than 
being sufficiently prepared. In this case, the hazard cannot be reduced but the risk can 
be managed with the employment of effective mitigation solutions. 
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9.2.2 Meteorological hazards 
 
- The weather patterns at Arthur’s Pass comprise mostly warm, north-westerly, rain-
bearing winds alternating with strong, cold southerlies. Summer thunderstorms 
associated with anti-cyclonic periods can generate heavy rain, hail, lightning and 
strong winds. During the cooler months, heavy snowfall and avalanches are hazards 
throughout the village and Arthur’s Pass National Park.  
- Meteorological hazards are generally high frequency, low magnitude events and 
primarily act as a trigger or catalyst for other hazard types, such as landslides, minor 
slips and flooding. Weather-related hazards tend to be a greater risk to users of the 
national park than people within the village boundaries, because of their higher degree 
of exposure. These hazards can be forecast to a certain extent and there are several 
mitigation methods available to treat the hazards and reduce the impacts they have on 
the Arthur’s Pass community.  
- Climate change and global warming is predicted to have a considerable effect on 
weather patterns, by increasing the unpredictability of extreme events in the Arthur’s 
Pass region. Temperature averages, rainfall and evaporation are all expected to 
increase, and future projections estimate that snow patterns and wind conditions will 
become more extreme. Determining the precise reactions of the Arthur’s Pass 
environment to global warming is very difficult, which increases the importance of 
having effective hazard management in the village.  
 
9.2.3 Mass movement hazards 
 
- Landslides, rockfalls and minor slips are the most common and widespread mass 
movement hazards identified in the area. There is also evidence for the occurrence of 
debris flows in the Rough Creek, McGrath Stream and possibly Wardens Creek 
tributaries despite there being no recorded debris flow events in the area since 
European settlement.  
- Storms and seismic shaking are the primary triggers for mass movements. Intense 
rainfall and slope instabilities have a strong correlation in the Arthur’s Pass region, 
with both occurring frequently; up to several times a month. Conversely, large 
landslide deposit distributions can be used to infer fault locations.  
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- The incidence of mass movements within the national park has severe implications for 
the recreational users of the park and for State Highway 73, which is prone to 
blockages and closures from slope failures on a regular basis.  
- Mass movements can potentially affect fluvial hazards by adding material to the 
drainage network, which may exacerbate erosion and aggradational processes and 
cause damage within the village. Large-scale, catastrophic mass movements are also a 
potential threat at Arthur’s Pass and may generate landslide damming, or large-scale 
aggradation and erosion of the Bealey River bed on which the village is sited. In many 
cases an event of this magnitude cannot be prepared for, other than having an prompt 
evacuation plan in place that will remove the public from the risk zone.  
 
9.2.4 Fluvial-related hazards 
 
- Numerous tributaries contribute to the Bealey River catchment, several of which flow 
through the village area. Flooding, riverbed erosion and aggradation, and channel 
avulsion are the fluvial-related hazards at Arthur’s Pass, and all have major 
implications for the village and its community.  
- Flooding of the Bealey River occurs in the village area up to several times a year, 
occasionally inundating houses along Crusher Loop. Further opportunities for fluvial-
related damage are in the form of surface flooding due to urban drainage systems 
failing, landslide damming, channel avulsion and encroachment of the village area, 
and the building up of alluvial fans. Most of these hazards are progressive and take 
some time to occur, which gives hazard managers the chance to mitigate the hazards 
and reduce the risk to the village, thereby decreasing its vulnerability.  
- Flooding is almost always connected to intense rainfall, and it cannot usually be 
predicted more than a few hours in advance. Aggradation, erosion and channel 
avulsion may be more predictable but it can be difficult to employ long-term 
mitigation measures for these hazards without disturbing the balance of the fluvial 
system and making the problem more severe.  
- Flood-protection measures, such as stopbanks and gabions, have been installed along 
the Bealey River and Rough Creek banks to prevent floods entering the developed 
area and damaging properties. Several of these mitigation measures have not been 
adequately maintained and may not provide good enough protection from floods and 
debris flows in the future.  
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9.3  HAZARD MAPPING AS AN AID TO RISK REDUCTION 
 
The value of hazard mapping is to provide a clear means of conveying hazard information 
to the public, government organisations and other involved agencies both at Arthur’s Pass 
and in the wider Canterbury region. Three maps were developed that show hazard events 
of >2%, 2%-0.2% and <0.2 % annual exceedence probabilities (0-50, 50-500 and 500+ 
year average return periods respectively). Some hazards, such as mass movements, 
flooding and erosion and aggradation increase in magnitude and severity over longer time 
periods. By contrast, fault return periods are unconstrained but considered to be constant so 
do not vary over the three time intervals. Snow avalanches and meteorological hazards are 
controlled by changes brought about by the seasons, climate change and climatic 
phenomena such as El Nino and the Interdecadal Pacific Oscillation (IPO), which makes 
prediction on their future behaviour and accurate hazard mapping difficult. Consequently, 
snow avalanche zones remain unchanged with time scale and meteorological hazards have 
been omitted from all three maps.  
 
Many of the vulnerable hazard areas have been mapped using historical data and previous 
hazard areas to indicate zones of future weakness, assuming that the past is the key to the 
future. The maps illustrate the high vulnerability of the whole Arthur’s Pass village 
because of its location within a very confined area on the Bealey River floodplain. Large-
scale mass movements have the potential to dam tributaries of the Bealey River, which 
would have catastrophic impacts on the village. An event of this magnitude is expected to 
have a long recurrence interval, and is illustrated on the <0.2% (500+ year) map.  
 
Also, both regional and local hazards have been accommodated on the maps because the 
natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass take place over a variety of different temporal and spatial 
scales. Subtle changes detected in the fluvial network and small-scale mass movements are 
able to be shown on the local map, which provides greater detail for emergency manages 
and ultimately assists in reducing the risk from natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass.  
 
9.4 PUBLIC RISK PERCEPTIONS AT ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
Public perceptions were assessed at Arthur’s Pass using an anonymous visitor 
questionnaire; results are discussed in Chapter 8. The survey found that most people 
visiting the village were not aware of the hazards, or thought they did not represent a high 
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risk, and a large proportion of participants said they would not feel confident knowing 
what actions to take in an emergency situation. Heavy snow and landslides were thought to 
be the most hazardous events, and river aggradation and earthquakes were rated as the least 
hazardous events at Arthur’s Pass. Improvements to public perception and hazard 
awareness can be achieved by education schemes and providing more detailed information 
about the specific risks from natural hazards in the Arthur’s Pass region. Installing warning 
signs and involving the community in emergency planning can also have a positive effect 
on public hazard perceptions, thereby reducing the vulnerability of the village.  
 
9.5 EMERGENCY PLANNING AT ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
An evaluation of the current emergency procedures and organisational structure of hazard 
management at Arthur’s Pass. It revealed several areas which require further development 
and improvements. Arthur’s Pass village is currently using a version of the Mt. Cook 
emergency plan and the Selwyn District Council’s Local CDEM Arrangements (2007), as 
there is currently no specific emergency response plan for the township. A revised plan 
specifically for the Arthur’s Pass village has been on the agenda of the village emergency 
managers for the last two years. It is anticipated that the new emergency plan will contain 
details on search methods for the village area, contact information for residents and details 
of their specialist emergency and rescue skills, in addition to lists of equipment and welfare 
supplies stored for use in emergency situations. 
 
Several recommendations were included for the future revision of the Arthur’s Pass 
emergency response plan. It is suggested that the future plan include details on all hazards, 
however insignificant, and also prepare for low magnitude, high consequence events as 
part of the town’s emergency management program. Stockpiling welfare kits and 
emergency equipment is considered paramount to improve response and recovery efforts 
during and after a disaster event. Other recommendations advised on the continued 
involvement of the Arthur’s Pass residents, the implementation of education schemes and 
land use planning as an aid to producing a successful emergency response plan.  
 
The lack of an emergency response plan for Arthur’s Pass is contributing to the 
vulnerability of the village as it reduces the effectiveness of preparedness, response and 
recovery actions before, during and after a disaster event. Ideally, a specific emergency 
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plan will enable emergency efforts to be better coordinated and executed to ultimately 
reduce the natural hazard risk to residents and visitors in Arthur’s Pass.  
 
9.6  VULNERABILITIES AT ARTHUR’S PASS 
 
The main aim of this research was to conduct a vulnerability assessment, in both scientific 
and social terms, to determine risk zones and identify aspects requiring development in 
order to progressively reduce the risks that natural hazards present at Arthur’s Pass. 
Vulnerability arising from natural hazards takes several forms at Arthur’s Pass. The social 
aspects of vulnerability are examined in Chapter 7 and 8 which discuss the impacts of 
natural hazard events on the community. The main vulnerabilities in the village affect 
people, property and infrastructural elements. Damage to the village infrastructure is a 
major issue because it affects the town’s ability to provide essential services and continue 
functioning. 
 
The Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s system of risk reduction using the four 
“R’s” was applied to the Arthur’s Pass conditions in Chapter 8. The process identified 
several areas with potential for improvement. Natural hazards can be reduced using 
physical protective methods and appropriate land use designation, as well as through the 
implementation of better education schemes and the distribution of information about the 
hazards. There is a lack of information available for visitors to the park, and as a result 
they are not as informed as they could be. Additionally, physical protection works require 
more maintenance if they are to provide sufficient protection from natural hazards in the 
future.  
 
Preparing the community for a disaster is also paramount in reducing the vulnerability of 
the community through the planning and development of operational systems and 
programs to deal with an emergency should one occur. Arthur’s Pass is not adequately 
prepared for a disaster event, and would rely heavily on outside organisations for 
assistance in a post-disaster phase. Possibly the most critical vulnerability is the township’s 
lack of self-sufficiency. During a regional disaster, Arthur’s Pass is likely to be isolated 
from other areas and will probably not receive assistance and supplies from outside 
organisations for some time. Improvements to the readiness of the community include the 
purchase and storage of welfare items and emergency equipment and the use of a well-
practiced emergency response and evacuation plan. 
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The response of the community in an emergency situation is largely dependent on the 
coordination and efficiency of emergency agencies and government organisations, so 
producing an up-to-date, adapted version of an emergency plan should be the highest 
priority for Arthur’s Pass emergency managers. The more organised and practiced these 
agencies are, the greater the success of response actions and the lower the vulnerability of 
the township.  
 
Finally, the recovery of the village in a post-disaster phase is greatly controlled by the 
success of the reduction, readiness and response efforts before and during a hazard event. 
The vulnerability of the village is expected to decrease through the implementation of 
these risk reduction measures, which will greatly benefit the village and its community in 
the future.  
 
9.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. Prior to this study, there was a lack of detailed natural hazard information for the 
Arthur’s Pass region.  
2. The most significant natural hazards affecting the township are earthquakes, 
landslides, debris flows, rockfalls and river flooding and erosion. Many of the 
identified hazards are interdependent, and act as a trigger or catalyst for other 
hazard events.  
3. Hazard maps for events of >2%, 2%-0.2% and <0.2 % annual exceedence 
probabilities (0-50, 50-500 and 500+ year average return periods) demonstrate that 
future hazards will take place over a variety of temporal and spatial scales, some 
with serious consequences on the village.  
4. There is potential for several catastrophic events to take place within the Bealey 
Valley, as a result of landslide damming, flooding and high intensity fault ruptures. 
5. Climate change and global warming will affect weather patterns and increase the 
unpredictability of natural hazards in the Arthur’s Pass region.  
6. Vulnerabilities at Arthur’s Pass are evident in social, structural and infrastructural 
elements of the village. Improvements to the reduction and readiness of the village 
for natural hazards are required to reduce the town’s vulnerability.  
7. The emergency plan for Arthur’s Pass requires modifications to include specific 
details, including: 
- resident contact information and specialist skills,  
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- response procedures,  
- land use planning,  
- preparedness aspects such as arrangements for the purchase, storage and use of 
welfare and emergency equipment to be used during a disaster.  
 
9.8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
 
This study was by no means exhaustive and was limited by the availability of historical 
data, the accessibility of field areas and the lack of an in depth investigation of the 
geomorphic environment. There is great potential for further research in the Arthur’s Pass 
study area: 
1. It is recommended that an in depth investigation of slope stability for various slopes 
within the Arthur’s Pass National Park should be undertaken in an attempt to 
expose previously unnoticed weaknesses in the mountains surrounding the 
township. 
2. The incidence and timing of debris flow events in the Bealey Valley may require 
further evaluation as the analysis of previous debris flows at Arthur’s Pass was 
severely limited by the lack of evidence and recorded data. The dating and detailed 
mapping of debris surfaces was considered beyond the scope of this study but is a 
good topic for research in the future. 
3. A hazard vulnerability assessment of similar structure as this research would be of 
use for the Otira village (14km north of Arthur’s Pass) as problems caused along 
the highway and within the Otira township would have consequences on the 
effectiveness of Arthur’s Pass emergency procedures. It may be possible for the 
two villages to work simultaneously to progressively reduce the vulnerability of 
both villages. Because in many ways the towns have very similar characteristics, it 
would be necessary for the Otira village to implement risk reduction methods also.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
 
 
Arthur’s Pass Climate Data 
 
 
 
This appendix shows the short-term trends in climate data for the Arthur’s Pass region, 
outlined in Chapter 2 and discussed further in Chapter 4. Temperature data from 1978 to 
2006 were used to graphically represent the average monthly minimum and maximum 
temperatures, and the maximum and minimum average annual temperature. Rainfall data 
from 1955 to 2006 were used to show rainfall days per year, monthly rainfall averages, 
yearly rainfall averages and yearly rainfall for each month (NIWA, 2007).  
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Arthur's Pass - Average January Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 7. Average January rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
 
 
 
Arthur's Pass - Average February Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 8. Average February rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
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Arthur's Pass - Average March Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 9. Average March rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
 
 
 
Arthur's Pass - Average April Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 10. Average April rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
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Arthur's Pass - Average May Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 11. Average May rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
 
 
 
Arthur's Pass - Average June Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 12. Average June rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
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Arthur's Pass - Average July Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 13. Average July rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
 
 
 
Arthur's Pass - Average August Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 14. Average August rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
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Arthur's Pass - Average September Rainfall 1955-2006
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
19
55
19
57
19
59
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
R
A
IN
FA
LL
 (m
m
)
September
Linear (September)
  
Appendix A. 15. Average September rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
 
 
 
Arthur's Pass - Average October Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 16. Average October rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
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Arthur's Pass - Average November Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 17. Average November rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
 
 
 
Arthur's Pass - Average December Rainfall 1955-2006
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Appendix A. 18. Average December rainfall at Arthur’s Pass from 1955 to 2006 (NIWA, 2007). 
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APPENDIX B  
 
 
 
Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale 
 
 
 
This appendix explains the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (MM) classification system 
for earthquakes, which quantifies the effects of ground shaking on objects and structures 
on the Earth’s surface, discussed in Chapter 3. MM I represents the lowest form of gentle 
ground shaking, whilst MM X+ is classified as catastrophic (Duff & Holmes, 1993; K. 
Smith, 2004). 
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MM Classification Description of effects 
I Instrumental Not felt by people, detected by seismographs. 
II Feeble Felt by people at rest and in favourable locations, especially in 
tall buildings, some animals disturbed. 
III Slight Small vibrations, felt quite noticeably indoors, similar to a 
truck passing, may not be recognised as an earthquake, 
possible to estimate duration. 
IV Moderate Suspended items swing, loose items shaken, standing cars 
rock, walls creak. 
V Moderately 
strong 
Felt by most people indoors and outdoors, sleepers awakened, 
household items displaced, doors swing open and shut, 
possible to estimate direction. 
VI Strong Felt by all, difficulty walking, trees and buildings sway, 
suspended items swing greatly, objects dislodged and 
damaged, furniture moved or overturned.  
VII Very strong General panic, difficulty standing, noticed by drivers, walls 
crack, masonry destabilises, slight building damage. 
VIII Destructive Difficulty driving vehicles, masonry cracked, chimneys fall, 
pipes rupture, partial collapse of many buildings, houses 
moved on foundations, branches broken from trees, changes in 
flow or temperature of springs and wells, cracks in slopes and 
on wet ground. 
IX Ruinous Widespread panic, houses seriously damaged, large ground 
fissures, underground pipes broken, damage to reservoirs, 
buildings shifted off foundations and timber frames warped. 
X Disastrous Large landslides, railway lines warped, most masonry and 
framed buildings destroyed, serious damage to dams and 
embankments, ground heavily cracked. 
XI Very 
disastrous 
Large and widespread ground fissures, few buildings remain 
standing, railway lines bent greatly, pipelines completely out 
of service, bridges destroyed. 
XII Catastrophic Damage nearly total, waves seen on ground surface, large rock 
masses displaced, objects thrown into the air, lines of sight and 
level distorted. 
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APPENDIX C  
 
 
 
Probabilistic Seismic Estimates of Ground Shaking 
Intensity at Arthur’s Pass 
 
 
 
This appendix shows the most recent probability estimates for ground shaking intensity for 
different return periods; 50 years, 150 years, 475 years and 1000 years (Stirling et al., 
2007). Because of its location close to several major plate boundary faults, Arthur’s Pass 
lies within very close proximity to the zones of highest ground shaking intensity. This 
indicates that it is at high risk from seismic shaking in the future and may potentially 
experience ground shaking up to MM X, which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Appendix C. 1. Updated probabilistic seismic ground shaking estimate for the Canterbury region for a 50 
year return interval, showing Arthur’s Pass in close proximity to the zone of highest ground shaking intensity 
(Stirling et al., 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C. 2. Updated probabilistic seismic ground shaking estimate for the Canterbury region for a 150 
year return interval, showing Arthur’s Pass in close proximity to the zone of highest ground shaking intensity 
(Stirling et al., 2007).  
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Appendix C. 3. Updated probabilistic seismic ground shaking estimate for the Canterbury region for a 475 
year return interval, showing Arthur’s Pass in close proximity to the zone of highest ground shaking intensity 
(Stirling et al., 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C. 4. Updated probabilistic seismic ground shaking estimate for the Canterbury region for a 1000 
year return interval, showing Arthur’s Pass in close proximity to the zone of highest ground shaking intensity 
(Stirling et al., 2007).  
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APPENDIX D  
 
 
 
Assessing Public Perceptions at Arthur’s Pass – 
Visitor Questionnaire 
 
 
This appendix contains a copy of the two-page, anonymous questionnaire distributed to 
random participants in the Arthur’s Pass Visitor Centre. Results from the survey are 
discussed in Chapter 8 and were used to assess the level of natural hazard awareness that 
visitors have, how it contributes to the overall vulnerability of the village and how this 
perception may be improved.  
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An all hazards vulnerability assessment of Arthur’s Pass, South 
Island, New Zealand. 
 
Please read the following note before completing the questionnaire. 
 
NOTE: You are invited to participate in the research project [name of project] by completing the following 
questionnaire. The aim of the project is to assess how visitors to the town perceive the natural hazard 
risk. The information you provide will be used to improve current methods of hazard education to the 
public and will contribute towards increasing visitor safety from natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass. 
 
The project is being carried out [as a requirement for course or degree (where relevant)] by Kate Dundas 
under the supervision of Associate Professor Tim Davies, who can be contacted at (03) 364 2700. They 
will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
 
This questionnaire has been reviewed and approved by the Department of Geological Sciences, 
University of Canterbury. The questionnaire is anonymous, and you will not be identified as a participant 
without your consent. 
 
You may withdraw your participation, including withdrawal of any information you have provided, until 
your questionnaire has been added to the others collected. Because it is anonymous, it cannot be 
retrieved after that. 
 
By completing the questionnaire it will be understood that you have consented to participate in 
the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the project with the 
understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
 
 
A natural hazard is defined as an environmental condition that has the potential to cause a 
disaster, which negatively affects peoples’ lives, property and infrastructure such as roads, 
railways, electricity, communications and water supplies. Examples of natural hazards are 
volcanoes, earthquakes and landslides.  
 
1. Have you seen, read or been told about any natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass since you 
arrived in the village? If yes, please specify___________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Did you have any prior knowledge of possible natural hazards at Arthur’s Pass before 
arriving in the town? If yes, please specify____________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
QUESTIONNAIRE
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3. Please rate the level of risk you think the following hazards pose to the Arthur’s Pass 
village (0 = no risk at all, 5 = very high risk): 
 
             NO RISK         VERY HIGH RISK 
• Earthquakes      0       1       2       3       4       5 
• Strong winds      0       1       2       3       4       5 
• Thunderstorms     0       1       2       3       4       5 
• Heavy snowfalls     0       1       2       3       4       5 
• Snow avalanches     0       1       2       3       4       5 
• Landslides and rockfalls    0       1       2       3       4       5 
• Floods       0       1       2       3       4       5 
• Debris flows (fast flowing, sediment-rich floods) 0       1       2       3       4       5 
• River erosion (the removal of river sediments)  0       1       2       3       4       5 
• River sedimentation (the build up of river sediments) 0       1       2       3       4       5 
 
4. Have you observed any emergency evacuation plans since arriving in the town? If yes, 
please give details._______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Would you feel confident knowing what to do if a hazard event did occur in the 
village?________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.  Are you aware of any protective measures against natural hazards that are currently in 
place at Arthur’s Pass?___________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Do you think the hazards are well managed?__________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Are there any improvements to safety from natural hazards that you feel are necessary? 
i.e. better education schemes, physical barriers protecting the village, etc? If yes, please 
specify ________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
